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ORCIDSynthese, Volume 198
Volume 198, Number 1, January 2021
- Josefine Lomholt Pallavicini
, Bjørn G. Hallsson, Klemens Kappel:
Polarization in groups of Bayesian agents. 1-55 - Patrick Dieveney:
Scientific explanation, unifying mathematics, and indispensability arguments (A new Cicada MES). 57-77 - Lauren N. Ross:
Causal explanation and the periodic table. 79-103 - Jonathan Tallant, Sam Baron:
It's one thing to rule them all and another thing to bind them. 105-115 - Christoph Merdes:
Strategy and the pursuit of truth. 117-138 - Christina Easton:
Women and 'the philosophical personality': evaluating whether gender differences in the Cognitive Reflection Test have significance for explaining the gender gap in Philosophy. 139-167 - Eamon Darnell, Aaron Thomas-Bolduc:
Is Hume's Principle analytic? 169-185 - Lorenz Demey:
Aristotelian diagrams for semantic and syntactic consequence. 187-207 - Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira:
Representationalism is a dead end. 209-235 - James F. Woodward:
Explanatory autonomy: the role of proportionality, stability, and conditional irrelevance. 237-265 - Ziqian Zhou:
What the progressive aspect tells us about processes. 267-293 - Anthony Nguyen:
A functional naturalism. 295-313 - Indrek Reiland:
On experiencing moral properties. 315-325 - Steffen Koch:
The externalist challenge to conceptual engineering. 327-348 - Ludger van Dijk, Erik Rietveld:
Situated anticipation. 349-371 - Stephen John:
Scientific deceit. 373-394 - Michael Duncan, Kristie Miller, James Norton:
Ditching determination and dependence: or, how to wear the crazy trousersa. 395-418 - Jamie Shaw:
Feyerabend's well-ordered science: how an anarchist distributes funds. 419-449 - Valentin Lageard, Cédric Paternotte:
Trolls, bans and reverts: simulating Wikipedia. 451-470 - Steven Bland:
Cognitive bias, situationism, and virtue reliabilism. 471-490 - Milos Kosterec:
On the essence of empty properties. 491-507 - Ilho Park:
Correcting credences with chances. 509-536 - Robert Northcott:
Pre-emption cases may support, not undermine, the counterfactual theory of causation. 537-555 - Joshua DiPaolo:
The word of a reluctant convert. 557-582 - Kenneth Boyce:
Why inference to the best explanation doesn't secure empirical grounds for mathematical platonism. 583-595 - Rico Hauswald:
The epistemic effects of close entanglements between research fields and activist movements. 597-614 - Bogdan Dicher, Francesco Paoli:
The original sin of proof-theoretic semantics. 615-640 - Jordi Fernández:
Observer memory and immunity to error through misidentification. 641-660 - Kyle Banick:
How to be an adverbialist about phenomenal intentionality. 661-686 - Francesco Bellucci:
Analysis and decomposition in Peirce. 687-706 - David Fisher:
A conflict between van Inwagen's metaontology and his ontology. 707-722 - René van Woudenberg:
Reading as a source of knowledge. 723-742 - Daniel Coren:
Epistemic conservatism and bare beliefs. 743-756 - Angelo Turri, John Turri:
Lying, fast and slow. 757-775 - Alexander R. Pruss:
Underdetermination of infinitesimal probabilities. 777-799 - Efraim Wallach:
Historiographic narratives and empirical evidence: a case study. 801-821 - Oisín Deery:
Free actions as a natural kind. 823-843 - François Kammerer:
The illusion of conscious experience. 845-866 - Blazej Skrzypulec:
The nonclassical mereology of olfactory experiences. 867-886
Volume 198, Number 2, February 2021
- Kit Fine:
Truthmaking and the is-ought gap. 887-914 - Ashley Coates:
Essence and the inference problem. 915-931 - Igor Sedlár:
Hyperintensional logics for everyone. 933-956 - Peter Finocchiaro:
Ideology and its role in metaphysics. 957-983 - Hichem Naar:
The possibility of fitting love: irreplaceability and selectivity. 985-1010 - François Jaquet:
A debunking argument against speciesism. 1011-1027 - Eugen Fischer, Paul E. Engelhardt, Joachim Horvath, Hiroshi Ohtani:
Experimental ordinary language philosophy: a cross-linguistic study of defeasible default inferences. 1029-1070 - Michael Roche, William Roche:
Authority without privilege: How to be a Dretskean conciliatory skeptic on self-knowledge. 1071-1087 - Nicholas Smyth:
Moral disagreement and non-moral ignorance. 1089-1108 - Corey Dethier:
Forces in a true and physical sense: from mathematical models to metaphysical conclusions. 1109-1122 - Julian J. Schlöder:
Counterfactual knowability revisited. 1123-1137 - Charles Neil:
Safety, domination, and differential support. 1139-1152 - Mark Satta:
Evil twins and the multiverse: distinguishing the world of difference between epistemic and physical possibility. 1153-1160 - Ellen Lehet:
Induction and explanatory definitions in mathematics. 1161-1175 - Philip Trammell:
Fixed-point solutions to the regress problem in normative uncertainty. 1177-1199 - Seyed Mohammad Yarandi:
Externalism and critical reasoning: a reconsideration. 1201-1216 - Andrea Oldofredi:
Some remarks on the mentalistic reformulation of the measurement problem: a reply to S. Gao. 1217-1233 - Theodore D. Locke:
Counterpossibles for modal normativists. 1235-1257 - Chao Xu, Yanjing Wang, Thomas Studer:
A logic of knowing why. 1259-1285 - Daniel Steel, Sina Fazelpour, Bianca Crewe, Kinley Gillette:
Information elaboration and epistemic effects of diversity. 1287-1307 - Rebecca Lea Morris:
Do mathematical explanations have instrumental value? 1309-1328 - Michael T. Stuart:
Towards a dual process epistemology of imagination. 1329-1350 - Sebastian Lutz:
Generalizing empirical adequacy II: partial structures. 1351-1380 - John Donaldson:
Vertical versus horizontal: What is really at issue in the exclusion problem? 1381-1396 - Mariana Vitti Rodrigues, Claus Emmeche:
Abduction and styles of scientific thinking. 1397-1425 - Nick Byrd:
What we can (and can't) infer about implicit bias from debiasing experiments. 1427-1455 - Daniel Ari Friedman, Eirik Søvik:
The ant colony as a test for scientific theories of consciousness. 1457-1480 - Mario Attie-Picker:
Is the folk concept of luck normative? 1481-1515 - Anastasia Kozyreva, Ralph Hertwig:
The interpretation of uncertainty in ecological rationality. 1517-1547 - James Andrew Smith:
Quine on naturalism, nominalism, and philosophy's place within science. 1549-1567 - Daniel Coren:
Evaluating epistemic virtues. 1569-1578 - Nicola Spinelli:
Is self-identity essential to objects? 1579-1595 - Søren Overgaard, Alessandro Salice:
Consciousness, belief, and the group mind hypothesis. 1597-1621 - M. Hosein M. A. Khalaj:
Knowledge-how and the problems of masking and finkishness. 1623-1641 - Stephan Krämer:
Ground-theoretic equivalence. 1643-1683 - George Darby, Martin Pickup:
Modelling deep indeterminacy. 1685-1710 - Pablo Acuña:
Charting the landscape of interpretation, theory rivalry, and underdetermination in quantum mechanics. 1711-1740 - Benjamin Elzinga:
Intellectualizing know how. 1741-1760 - Patrick Bondy:
The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief. 1761-1781 - Pierre Saint-Germier:
Getting Gettier straight: thought experiments, deviant realizations and default interpretations. 1783-1806 - Arno Schubbach:
Judging machines: philosophical aspects of deep learning. 1807-1827 - Emily Prychitko:
The causal situationist account of constitutive relevance. 1829-1843 - Keith Harris:
Knowledge-how and false belief. 1845-1861
Volume 198, Number 3-S, February 2021
- Javier Cumpa:
Editor's introduction. 759-761 - Berit Brogaard, Bartek Chomanski, Dimitria Electra Gatzia:
Consciousness and information integration. 763-792 - Valerio Buonomo:
The scientific turn in metaphysics: a factualist approach. 793-807 - Paul Coates:
Perception naturalised: relocation and the sensible qualities. 809-829 - Luis Fernández Moreno:
Language and metaphysics: the case of theoretical identities. 831-848 - John Heil:
Truthmaking and fundamentality. 849-860 - Walter Sinnott-Armstrong:
Contrastive mental causation. 861-883 - Robert C. Koons:
The ontological and epistemological superiority of hylomorphism. 885-903
Volume 198, Number 4, April 2021
- Helen E. Longino:
Scaling up; scaling down: What's missing? 2849-2863 - Ethan Nowak:
Complex demonstratives, hidden arguments, and presupposition. 2865-2900 - Henrik Rydenfelt:
Realism without representationalism. 2901-2918 - Jonathan Fuller:
The myth and fallacy of simple extrapolation in medicine. 2919-2939 - Uwe Peters:
Teleology and mentalizing in the explanation of action. 2941-2957 - Stefano Predelli:
Four Dthats. 2959-2972 - Sebastian De Haro, Jeremy Butterfield:
On symmetry and duality. 2973-3013 - Christopher S. Hill:
Unrevisability. 3015-3031 - Jan Heylen, Lars Arthur Tump:
The Enhanced Indispensability Argument, the circularity problem, and the interpretability strategy. 3033-3045 - Alison Duncan Kerr:
A plea for KR. 3047-3071 - Arthur Schipper:
Fundamental truthmakers and non-fundamental truths. 3073-3098 - Silver Bronzo:
Propositional complexity and the Frege-Geach Point. 3099-3130 - Ezequiel López-Rubio, Emanuele Ratti:
