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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 135
Volume 135, September 2022
- John Hillas
, Dov Samet:
Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality. 1-15 - Sergio Currarini, Chiara Marchiori:
Issue linkage. 16-40 - Yu Awaya, Jihwan Do:
Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation. 41-59 - Tom-Reiel Heggedal, Leif Helland, Rebecca B. Morton:
Can paying politicians well reduce corruption? The effects of wages and uncertainty on electoral competition. 60-73
- Jan-Henrik Steg:
On identifying subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes for timing games. 74-78 - Nicolas Fugger, Vitali Gretschko, Martin Pollrich:
Information design in sequential procurement. 79-85
- Carlo Prato, Stephane Wolton:
Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy. 86-95 - David Pérez-Castrillo, Chaoran Sun:
The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies. 96-109 - Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Fabio Maccheroni, David Schmeidler:
Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games. 110-131
- Guido Merzoni, Federico Trombetta:
Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency. 132-143
- Matthias Fahn, Regina Seibel:
Present bias in the labor market - when it pays to be naive. 144-167 - Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl:
The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints. 168-187 - Agustín G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juárez, Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo:
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings. 188-200 - Anne-Christine Barthel, Eric J. Hoffmann, Tarun Sabarwal:
Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games. 201-219 - Benjamin Heymann, Michel De Lara, Jean-Philippe Chancelier:
Kuhn's equivalence theorem for games in product form. 220-240 - Adrian Hillenbrand, Eugenio Verrina:
The asymmetric effect of narratives on prosocial behavior. 241-270 - Masaki Aoyagi, Seung Han Yoo:
Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform. 271-296 - Alexander Rodivilov:
Monitoring innovation. 297-326
- Áron Tóbiás:
Equilibrium non-existence in generalized games. 327-337
- Simon Gächter, Felix Kölle, Simone Quercia:
Preferences and perceptions in Provision and Maintenance public goods. 338-355 - Rasoul Ramezanian, Mehdi Feizi:
Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results. 356-367 - Marc Kaufmann:
Projection bias in effort choices. 368-393 - Changxia Ke, Florian Morath, Anthony Newell, Lionel Page:
Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation. 394-410 - Inácio Bó, Rustamdjan Hakimov:
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism. 411-433
- Michele Gori:
Corrigendum to "Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information" [Games Econ. Behav. 129 (2021) 350-369]. Games Econ. Behav. 135: 434-435 (2022)
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