Data science and molecular biology: prediction and mechanistic explanation. 3131-3156 - Matthew Simpson:
Deflationism and truthmaking. 3157-3181 - Kirk Lougheed:
Catherine Elgin on peerhood and the epistemic benefits of disagreement. 3183-3202 - Douglas Ian Campbell, Yi Yang:
Does the solar system compute the laws of motion? 3203-3220 - Regina E. Fabry, Markus Pantsar:
A fresh look at research strategies in computational cognitive science: The case of enculturated mathematical problem solving. 3221-3263 - Mohan Matthen:
Objects, seeing, and object-seeing. 3265-3288 - Felipe Morales Carbonell:
Mistakes as revealing and as manifestations of competence. 3289-3308 - Gabriele Ferretti:
Visual phenomenology versus visuomotor imagery: How can we be aware of action properties? 3309-3338 - John Woods:
Four grades of ignorance-involvement and how they nourish the cognitive economy. 3339-3368 - Henry Taylor:
Whales, fish and Alaskan bears: interest-relative taxonomy and kind pluralism in biology. 3369-3387 - Thomas A. C. Reydon:
On radical solutions in the philosophy of biology: What does "individuals thinking" actually solve? 3389-3411 - Lowell Abrams, Landon D. C. Elkind:
Word choice in mathematical practice: a case study in polyhedra. 3413-3441 - Sarah Vooys, David G. Dick:
Money and mental contents. 3443-3458 - Erik C. W. Krabbe, Jan Albert Van Laar:
In the quagmire of quibbles: a dialectical exploration. 3459-3476 - Robert Weston Siscoe:
No work for a theory of epistemic dispositions. 3477-3498 - Katie McShane:
Against etiological function accounts of interests. 3499-3517 - Jonathan Mitchell:
Affective representation and affective attitudes. 3519-3546 - Gerd Gigerenzer:
Axiomatic rationality and ecological rationality. 3547-3564 - Massimiliano Carrara, Daniele Chiffi, Ciro De Florio, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen:
We don't know we don't know: asserting ignorance. 3565-3580 - Jennifer Rose Carr:
A modesty proposal. 3581-3601 - Tomasz Placek:
Past, present and future modally introduced. 3603-3624 - Quentin Hiernaux:
History and epistemology of plant behaviour: a pluralistic view? 3625-3650 - Daniel Munro:
Visual and bodily sensational perception: an epistemic asymmetry. 3651-3674 - Harald A. Wiltsche:
The Forever War: understanding, science fiction, and thought experiments. 3675-3698 - Pierrick Bourrat:
Transitions in evolution: a formal analysis. 3699-3731 - Edward Elliott:
Betting against the Zen Monk: on preferences and partial belief. 3733-3758 - Kai Michael Büttner:
Hume's principle: a plea for austerity. 3759-3781 - Alessio Persichetti:
The later Wittgenstein's guide to contradictions. 3783-3799 - Miklós Rédei, Zalán Gyenis:
Having a look at the Bayes Blind Spot. 3801-3832 - Barnaby Walker:
Knowledge first, stability and value. 3833-3854 - Simon Wimmer:
Knowledge-first believing the unknowable. 3855-3871 - Jaana Parviainen, Lauri Lahikainen:
Negative expertise in conditions of manufactured ignorance: epistemic strategies, virtues and skills. 3873-3891 - Marc Lange:
Asymmetry as a challenge to counterfactual accounts of non-causal explanation. 3893-3918 - Arianna Borrelli:
Between symmetry and asymmetry: spontaneous symmetry breaking as narrative knowing. 3919-3948 - John Woods:
What did Frege take Russell to have proved? 3949-3977
Volume 198, Number 5-S, March 2021
- Marianna Antonutti Marfori, Paula Quinon:
Intensionality in mathematics: problems and prospects. 995-999 - Barbara W. Sarnecka:
Learning to represent exact numbers. 1001-1018 - Jan Heylen:
The epistemic significance of numerals. 1019-1045 - Paula Quinon:
Can Church's thesis be viewed as a Carnapian explication? 1047-1074 - Dustin Tucker:
Paradoxes and the limits of theorizing about propositional attitudes. 1075-1094 - Gil Sagi:
Extensionality and logicality. 1095-1119 - Sara Negri:
The intensional side of algebraic-topological representation theorems. 1121-1143 - Luca Tranchini:
Proof-theoretic harmony: towards an intensional account. 1145-1176 - Staffan Angere:
Identity and intensionality in Univalent Foundations and philosophy. 1177-1217
Volume 198, Number 6-S, March 2021
- Donnchadh Ó Conaill, Tuomas E. Tahko:
New frontiers in ground, essence, and modality: introduction. 1219-1230 - Henrik Rydéhn:
Grounding and ontological dependence. 1231-1256 - Michael Wallner:
The ground of ground, essence, and explanation. 1257-1277 - Fabrice Correia:
The logic of relative fundamentality. 1279-1301 - Michele Lubrano:
The emergence of ground: some limitative results. 1303-1315 - Samuele Chilovi:
Grounding entails supervenience. 1317-1334 - Benjamin Schnieder:
On ground and consequence. 1335-1363 - Barbara Vetter:
A plenitude of powers. 1365-1385 - Antonella Mallozzi:
Two notions of metaphysical modality. 1387-1408 - Martin Glazier:
The difference between epistemic and metaphysical necessity. 1409-1424 - Penelope Mackie:
Persistence and modality. 1425-1438 - Mark Jago:
Essential bundle theory and modality. 1439-1454 - Nathan W. Wildman:
Against the reduction of modality to essence. 1455-1471
Volume 198, Number 7-S, April 2021
- Rodrigo Borges:
Introduction to the special issue 'knowledge and justification: new perspectives'. 1473-1480 - Samuel Z. Elgin:
Merely partial definition and the analysis of knowledge. 1481-1505 - Jennifer Nado:
Conceptual engineering, truth, and efficacy. 1507-1527 - Josefa Toribio:
Accessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justification. 1529-1547 - David Jenkins:
Luminosity in the stream of consciousness. 1549-1562 - Nicholas Koziolek:
Inferring as a way of knowing. 1563-1582 - Christoph Kelp:
Inquiry, knowledge and understanding. 1583-1593 - Carlotta Pavese:
Know-how, action, and luck. 1595-1617 - Kevin Wallbridge:
Subject-specific intellectualism: re-examining know how and ability. 1619-1638 - Igal Kvart:
The steering thrust phenomenon in action-directed-pragmatics. 1639-1671 - Matthew A. Benton:
Knowledge, hope, and fallibilism. 1673-1689 - Sarah Wright:
Epistemic harm and virtues of self-evaluation. 1691-1709 - Duncan Pritchard:
Intellectual humility and the epistemology of disagreement. 1711-1723 - Jeffrey Tolly:
Swampman: a dilemma for proper functionalism. 1725-1750 - Harmen Ghijsen:
Predictive processing and foundationalism about perception. 1751-1769 - Juan Comesaña:
Empirical justification and defeasibility. 1771-1786 - Roy Sorensen:
Stealing Harman's Thought: knowledge saboteurs and dogmatists. 1787-1799 - John N. Williams:
Once you think you're wrong, you must be right: new versions of the preface paradox. 1801-1825 - Michael Veber:
A different kind of dream-based skepticism. 1827-1839
Volume 198, Number 8-S, April 2021
- Antonella Mallozzi:
Special issue of synthese on new directions in the epistemology of modality: introduction. 1841-1859 - Justin Clarke-Doane:
Metaphysical and absolute possibility. 1861-1872 - Graham Priest:
Metaphysical necessity: a skeptical perspective. 1873-1885 - Jennifer Wang:
The epistemological objection to modal primitivism. 1887-1898 - Frank Jackson:
Deflationism about the necessary a posteriori and Twin Earth. 1899-1907 - Anand Jayprakash Vaidya, Michael Wallner:
The epistemology of modality and the problem of modal epistemic friction. 1909-1935 - Antonella Mallozzi:
Putting modal metaphysics first. 1937-1956 - Boris Kment:
Essence and modal knowledge. 1957-1979 - Mark Jago:
Knowing how things might have been. 1981-1999 - Bob Hale:
Essence and definition by abstraction. 2001-2017 - Philip Goff:
Essentialist modal rationalism. 2019-2027 - Francesco Berto:
Taming the runabout imagination ticket. 2029-2043 - Stephen Biggs, Jessica Wilson:
Abduction versus conceiving in modal epistemology. 2045-2076 - Amie L. Thomasson:
How can we come to know metaphysical modal truths? 2077-2106 - Gabriel Oak Rabin:
Modal rationalism and the demonstrative reply to the scrutability argument against physicalism. 2107-2134
Volume 198, Number 5, May 2021
- David Alexander:
Fallible reasons on behalf of fallibilism. 3979-3998 - Alison S. Fernandes:
Does the temporal asymmetry of value support a tensed metaphysics? 3999-4016 - Peter J. Lewis, Don Fallis:
Accuracy, conditionalization, and probabilism. 4017-4033 - Dirk Kindermann:
Knowledge embedded. 4035-4055 - Cathal O'Madagain, Michael Tomasello:
Joint attention to mental content and the social origin of reasoning. 4057-4078 - Selene Arfini:
Situated ignorance: the distribution and extension of ignorance in cognitive niches. 4079-4095 - Collin Rice:
Understanding realism. 4097-4121 - Patrick Frierson:
Situationism and intellectual virtue: a Montessori perspective. 4123-4144 - David Glick:
Pluralist structural realism: The best of both worlds? 4145-4166 - Fred D'Agostino:
Growth of knowledge: dual institutionalization of disciplines and brokerage. 4167-4190 - Claudio Calosi:
Determinables, location, and indeterminacy. 4191-4204 - Mousa Mohammadian:
Abduction - the context of discovery + underdetermination = inference to the best explanation. 4205-4228 - Alex Steinberg:
How to properly lose direction. 4229-4250 - Andrew James Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton:
Is our naïve theory of time dynamical? 4251-4271 - Sam Baron, Mark Colyvan, Kristie Miller, Michael Rubin:
Non-naturalistic moral explanation. 4273-4294 - Tamer Nawar:
Veritism refuted? Understanding, idealization, and the facts. 4295-4313 - Abel Suñé, Manolo Martínez:
Real patterns and indispensability. 4315-4330 - Damiano Costa:
An argument against Aristotelian universals. 4331-4338 - J. Dmitri Gallow:
A subjectivist's guide to deterministic chance. 4339-4372 - Maria Doulatova:
Tracking intentionalism and the phenomenology of mental effort. 4373-4389 - Cecilia Heyes:
Is morality a gadget? Nature, nurture and culture in moral development. 4391-4414 - Stefanie Dach:
Sellars, we-intentions and ought-statements. 4415-4439 - Lu Chen:
Do simple infinitesimal parts solve Zeno's paradox of measure? 4441-4456 - E. J. Green:
Binding and differentiation in multisensory object perception. 4457-4491 - Alex James Miller Tate:
A predictive processing theory of motivation. 4493-4521 - Olivier Roy, Anne Schwenkenbecher:
Shared intentions, loose groups, and pooled knowledge. 4523-4541 - Christophe Malaterre, Jean-François Chartier:
Beyond categorical definitions of life: a data-driven approach to assessing lifeness. 4543-4572 - Samuel D. Taylor:
Two kinds of explanatory integration in cognitive science. 4573-4601 - Kathryn S. Plaisance, Alexander V. Graham, John McLevey, Jay Michaud:
Show me the numbers: a quantitative portrait of the attitudes, experiences, and values of philosophers of science regarding broadly engaged work. 4603-4633 - Chris J. Atkinson:
Weighing aims in doxastic deliberation. 4635-4650 - Ryan Cox:
How why-interrogatives work. 4651-4688 - Gloria Andrada:
Mind the notebook. 4689-4708 - Assaf Weksler, Hilla Jacobson, Zohar Z. Bronfman:
The transparency of experience and the neuroscience of attention. 4709-4730 - Christopher Ranalli, René van Woudenberg:
Collective ignorance: an information theoretic account. 4731-4750 - Stephan Leuenberger, Martin Smith:
Epistemic logic without closure. 4751-4774 - Tuomas E. Tahko:
A survey of logical realism. 4775-4790 - Michael D. Kirchhoff, Julian Kiverstein:
How to determine the boundaries of the mind: a Markov blanket proposal. 4791-4810 - Samuel C. Fletcher:
An invitation to approximate symmetry, with three applications to intertheoretic relations. 4811-4831 - Renée Jorgensen Bolinger:
Demographic statistics in defensive decisions. 4833-4850 - Adam J. Andreotta:
Confabulation does not undermine introspection for propositional attitudes. 4851-4872 - Alexander Gebharter, Florian Fischer:
A causal Bayes net analysis of dispositions. 4873-4895 - Yuval Avnur:
Justification as a loaded notion. 4897-4916 - Chiwook Won:
Mental causation as joint causation. 4917-4937 - Johannes Himmelreich:
Existence, really? Tacit disagreements about "existence" in disputes about group minds and corporate agents. 4939-4953
Volume 198, Number 6, June 2021
- Emma C. Gordon:
Elgin on understanding: How does it involve know-how, endorsement and factivity? 4955-4972 - Ronald W. J. Meester, Timber Kerkvliet:
The infinite epistemic regress problem has no unique solution. 4973-4983 - Klaas J. Kraay:
Elgin's community-oriented steadfastness. 4985-5008 - Daniel Story:
Joint action without robust theory of mind. 5009-5026 - Nicolas Troquard:
Tracking and managing deemed abilities. 5027-5045 - Roberto Ciuni, Giovanni Tuzet:
Inevitable ignorance as a standard for excusability: an epistemological analysis. 5047-5066 - Tommaso Piazza:
The value of truth and the normativity of evidence. 5067-5088 - Maximilian Noichl:
Modeling the structure of recent philosophy. 5089-5100 - Jonathan Nebel:
Doubting Pritchard's account of hinge propositions. 5101-5113 - Christa M. Johnson:
Resolutions, salient reasons, and weakness of will. 5115-5138 - Sebastian De Haro:
Theoretical equivalence and duality. 5139-5177 - Raja Rosenhagen:
Norwood Russell Hanson's account of experience: an untimely defense. 5179-5204 - Aldo Filomeno:
Are non-accidental regularities a cosmic coincidence? Revisiting a central threat to Humean laws. 5205-5227 - Luca Gasparri, Michael Murez:
Hearing meanings: the revenge of context. 5229-5252 - Berta Grimau:
In defence of Higher-Level Plural Logic: drawing conclusions from natural language. 5253-5280 - Joshua M. Mozersky:
Nominalism, contingency, and natural structure. 5281-5296 - Justin Mooney:
Self-colocation: a colocation puzzle for endurantists. 5297-5309 - David Papineau:
The disvalue of knowledge. 5311-5332 - David Papineau:
Correction to: The disvalue of knowledge. 5333 - Fabian Hundertmark:
Explaining how to perceive the new: causal-informational teleosemantics and productive response functions. 5335-5350 - Ben Holguín:
Lying and knowing. 5351-5371 - Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Louis Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Karen Kovaka, Jiin Jung, William J. Berger:
Don't forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget. 5373-5394 - Harmen Ghijsen:
Traits, beliefs and dispositions in a pluralistic folk psychology. 5395-5413 - Soazig Le Bihan:
Partial truth versus felicitous falsehoods. 5415-5436 - Lisa Bortolotti, Ema Sullivan-Bissett:
Is choice blindness a case of self-ignorance? 5437-5454 - Charles Côté-Bouchard:
Two types of epistemic instrumentalism. 5455-5475 - Keshav Singh:
Evidentialism doesn't make an exception for belief. 5477-5494 - Brandon Boesch:
Scientific representation and dissimilarity. 5495-5513 - Duncan Pritchard:
Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth. 5515-5528 - Marko-Luka Zubcic:
Ignorance, norms and instrumental pluralism: Hayekian institutional epistemology. 5529-5545 - Günther Eder:
Frege and the origins of model theory in nineteenth century geometry. 5547-5575 - Ashton T. Sperry-Taylor:
Reassessing equilibrium explanations: When are they causal explanations? 5577-5598 - Aydin Mohseni, Cailin O'Connor, Hannah Rubin:
On the emergence of minority disadvantage: testing the cultural Red King hypothesis. 5599-5621 - Toby Charles Penhallurick Solomon:
Causal decision theory's predetermination problem. 5623-5654 - Ylwa Sjölin Wirling:
An integrative design? How liberalised modal empiricism fails the integration challenge. 5655-5673 - Paal Fjeldvig Antonsen:
Fictional reports. 5675-5688 - Eilidh Harrison:
Seemings, truth-makers, and epistemic justification. 5689-5708 - Rodrigo Díaz, Manuel Almagro:
You are just being emotional! Testimonial injustice and folk-psychological attributions. 5709-5730 - James T. M. Miller:
A bundle theory of words. 5731-5748 - Patricia Rich, Mark Blokpoel, Ronald de Haan, Maria Otworowska, Marieke Sweers, Todd Wareham, Iris van Rooij:
Naturalism, tractability and the adaptive toolbox. 5749-5784 - Nikolai Alksnis, Jack Reynolds:
Revaluing the behaviorist ghost in enactivism and embodied cognition. 5785-5807 - Mark Rubin:
What type of Type I error? Contrasting the Neyman-Pearson and Fisherian approaches in the context of exact and direct replications. 5809-5834 - Tobias Hansson Wahlberg:
The creation of institutional reality, special theory of relativity, and mere Cambridge change. 5835-5860 - Kian Salimkhani:
Explaining unification in physics internally. 5861-5882 - Xingming Hu:
In what sense is understanding an intellectual virtue? 5883-5895 - Erica Shumener:
Humeans are out of this world. 5897-5916 - Ekaterina Kubyshkina, Mattia Petrolo:
A logic for factive ignorance. 5917-5928 - Sille Obelitz Søe:
A unified account of information, misinformation, and disinformation. 5929-5949 - Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen:
Correction to: Non-rational action in the face of disagreement: an argument against (strong) non-conformism. 5951
Volume 198, Number 9-S, May 2021
- Alistair M. C. Isaac, Dave Ward:
Introduction. 2135-2151 - Uljana Feest:
Gestalt psychology, frontloading phenomenology, and psychophysics. 2153-2173 - Edward Baggs, Anthony Chemero:
Radical embodiment in two directions. 2175-2190 - Liliana Albertazzi:
Experimental phenomenology: What it is and what it is not. 2191-2212 - Gary Hatfield:
Gibson and Gestalt: (re)presentation, processing, and construction. 2213-2241 - Robin M. Muller:
Merleau-Ponty and the radical sciences of mind. 2243-2277 - Julian Kiverstein, Ludger van Dijk, Erik Rietveld:
The field and landscape of affordances: Koffka's two environments revisited. 2279-2296 - Benjamin Sheredos:
Merleau-Ponty's implicit critique of the new mechanists. 2297-2321 - Hayden Kee:
Phenomenology and naturalism in autopoietic and radical enactivism: exploring sense-making and continuity from the top down. 2323-2343 - Matthew Crippen:
Aesthetics and action: situations, emotional perception and the Kuleshov effect. 2345-2363 - Sarah Pawlett Jackson:
Gestalt structures in multi-person intersubjectivity. 2365-2382
Volume 198, Number 10-S, May 2021
- Jonathan Michael Kaplan, Sean Valles:
Reflecting on what philosophy of epidemiology is and does, as the field comes into its own: Introduction to the Special Issue on Philosophy of Epidemiology. 2383-2392 - Joby Varghese:
Influence and prioritization of non-epistemic values in clinical trial designs: a study of Ebola ça Suffit trial. 2393-2409 - Peter J. Taylor:
Critical epidemiological literacy: understanding ideas better when placed in relation to alternatives. 2411-2438 - Shelbi Nahwilet Meissner:
How does the consideration of Indigenous identities in the US complicate conversations about tracking folk racial categories in epidemiologic research? 2439-2462 - Till Grüne-Yanoff:
Choosing the right model for policy decision-making: the case of smallpox epidemiology. 2463-2484 - Sabina Leonelli, Niccoló Tempini:
Where health and environment meet: the use of invariant parameters in big data analysis. 2485-2504 - Jon Williamson:
Establishing the teratogenicity of Zika and evaluating causal criteria. 2505-2518 - Jon Williamson:
Correction to: Establishing the teratogenicity of Zika and evaluating causal criteria. 2519 - Leah M. McClimans:
First person epidemiological measures: vehicles for patient centered care. 2521-2537 - Keekok Lee:
Epidemiology is ecosystem science. 2539-2567 - Dana Tulodziecki:
How (not) to think about theory-change in epidemiology. 2569-2588 - Sean Valles:
A pluralistic and socially responsible philosophy of epidemiology field should actively engage with social determinants of health and health disparities. 2589-2611 - Alex Broadbent:
The C-word, the P-word, and realism in epidemiology. 2613-2628 - Saana Jukola:
Commercial interests, agenda setting, and the epistemic trustworthiness of nutrition science. 2629-2646
Volume 198, Number 7, July 2021
- T. G. Murphy:
An encoding approach to Ante Rem structuralism. 5953-5976 - Alexander Motchoulski:
Adjudicating distributive disagreement. 5977-6008 - Joeri Witteveen:
Evolutionary debunking arguments and the explanatory scope of natural selection. 6009-6024 - Jon Marc Asper:
Subjective values should be sharp. 6025-6043 - Peter Fritz:
Structure by proxy, with an application to grounding. 6045-6063 - Péter Fazekas, Balázs Gyenis, Gábor Hofer-Szabó, Gergely Kertész:
A dynamical systems approach to causation. 6065-6087 - Jan Almäng:
Twin Earth and perceptual content. 6089-6109 - Michael Barkasi:
Are there epistemic conditions necessary for demonstrative thought? 6111-6138 - Sim-Hui Tee:
Mechanisms and generative material models. 6139-6157 - H. Orri Stefánsson:
Ambiguity aversion behind the veil of ignorance. 6159-6182 - Byron Simmons:
Fundamental non-qualitative properties. 6183-6206 - Maciej Witek:
Illocution and accommodation in the functioning of presumptions. 6207-6244 - Michael Esfeld:
Super-Humeanism and free will. 6245-6258 - Chris Dragos:
Epistemic autonomy and group knowledge. 6259-6279 - Benjamin Marschall:
Easy Ontology, quantification, and realism. 6281-6295 - Konrad Werner:
Cognitive confinement: theoretical considerations on the construction of a cognitive niche, and on how it can go wrong. 6297-6328 - Charles Lassiter:
Arational belief convergence. 6329-6350 - Jane Suilin Lavelle:
The impact of culture on mindreading. 6351-6374 - Paul Tappenden:
Everettian theory as pure wave mechanics plus a no-collapse probability postulate. 6375-6402 - David Fisher, Hao Hong, Timothy Perrine:
A challenge to the new metaphysics: deRosset, Priority, and explanation. 6403-6433 - Julie Zahle:
Limits to levels in the methodological individualism-holism debate. 6435-6454 - Regina E. Fabry:
Getting it: A predictive processing approach to irony comprehension. 6455-6489 - Chris Mays:
Ignorance as a productive response to epistemic perturbations. 6491-6507 - Sean Aas:
Prosthetic embodiment. 6509-6532 - Pasi Valtonen:
Generic inferential rules for slurs: Dummett and Williamson on ethnic pejoratives. 6533-6551 - Gregory Currie, Xuanqi Zhu:
Aesthetic sense and social cognition: a story from the Early Stone Age. 6553-6572 - Tadeusz W. Zawidzki:
A new perspective on the relationship between metacognition and social cognition: metacognitive concepts as socio-cognitive tools. 6573-6596 - Baptiste Bedessem:
Two conceptions of the sources of conservatism in scientific research. 6597-6614 - Joshua Gert:
Transparency, representationalism, and visual noise. 6615-6629 - Matthew Rellihan:
Strengthening the exclusion argument. 6631-6659 - Christian de Ronde, César Massri:
A new objective definition of quantum entanglement as potential coding of intensive and effective relations. 6661-6688 - Pierrick Bourrat:
Heritability, causal influence and locality. 6689-6715 - Kate Nolfi:
Epistemic norms, all things considered. 6717-6737 - Julia Staffel:
Normative uncertainty and probabilistic moral knowledge. 6739-6765 - Johanna Thoma:
Judgementalism about normative decision theory. 6767-6787 - Francesca Ervas:
Metaphor, ignorance and the sentiment of (ir)rationality. 6789-6813 - Anika Fiebich:
In defense of pluralist theory. 6815-6834 - Anika Fiebich:
Correction to: In defense of pluralist theory. 6835 - Kenneth Boyd:
Group understanding. 6837-6858 - Insa Lawler:
Scientific understanding and felicitous legitimate falsehoods. 6859-6887 - Seth Lazar, Peter A. Graham:
Deontological decision theory and lesser-evil options. 6889-6916 - Juliette Vazard:
(Un)reasonable doubt as affective experience: obsessive-compulsive disorder, epistemic anxiety and the feeling of uncertainty. 6917-6934 - Jim Hutchinson:
Why can't what is true be valuable? 6935-6954
Volume 198, Number 11-S, June 2021
- Anna Marmodoro, Michele Paolini Paoletti:
Introduction to the special issue on form, structure and hylomorphism. 2647-2656 - John Heil:
Hylomorphism: what's not to like? 2657-2670 - Michele Paolini Paoletti:
Structures as relations. 2671-2690 - Jeremy W. Skrzypek:
From potency to act: hyloenergeism. 2691-2716 - Travis Dumsday:
Can a relational substance ontology be hylomorphic? 2717-2734 - Thomas Sattig:
Part, slot, ground: foundations for neo-Aristotelian mereology. 2735-2749 - Robert C. Koons:
Thermal substances: a Neo-Aristotelian ontology of the quantum world. 2751-2772 - Matteo Morganti:
Quantum entanglement: a hylomorphic account. 2773-2793 - John G. Brungardt:
World enough and form: why cosmology needs hylomorphism. 2795-2827 - Matthew Owen:
Circumnavigating the causal pairing problem with hylomorphism and the integrated information theory of consciousness. 2829-2851
Volume 198, Number 12-S, June 2021
- Luis Fernández Moreno:
Reflection on natural kinds. Introduction to the special issue on natural kinds: language, science, and metaphysics. 2853-2862 - Richard Boyd:
Rethinking natural kinds, reference and truth: towards more correspondence with reality, not less. 2863-2903 - Richard Boyd:
Correction to: Rethinking natural kinds, reference and truth: towards more correspondence with reality, not less. 2905 - Olivier Lemeire:
No purely epistemic theory can account for the naturalness of kinds. 2907-2925 - Sophie R. Allen:
Kinds behaving badly: intentional action and interactive kinds. 2927-2956 - Stephen P. Schwartz:
Against rigidity for natural kind terms. 2957-2971 - Genoveva Martí, Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña:
Tolerance, flexibility and the application of kind terms. 2973-2986 - Ted Parent:
A dilemma about kinds and kind terms. 2987-3006 - Elena Casetta, Davide Vecchi:
Species are, at the same time, kinds and individuals: a causal argument based on an empirical approach to species identity. 3007-3025 - Caleb C. Hazelwood:
The species category as a scientific kind. 3027-3040 - Marion Godman:
Scientific realism with historical essences: the case of species. 3041-3057 - Robert van Rooij, Katrin Schulz:
Natural kinds and dispositions: a causal analysis. 3059-3084 - Max A. Freund:
Predication and sortal concepts. 3085-3106
Volume 198, Number 13-S, June 2021
- Gabriele Gava:
Introduction: Kant's philosophical method and contemporary perspectives in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and ethics. 3107-3111 - Karl Schafer:
A Kantian virtue epistemology: rational capacities and transcendental arguments. 3113-3136 - Thomas Land:
Epistemic agency and the self-knowledge of reason: on the contemporary relevance of Kant's method of faculty analysis. 3137-3154 - Robert Audi:
Methodological reflections on Kant's ethical theory. 3155-3170 - Tobias Rosefeldt:
Kant on the epistemic role of the imagination. 3171-3192 - Jessica Leech:
The function of modal judgment and the Kantian gap. 3193-3212 - Eric Watkins:
What real progress has metaphysics made since the time of Kant? Kant and the metaphysics of grounding. 3213-3229 - Dietmar Heidemann:
Kant and the forms of realism. 3231-3252 - Andrew Stephenson:
How to solve the knowability paradox with transcendental epistemology. 3253-3278 - Michela Massimi:
Points of view: Kant on perspectival knowledge. 3279-3296
Volume 198, Number 14-S, June 2021
- Catherine Herfeld, Milena Ivanova:
Introduction: first principles in science - their status and justification. 3297-3308 - Kevin D. Hoover:
First principles, fallibilism, and economics. 3309-3327 - Catherine Herfeld:
Understanding the rationality principle in economics as a functional a priori principle. 3329-3358 - Alexander Linsbichler:
Austrian economics without extreme apriorism: construing the fundamental axiom of praxeology as analytic. 3359-3390 - Robin Findlay Hendry:
Elements and (first) principles in chemistry. 3391-3411 - Samir Okasha:
The strategy of endogenization in evolutionary biology. 3413-3435 - Michele Luchetti:
Constitutive elements in science beyond physics: the case of the Hardy-Weinberg principle. 3437-3461 - Matteo Colombo, Cory Wright:
First principles in the life sciences: the free-energy principle, organicism, and mechanism. 3463-3488 - Karen Crowther:
Defining a crisis: the roles of principles in the search for a theory of quantum gravity. 3489-3516
Volume 198, Number 15-S, July 2021
- J. Adam Carter, Guillaume Dechauffour, Grégoire Lefftz:
Introduction to special issue: Skepticism and Epistemic Angst. 3517-3519 - Annalisa Coliva:
Strange bedfellows: on Pritchard's disjunctivist hinge epistemology. 3521-3532 - Xiaoxing Zhang:
Closure, deduction and hinge commitments. 3533-3551 - Mona Simion, Johanna Schnurr, Emma C. Gordon:
Epistemic norms, closure, and No-Belief hinge epistemology. 3553-3564 - Matt Jope:
Closure, credence and rationality: a problem for non-belief hinge epistemology. 3565-3575 - Ram Neta:
An evidentialist account of hinges. 3577-3591 - John Greco:
Hinge epistemology and the prospects for a unified theory of knowledge. 3593-3607 - Marion Vorms, Ulrike Hahn:
In the Space of Reasonable Doubt. 3609-3633 - Duncan Pritchard:
Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux. 3635-3664
Volume 198, Number 16-S, July 2021
- Benjamin Eva, Stephan Hartmann:
Reasoning in physics. 3665-3669 - Frank Cabrera:
String theory, non-empirical theory assessment, and the context of pursuit. 3671-3699 - Karen Crowther, Niels S. Linnemann, Christian Wüthrich:
What we cannot learn from analogue experiments. 3701-3726 - Sabine Hossenfelder:
Screams for explanation: finetuning and naturalness in the foundations of physics. 3727-3745 - Adam Koberinski:
Mathematical developments in the rise of Yang-Mills gauge theories. 3747-3777 - Cristin Chall, Martin King, Peter Mättig, Michael Stöltzner:
From a boson to the standard model Higgs: a case study in confirmation and model dynamics. 3779-3811 - Erik Curiel:
Framework confirmation by Newtonian abduction. 3813-3851 - John D. Norton:
Eternal inflation: when probabilities fail. 3853-3875 - Samuel C. Fletcher:
Counterfactual reasoning within physical theories. 3877-3898
Volume 198, Number 17-S, July 2021
- Gabriele Ferretti, Silvano Zipoli Caiani:
Between vision and action: introduction to the special issue. 3899-3911 - Robert Eamon Briscoe:
Bodily awareness and novel multisensory features. 3913-3941 - Berit Brogaard:
Implicit biases in visually guided action. 3943-3967 - Stephen A. Butterfill:
Goals and targets: a developmental puzzle about sensitivity to others' actions. 3969-3990 - Dan Cavedon-Taylor:
Sensorimotor expectations and the visual field. 3991-4006 - Erica Cosentino:
Artifacts and affordances. 4007-4026 - Frédérique de Vignemont:
Peripersonal perception in action. 4027-4044 - Thor Grünbaum:
The two visual systems hypothesis and contrastive underdetermination. 4045-4068 - Bence Nanay:
Perception is not all-purpose. 4069-4080 - Thomas Raleigh:
Visual acquaintance, action and the explanatory gap. 4081-4106 - Melanie Rosen:
Dreaming of a stable world: vision and action in sleep. 4107-4142 - Joshua Shepherd:
Intelligent action guidance and the use of mixed representational formats. 4143-4162 - Josefa Toribio:
Are visuomotor representations cognitively penetrable? Biasing action-guiding vision. 4163-4181 - Silvano Zipoli Caiani:
Intensional biases in affordance perception: an explanatory issue for radical enactivism. 4183-4203
Volume 198, Number 8, August 2021
- Eli Shupe:
Perceiving deviance. 6955-6967 - Haicheng Zhao:
Better virtuous than safe. 6969-6991 - Tore Fjetland Øgaard:
Non-Boolean classical relevant logics I. 6993-7024 - Charles Goldhaber:
Does perceptual psychology rule out disjunctivism in the theory of perception? 7025-7047 - Ivan V. Ivanov:
Properties in sight and in thought. 7049-7071 - Bogdan Dicher:
Requiem for logical nihilism, or: Logical nihilism annihilated. 7073-7096 - Celine Boisserie-Lacroix, Marco Inchingolo:
Empathy for a reason? From understanding agency to phenomenal insight. 7097-7118 - Mauro Rossi:
A perceptual theory of moods. 7119-7147 - August Faller:
How groups persist. 7149-7163 - Emily C. McWilliams:
Evidentialism and belief polarization. 7165-7196 - William Roche, Elliott Sober:
Disjunction and distality: the hard problem for purely probabilistic causal theories of mental content. 7197-7230 - Adam Michael Bricker:
Neural phase: a new problem for the modal account of epistemic luck. 7231-7248 - Constantin C. Brîncus:
Are the open-ended rules for negation categorical? 7249-7256 - James Owen Weatherall, Cailin O'Connor:
Conformity in scientific networks. 7257-7278 - Karen Crowther:
As below, so before: 'synchronic' and 'diachronic' conceptions of spacetime emergence. 7279-7307 - Christopher J. G. Meacham:
Too much of a good thing: decision-making in cases with infinitely many utility contributions. 7309-7349 - Francesca Poggiolesi:
Grounding principles for (relevant) implication. 7351-7376 - Jeremy Avigad:
Reliability of mathematical inference. 7377-7399 - Justin Khoo:
Disjunctive antecedent conditionals. 7401-7430 - Andrew Brenner:
Mereology and ideology. 7431-7448 - Anna-Maria A. Eder:
No commitment to the truth. 7449-7472 - Sara Dellantonio, Luigi Pastore:
Ignorance, misconceptions and critical thinking. 7473-7501 - Lorenzo Magnani:
Computational domestication of ignorant entities. 7503-7532 - Lu Chen:
Intrinsic local distances: a mixed solution to Weyl's tile argument. 7533-7552 - Zeev Goldschmidt, Ittay Nissan-Rozen:
The intrinsic value of risky prospects. 7553-7575 - Edoardo Datteri:
Interactive biorobotics. 7577-7595 - Víctor Fernández Castro, Elisabeth Pacherie:
Joint actions, commitments and the need to belong. 7597-7626 - Cyril Hédoin:
Practical reasoning, rule-following and belief revision: an account in terms of Jeffrey's rule. 7627-7645 - Gregory Nirshberg, Lawrence Shapiro:
Structural and indicator representations: a difference in degree, not kind. 7647-7664 - Joyce C. Havstad:
Complexity begets crosscutting, dooms hierarchy (another paper on natural kinds). 7665-7696 - Michael Schippers, Mark Siebel:
The logic of coherence. 7697-7714 - Gaétan Bovey:
Essence, modality, and intrinsicality. 7715-7737 - Brent G. Kyle:
Truth and ignorance. 7739-7762 - Adam Bales, Claire Benn:
Supererogation and sequence. 7763-7780 - Krzysztof Dolega, Joe E. Dewhurst:
Fame in the predictive brain: a deflationary approach to explaining consciousness in the prediction error minimization framework. 7781-7806 - Daniel Williams:
Motivated ignorance, rationality, and democratic politics. 7807-7827 - Andreas Stokke:
Fictional names and individual concepts. 7829-7859 - Stina Björkholm, Krister Bykvist, Jonas Olson:
Quasi-realism and normative certitude. 7861-7869 - Joulia Smortchkova:
After-effects and the reach of perceptual content. 7871-7890 - Mylan Engel:
Lotteries, knowledge, and inconsistent belief: why you know your ticket will lose. 7891-7921 - Christoph Baumberger, Georg Brun:
Reflective equilibrium and understanding. 7923-7947 - Rik Peels, Duncan Pritchard:
Educating for ignorance. 7949-7963 - Quentin Ruyant:
Semantic realism in the semantic conception of theories. 7965-7983 - Dietmar Heidemann:
Correction to: Kant and the forms of realism. 7985
Volume 198, Number 18-S, August 2021
- Massimiliano Carrara, Giorgio Lando:
Mereology and Identity. 4205-4227 - A. J. Cotnoir:
Is Weak Supplementation analytic? 4229-4245 - Jean-Baptiste Guillon:
Coincidence as parthood. 4247-4276 - Paolo Maffezioli, Achille C. Varzi:
Intuitionistic mereology. 4277-4302 - Lorenzo Azzano:
Structural properties, mereology, and modal magic. 4303-4329 - Meg Wallace:
The polysemy of 'part'. 4331-4354 - Jeroen Smid:
Extensionality for fusions and pluralities. 4355-4374 - Joshua Spencer:
On the explanatory demands of the Special Composition Question. 4375-4388 - Phillip Bricker:
Composition as identity, Leibniz's Law, and slice-sensitive emergent properties. 4389-4409 - Massimiliano Carrara, Giorgio Lando:
Contingent composition as identity. 4411-4440 - Manuel Lechthaler:
No universalism without gunk? Composition as identity and the universality of identity. 4441-4452 - Martin A. Lipman:
On relativist approaches to many-one identity. 4453-4465 - Byeong-Uk Yi:
Is composition identity? 4467-4501 - Claudio Calosi:
Is parthood identity? 4503-4517 - Roberto Loss:
On atomic composition as identity. 4519-4542 - Roberto Loss:
Correction to: On atomic composition as identity. 4543 - Martina Botti:
Composition as analysis: the meta-ontological origins (and future) of composition as identity. 4545-4570 - Jonathan D. Payton:
How to identify wholes with their parts. 4571-4593 - Einar Duenger Bohn:
Composition as identity: pushing forward. 4595-4607 - Evan T. Woods:
Many, but one. 4609-4626
Volume 198, Number 19-S, August 2021
- Martin Carrier, Gürol Irzik:
Responsible research and innovation: coming to grips with an ambitious concept. 4627-4633 - Job Timmermans, Vincent Blok:
A critical hermeneutic reflection on the paradigm-level assumptions underlying responsible innovation. 4635-4666 - Lucien von Schomberg, Vincent Blok:
The turbulent age of innovation. 4667-4683 - Janice Limson:
Putting responsible research and innovation into practice: a case study for biotechnology research, exploring impacts and RRI learning outcomes of public engagement for science students. 4685-4710 - Anke Bueter:
Public epistemic trustworthiness and the integration of patients in psychiatric classification. 4711-4729 - Gürol Irzik, Faik Kurtulmus:
Well-ordered science and public trust in science. 4731-4748 - Martin Carrier:
How to conceive of science for the benefit of society: prospects of responsible research and innovation. 4749-4768 - Ibo van de Poel, Martin Sand:
Varieties of responsibility: two problems of responsible innovation. 4769-4787
Volume 198, Number 20-S, August 2021
- Colin R. Caret, Teresa Kouri Kissel:
Pluralistic perspectives on logic: an introduction. 4789-4800 - Teresa Kouri Kissel:
Metalinguistic negotiation and logical pluralism. 4801-4812 - Nicole Wyatt, Gillman Payette:
Against logical generalism. 4813-4830 - Rea Golan:
Is there a neutral metalanguage? 4831-4858 - Christopher Blake-Turner, Gillian Russell:
Logical pluralism without the normativity. 4859-4877 - Filippo Ferrari, Eugenio Orlandelli:
Proof-theoretic pluralism. 4879-4903 - Suki Finn:
Limiting logical pluralism. 4905-4923 - Stewart Shapiro, Michael Lynch:
Does logical pluralism imply, or suggest, truth pluralism, or vice versa? 4925-4936 - Graham Priest:
A note on mathematical pluralism and logical pluralism. 4937-4946 - Colin R. Caret:
Why logical pluralism? 4947-4968 - Rohan French:
A dialogical route to logical pluralism. 4969-4989 - Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Matias Pailos, Damián Enrique Szmuc:
Substructural logics, pluralism and collapse. 4991-5007
Volume 198, Number 9, September 2021
- M. Emrah Aktunc:
Productive theory-ladenness in fMRI. 7987-8003 - Joana Rigato, Scott M. Rennie, Zachary F. Mainen:
The overlooked ubiquity of first-person experience in the cognitive sciences. 8005-8041 - Linus Ta-Lun Huang:
Can massive modularity explain human intelligence? Information control problem and implications for cognitive architecture. 8043-8072 - John Turri:
Truth, fallibility, and justification: new studies in the norms of assertion. 8073-8084 - Catherine M. Robb:
Talent dispositionalism. 8085-8102 - James Read, Emily Qureshi-Hurst:
Getting tense about relativity. 8103-8125 - Giovanni Valente:
Quantum symmetry breaking and physical inequivalence: the case of ferromagnetism. 8127-8148 - Giovanni Merlo, Giulia Pravato:
Relativism, realism, and subjective facts. 8149-8165 - Karen Brøcker:
Justifying the evidential use of linguistic intuitions. 8167-8189 - Azita Chellappoo:
Rethinking prestige bias. 8191-8212 - Evan Westra:
Folk personality psychology: mindreading and mindshaping in trait attribution. 8213-8232 - Tarja Knuuttila, Rami Koskinen:
Synthetic fictions: turning imagined biological systems into concrete ones. 8233-8250 - Pablo Cobreros, Elio La Rosa, Luca Tranchini:
(I can't get no) antisatisfaction. 8251-8265 - Alexander Dinges:
Knowledge and non-traditional factors: prospects for doxastic accounts. 8267-8288 - Robert Gressis:
Broad and narrow epistemic standing: its relevance to the epistemology of disagreement. 8289-8306 - Melissa Fusco:
A two-dimensional logic for diagonalization and the a priori. 8307-8322 - Wade Munroe:
Reasoning, rationality, and representation. 8323-8345 - Ashley Coates:
Making sense of powerful qualities. 8347-8363 - Marco Fenici, Tadeusz W. Zawidzki:
The origins of mindreading: how interpretive socio-cognitive practices get off the ground. 8365-8387 - Ludger van Dijk, Julian Kiverstein:
Direct perception in context: radical empiricist reflections on the medium. 8389-8411 - James M. Joyce:
Conditional desirability: comments on Richard Bradley's decision theory with a human face. 8413-8431 - Patrick Dawson:
Hard presentism. 8433-8461 - Hande Ilgaz, Jedediah W. P. Allen:
(Co-)Constructing a theory of mind: From language or through language? 8463-8484 - Tomasz Bigaj:
On discernibility in symmetric languages: the case of quantum particles. 8485-8502 - Laura Danón:
The content of aliefs. 8503-8520 - Daniel E. Weissglass:
Is belief evaluation truth sensitive? A reply to Turri. 8521-8532 - Andrew Buskell:
Cognitive novelties, informational form, and structural-causal explanations. 8533-8553 - Florian J. Boge:
Correction to: An argument against global no miracles arguments. 8555 - Kim Sterelny:
Demography and cultural complexity. 8557-8580 - Marc Artiga:
Signals are minimal causes. 8581-8599 - Miriam Schleifer McCormick:
Value beyond truth-value: a practical response to skepticism. 8601-8619 - William D'Alessandro:
Proving quadratic reciprocity: explanation, disagreement, transparency and depth. 8621-8664 - María del Rosario Martínez-Ordaz:
The ignorance behind inconsistency toleration. 8665-8686 - Gil Santos:
Integrated-structure emergence and its mechanistic explanation. 8687-8711 - Pablo Carnino:
Humean laws, circularity, and contrastivity. 8713-8731 - Allard M. Tamminga, Hein Duijf, Frederik Van De Putte:
Expressivity results for deontic logics of collective agency. 8733-8753 - Michele Paolini Paoletti:
Emergence and structural properties. 8755-8778 - Adrian Heathcote:
Multiplicity and indiscernibility. 8779-8808 - Lucas Battich, Bart Geurts:
Joint attention and perceptual experience. 8809-8822 - Michael Ridge:
Individuating games. 8823-8850 - Jonathan Egeland:
Against overconfidence: arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification. 8851-8871 - Samuel C. Fletcher:
Similarity structure and diachronic emergence. 8873-8900 - Paul Roberts:
Presumptuous or pluralistic presumptions of innocence? Methodological diagnosis towards conceptual reinvigoration. 8901-8932 - David Mark Kovacs:
The oldest solution to the circularity problem for Humeanism about the laws of nature. 8933-8953 - Preston Stovall:
Rationality, autonomy, and obedience to linguistic norms. 8955-8980 - Anna Mahtani:
Awareness growth and dispositional attitudes. 8981-8997 - Stijn Conix, Pei-Shan Chi:
Against natural kind eliminativism. 8999-9020 - Ludger van Dijk:
Temporalizing ontology: a case for pragmatic emergence. 9021-9034 - Bert Leuridan, Thomas Lodewyckx:
Diachronic causal constitutive relations. 9035-9065 - Aldo Filomeno:
Correction to: Are non-accidental regularities a cosmic coincidence? Revisiting a central threat to Humean laws. 9067
Volume 198, Number 10, October 2021
- Ben Martin:
Identifying logical evidence. 9069-9095 - Kino Zhao:
Sample representation in the social sciences. 9097-9115 - Stefan Rinner:
The multiple relation theory and Schiffer's puzzle. 9117-9137 - Elena Castroviejo, Katherine Fraser, Agustín Vicente:
More on pejorative language: insults that go beyond their extension. 9139-9164 - Saja Parvizian:
Scientia, diachronic certainty, and virtue. 9165-9192 - Roberto Loss:
Composition, identity and plural ontology. 9193-9210 - David S. Watson, Luciano Floridi:
The explanation game: a formal framework for interpretable machine learning. 9211-9242 - J. Adam Carter, Robert D. Rupert:
Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale. 9243-9272 - Bianca Cepollaro, Filippo Domaneschi, Isidora Stojanovic:
When is it ok to call someone a jerk? An experimental investigation of expressives. 9273-9292 - Daniel Buckley:
Varieties of epistemic instrumentalism. 9293-9313 - Christopher Hunter Lean:
Invasive species and natural function in ecology. 9315-9333 - Robert Carry Osborne:
A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief. 9335-9356 - Brittany A. Gentry:
Measuring the present: What is the duration of 'now'? 9357-9371 - Michael R. Hicks:
Wilfrid Sellars and the task of philosophy. 9373-9400 - Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien:
Towards a socially constructed and objective concept of mental disorder. 9401-9426 - Giulia Terzian, María Inés Corbalán:
Simplicity of what? A case study from generative linguistics. 9427-9452 - Andrew James Latham, Kristie Miller:
Quantum gravity, timelessness, and the folk concept of time. 9453-9478 - Dolf Rami:
Single-domain free logic and the problem of compositionality. 9479-9523 - Kourken Michaelian:
Episodic memory is not immune to error through misidentification: against Fernández. 9525-9543 - Neil Levy:
Virtue signalling is virtuous. 9545-9562 - Lisa Cassell:
Bayesian coherentism. 9563-9590 - Karen Yan, Meng-Li Tsai, Tsung-Ren Huang:
Improving the quality of case-based research in the philosophy of contemporary sciences. 9591-9610 - Charles M. Djordjevic:
When clarity and consistency conflicts with empirical adequacy: conceptual engineering, anthropology, and Evans-Pritchard's ethnography. 9611-9637 - Ali Hossein Khani:
Interpretationism and judgement-dependence. 9639-9659 - Rasmus Jaksland:
Entanglement as the world-making relation: distance from entanglement. 9661-9693 - Nurbay Irmak:
The problem of creation and abstract artifacts. 9695-9708 - Eric R. Scerri:
Causation, electronic configurations and the periodic table. 9709-9720 - Jonas Werner:
A grounding-based measure of relative fundamentality. 9721-9737 - Wiktor Rorot:
Explaining "spatial purport of perception": a predictive processing approach. 9739-9762 - Nicholas Silins:
The evil demon in the lab: skepticism, introspection, and introspection of introspection. 9763-9785 - Harold Langsam:
McDowell's infallibilism and the nature of knowledge. 9787-9801 - Lauren N. Ross:
Distinguishing topological and causal explanation. 9803-9820 - Michael De:
Truthmakers or truthmaking supervenience? 9821-9839 - Douglas C. Wadle:
Sensory modalities and novel features of perceptual experiences. 9841-9872 - Alexander Roberts:
Two morals about a modal paradox. 9873-9896 - M R. X. Dentith:
Debunking conspiracy theories. 9897-9911 - Will Fleisher:
How to endorse conciliationism. 9913-9939 - Gabbrielle M. Johnson:
Algorithmic bias: on the implicit biases of social technology. 9941-9961 - Hannes Fraissler:
Schmidentity and informativity. 9963-9989 - Richard Pettigrew:
Logical ignorance and logical learning. 9991-10020 - Ezequiel López-Rubio:
Throwing light on black boxes: emergence of visual categories from deep learning. 10021-10041 - David Palmer:
Free will and control: a noncausal approach. 10043-10062 - Marco Ruffino, Luca San Mauro, Giorgio Venturi:
Speech acts in mathematics. 10063-10087 - Víctor M. Verdejo:
Perspectives on de se immunity. 10089-10107
Volume 198, Number 11, November 2021
- Ivo Pezlar:
The placeholder view of assumptions and the Curry-Howard correspondence. 10109-10125 - Eugen Fischer, Paul E. Engelhardt, Justin Sytsma:
Inappropriate stereotypical inferences? An adversarial collaboration in experimental ordinary language philosophy. 10127-10168 - Emmanuel J. Genot:
The Holmesian logician: Sherlock Holmes' "Science of Deduction and Analysis" and the logic of discovery. 10169-10186 - Luca Zanetti:
Grounding and auto-abstraction. 10187-10205 - Pieter Thyssen, Sylvia Wenmackers:
Degrees of freedom. 10207-10235 - John Horden, Dan López de Sa:
Groups as pluralities. 10237-10271 - Peter Kügler:
What Bergson should have said about special relativity. 10273-10288 - Fernando Rudy-Hiller:
In defense of a strong persistence requirement on intention. 10289-10312 - Samuel Murray, Peter Finocchiaro:
These confabulations are guaranteed to improve your marriage! Toward a teleological theory of confabulation. 10313-10339 - Bram Vaassen:
Causal exclusion without causal sufficiency. 10341-10353 - Andrea Giananti:
I know how I know: perception, self-awareness, self-knowledge. 10355-10375 - Marina Baldissera Pacchetti:
Structural uncertainty through the lens of model building. 10377-10393 - Anna-Sara Malmgren:
Goodness, availability, and argument structure. 10395-10427 - François Papale:
Evolution by means of natural selection without reproduction: revamping Lewontin's account. 10429-10455 - Neri Marsili:
Retweeting: its linguistic and epistemic value. 10457-10483 - Ethan Brauer:
The dependence of computability on numerical notations. 10485-10511 - Namjoong Kim:
Limitation of analogy in the Sleeping Beauty debate: the case of Singer's argument. 10513-10528 - Cory Nichols:
Relevance first: relocating similarity in counterfactual semantics. 10529-10564 - Alba Amilburu, Alvaro Moreno, Kepa Ruiz-Mirazo:
Definitions of life as epistemic tools that reflect and foster the advance of biological knowledge. 10565-10585 - Davide Romano:
Multi-field and Bohm's theory. 10587-10609 - Jürgen Landes:
The variety of evidence thesis and its independence of degrees of independence. 10611-10641 - Cameron Gibbs:
Counterfactuals and laws with violations. 10643-10659 - Guido Melchior:
A modal theory of discrimination. 10661-10684 - Maurizio Meloni, Jack Reynolds:
Thinking embodiment with genetics: epigenetics and postgenomic biology in embodied cognition and enactivism. 10685-10708 - Jack Shardlow, Ruth Lee, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack, Patrick Burns, Alison S. Fernandes:
Exploring people's beliefs about the experience of time. 10709-10731 - Gabriele Ferretti:
Anti-intellectualist motor knowledge. 10733-10763 - István Aranyosi:
Preteriception: memory as past-perception. 10765-10792 - Aboutorab Yaghmaie:
Deformation quantization as an appropriate guide to ontic structure. 10793-10815 - Kevin Coffey:
On the ontology of particle mass and energy in special relativity. 10817-10846 - Pablo Fernández Velasco, Slawa Loev:
Affective experience in the predictive mind: a review and new integrative account. 10847-10882 - Jack Himelright:
Paraphrasing away properties with pluriverse counterfactuals. 10883-10902 - Kyle Banick:
A modal analysis of phenomenal intentionality: horizonality and object-directed phenomenal presence. 10903-10922 - Casper Storm Hansen:
The signalman against the glut and gap theorists. 10923-10937 - Tomoji Shogenji:
Probability and proximity in surprise. 10939-10957 - Jeremy Schwartz, Christopher Hom:
Embedding speech-act propositions. 10959-10977 - Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker:
Is consequentialist perdurantism in moral trouble? 10979-10990 - Guido Bonino, Paolo Maffezioli, Paolo Tripodi:
Logic in analytic philosophy: a quantitative analysis. 10991-11028 - Hanoch Ben-Yami:
The Barcan formulas and necessary existence: the view from Quarc. 11029-11064 - Michael Cohen:
The problem of perception and the no-miracles principle. 11065-11080 - Ravit Dotan:
Theory choice, non-epistemic values, and machine learning. 11081-11101 - Vishnu Sridharan:
Two faces of rationality. 11103-11124 - Max Deutsch:
Conceptual analysis without concepts. 11125-11157 - Hannes Fraissler:
Correction to: Schmidentity and informativity. 11159
Volume 198, Number 12, December 2021
- Santiago Amaya:
Out of habit. 11161-11185 - Matthew Tugby:
Grounding theories of powers. 11187-11216 - Sandy C. Boucher:
Evolutionary debunking arguments, commonsense and scepticism. 11217-11239 - Paolo Galeazzi, Alessandro Galeazzi:
The ecological rationality of decision criteria. 11241-11264 - Alexander R. Pruss:
Avoiding Dutch Books despite inconsistent credences. 11265-11289 - Kate Nolfi:
Epistemically flawless false beliefs. 11291-11309 - Derek Lam:
Being pessimistic about the objective present. 11311-11326 - Andrew James Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton, Christian Tarsney:
Future bias in action: does the past matter more when you can affect it? 11327-11349 - Will Gamester:
Shopping for truth pluralism. 11351-11377 - Holger Andreas:
An analysis of disposition concepts by the Ramsey test. 11379-11397 - Tatyana A. Kostochka:
Why moods change: their appropriateness and connection to beliefs. 11399-11420 - Christopher P. Taggart:
A response to the problem of wild coincidences. 11421-11435 - Christopher P. Taggart:
Correction to: A response to the problem of wild coincidences. 11437 - Stuart Glennan:
Corporeal composition. 11439-11462 - J. P. Grodniewicz:
The process of linguistic understanding. 11463-11481 - Ko-Hung Kuan:
Beyond linear conciliation. 11483-11504 - David E. Taylor:
Reference for neo-Fregeans. 11505-11536 - Jonas Rafael Becker Arenhart:
The evidence approach to paraconsistency versus the paraconsistent approach to evidence. 11537-11559 - Mattias Skipper:
Does rationality demand higher-order certainty? 11561-11585 - Joey Pollock:
Content internalism and conceptual engineering. 11587-11605 - Dan Baras:
How can necessary facts call for explanation? 11607-11624 - Junyeol Kim:
The horizontal in Frege's Begriffsschrift. 11625-11644 - Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Melissa Bukovsky, Linda O. Mearns:
An analysis of the disagreement about added value by regional climate models. 11645-11672 - Joachim Horvath, Jennifer Nado:
Knowledge and normality. 11673-11694 - Franklin Jacoby:
Data identity and perspectivism. 11695-11711 - Michael Nielsen:
The strength of de Finetti's coherence theorem. 11713-11724 - Roland Mühlenbernd:
Evolutionary stability of ambiguity in context signaling games. 11725-11753 - Nicholas Tebben:
Selfless assertions and the Knowledge Norm. 11755-11774 - Robin Stenwall:
A grounding physicalist solution to the causal exclusion problem. 11775-11795 - Joshua A. Smart:
Disbelief is a distinct doxastic attitude. 11797-11813 - Katja Crone:
Foundations of a we-perspective. 11815-11832 - Jonathan Bain:
The RT formula and its discontents: spacetime and entanglement. 11833-11860 - Reuben Sass:
An ontology of weak entity realism for HPC kinds. 11861-11880 - Mohammad Shafiei, Ahmad Ali Akbar Mesgari:
On Kant and Husserl on transcendental logic. 11881-11896 - Michael Pace:
Trusting in order to inspire trustworthiness. 11897-11923 - Theodore Korzukhin:
A Dutch book for CDT thirders. 11925-11941 - Charles T. Sebens:
Particles, fields, and the measurement of electron spin. 11943-11975 - Mason Westfall:
Other minds are neither seen nor inferred. 11977-11997 - Uwe Peters:
An argument for egalitarian confirmation bias and against political diversity in academia. 11999-12019 - Lisa J. Miracchi:
A case for integrative epistemology. 12021-12039 - Sofia Ellinor Bokros:
A deference model of epistemic authority. 12041-12069 - Justin P. McBrayer:
Everybody else is thinking it, so why can't we? 12071-12087 - Leszek Wronski:
Objective consequentialism and the plurality of chances. 12089-12105 - Sébastien Rivat:
Effective theories and infinite idealizations: a challenge for scientific realism. 12107-12136 - J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, J. P. Grodniewicz:
Understanding a communicated thought. 12137-12151 - Brian McLoone:
Calculus and counterpossibles in science. 12153-12174 - Erik Myin, Jasper C. van den Herik:
A twofold tale of one mind: revisiting REC's multi-storey story. 12175-12193 - John Dougherty:
The non-ideal theory of the Aharonov-Bohm effect. 12195-12221 - Douglas Ehring:
Fission and anticipating having an experience. 12223-12234
Volume 198, Number 21, October 2021
- Sanjay Chandrasekharan, Nancy J. Nersessian:
Rethinking correspondence: how the process of constructing models leads to discoveries and transfer in the bioengineering sciences. 1-30 - Katia Wilson:
The case of the missing satellites. 1-21 - Tarja Knuuttila:
Imagination extended and embedded: artifactual versus fictional accounts of models. 5077-5097 - Vadim Keyser:
Experimental effects and causal representations. 5145-5176 - Jay Odenbaugh:
Models, models, models: a deflationary view. 1-16 - Thomas Mormann:
Structure-preserving representations, constitution, and the relative a priori. 1-24 - Paul Teller:
Making worlds with symbols. 5015-5036 - Eric Winsberg:
What does robustness teach us in climate science: a re-appraisal. 5099-5122 - Inaki San Pedro:
From structure preserving representation to making worlds with symbols. 5009-5013
Volume 198, Number 22-S, October 2021
- Heinrich Wansing, Marco Ruffino:
Varieties of entailment: introduction to the special issue. 5207-5211 - Sergey Drobyshevich:
Tarskian consequence relations bilaterally: some familiar notions. 5213-5240 - Yaroslav Shramko, Heinrich Wansing:
The nature of entailment: an informational approach. 5241-5261 - Yaroslav Shramko, Heinrich Wansing:
Correction to: The nature of entailment: an informational approach. 5263-5264 - Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Matias Pailos, Damián Enrique Szmuc:
(Meta)inferential levels of entailment beyond the Tarskian paradigm. 5265-5289 - Rohan French, David Ripley:
Two traditions in abstract valuational model theory. 5291-5313 - Emmanuel Chemla, Paul Égré:
From many-valued consequence to many-valued connectives. 5315-5352 - Arnon Avron:
Quasi-canonical systems and their semantics. 5353-5371 - Sérgio Marcelino, Carlos Caleiro:
Axiomatizing non-deterministic many-valued generalized consequence relations. 5373-5390 - Elaine Pimentel, Luiz Carlos Pereira, Valeria de Paiva:
An ecumenical notion of entailment. 5391-5413 - Peter Verdée:
Obtaining infinitely many degrees of inconsistency by adding a strictly paraconsistent negation to classical logic. 5415-5449 - Abilio Rodrigues, Juliana Bueno-Soler, Walter Carnielli:
Measuring evidence: a probabilistic approach to an extension of Belnap-Dunn logic. 5451-5480 - Carolina Blasio, Carlos Caleiro, João Marcos:
What is a logical theory? On theories containing assertions and denials. 5481-5504 - José L. Zalabardo:
Logic without metaphysics. 5505-5532 - Elisángela Ramírez-Cámara, Luis Estrada-González:
Knot is not that nasty (but it is hardier than tonk). 5533-5554 - Ekaterina Kubyshkina:
Conservative translations of four-valued logics in modal logic. 5555-5571 - Konrad Rudnicki, Piotr Lukowski:
Psychophysiological approach to the Liar paradox: Jean Buridan's virtual entailment principle put to the test. 5573-5592 - Marco Ruffino:
Contingent a priori truths and performatives. 5593-5613
Volume 198, Number 23-S, October 2021
- Stefano Bonzio, Jürgen Landes, Barbara Osimani:
Reliability: an introduction. 5615-5624 - Jeffrey Tolly:
Knowledge, evidence, and multiple process types. 5625-5652 - Jeffrey Dunn:
Reliable group belief. 5653-5677 - Christian de Ronde, Hector Freytes, Giuseppe Sergioli:
Quantum probability: a reliable tool for an agent or a reliable source of reality? 5679-5699 - Elisabetta Lalumera, Stefano Fanti, Giovanni Boniolo:
Reliability of molecular imaging diagnostics. 5701-5717 - Giuseppe Primiero, Franco Raimondi, Taolue Chen:
A theory of change for prioritised resilient and evolvable software systems. 5719-5744 - Gilles Dutilh, Alexandra Sarafoglou, Eric-Jan Wagenmakers:
Flexible yet fair: blinding analyses in experimental psychology. 5745-5772 - Christoph Merdes, Momme von Sydow, Ulrike Hahn:
Formal models of source reliability. 5773-5801 - Felipe Romero, Jan Sprenger:
Scientific self-correction: the Bayesian way. 5803-5823 - Bennett Holman:
An ethical obligation to ignore the unreliable. 5825-5848
Volume 198, Number 24-S, October 2021
- Demetris Portides:
Thinking about idealization, abstraction and scientific models: an introduction. 5849-5853 - Arnon Levy:
Idealization and abstraction: refining the distinction. 5855-5872 - Demetris Portides:
Idealization and abstraction in scientific modeling. 5873-5895 - Steven French:
Identity conditions, idealisations and isomorphisms: a defence of the Semantic Approach. 5897-5917 - Alisa Bokulich:
Using models to correct data: paleodiversity and the fossil record. 5919-5940 - James Nguyen, Roman Frigg:
Mathematics is not the only language in the book of nature. 5941-5962 - Margaret Morrison:
Turbulence, emergence and multi-scale modelling. 5963-5985
Volume 198, Number 25-S, November 2021
- Finnur Dellsén, Maria Baghramian:
Disagreement in science: introduction to the special issue. 6011-6021 - Markus Seidel:
Kuhn's two accounts of rational disagreement in science: an interpretation and critique. 6023-6051 - Jamie Shaw:
Feyerabend and manufactured disagreement: reflections on expertise, consensus, and science policy. 6053-6084 - David M. Frank:
Disagreement or denialism? "Invasive species denialism" and ethical disagreement in science. 6085-6113 - Michela Massimi:
Realism, perspectivism, and disagreement in science. 6115-6141 - Dunja Seselja:
Some lessons from simulations of scientific disagreements. 6143-6158 - Carlos Santana:
Let's not agree to disagree: the role of strategic disagreement in science. 6159-6177 - James Owen Weatherall, Cailin O'Connor:
Endogenous epistemic factionalization. 6179-6200 - David Anzola:
Disagreement in discipline-building processes. 6201-6224
Volume 198, Number 26-S, November 2021
- Benedikt Löwe, Ursula Martin, Alison Pease:
Enabling mathematical cultures: introduction. 6225-6231 - Line Edslev Andersen, Mikkel Willum Johansen, Henrik Kragh Sørensen:
Mathematicians writing for mathematicians. 6233-6250 - Zoe Ashton:
Audience role in mathematical proof development. 6251-6275 - Michael J. Barany:
Abstract relations: bibliography and the infra-structures of modern mathematics. 6277-6290 - Timothy Johnson:
The influence of financial practice in developing mathematical probability. 6291-6331 - Michael Friedman, Colin Jakob Rittberg:
The material reasoning of folding paper. 6333-6367 - Matthew Inglis, Juan Pablo Mejia-Ramos:
Functional explanation in mathematics. 6369-6392 - Keith Weber:
The role of syntactic representations in set theory. 6393-6412
Volume 198, Number 27-S, November 2021
- Yang Liu, Stephan Hartmann, Huw Price:
Editorial to "Decision theory and the future of AI". 6413-6414 - Kenny Easwaran:
A classification of Newcomb problems and decision theories. 6415-6434 - Tom Everitt, Marcus Hutter, Ramana Kumar, Victoria Krakovna:
Reward tampering problems and solutions in reinforcement learning: a causal influence diagram perspective. 6435-6467 - Jens Kipper:
Intuition, intelligence, data compression. 6469-6489 - Caspar Oesterheld:
Approval-directed agency and the decision theory of Newcomb-like problems. 6491-6504 - Reuben Stern:
Causal concepts and temporal ordering. 6505-6527 - Marco Zaffalon, Enrique Miranda:
Desirability foundations of robust rational decision making. 6529-6570 - Jiji Zhang, Teddy Seidenfeld, Hailin Liu:
Subjective causal networks and indeterminate suppositional credences. 6571-6597
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