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Publication search results
found 47 matches
- 2012
- Nejat Anbarci
, Nick Feltovich
:
Bargaining with random implementation: An experimental study. Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 495-514 (2012) - Yakov Babichenko:
Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria. Games Econ. Behav. 76(1): 1-14 (2012) - Hassan Benchekroun, Cees Withagen:
On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel-fringe game. Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 355-374 (2012) - T. Renee Bowen, Zaki Zahran:
On dynamic compromise. Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 391-419 (2012) - René van den Brink
:
Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks. Games Econ. Behav. 76(1): 344-348 (2012) - Roberto Burguet
, Juan-José Ganuza, Esther Hauk
:
Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement. Games Econ. Behav. 76(1): 15-25 (2012) - Thomas Buser:
Digit ratios, the menstrual cycle and social preferences. Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 457-470 (2012) - Timothy N. Cason, Roman M. Sheremeta, Jingjing Zhang
:
Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games. Games Econ. Behav. 76(1): 26-43 (2012) - Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique:
When does aggregation reduce risk aversion? Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 582-595 (2012) - Bo Chen, Satoru Takahashi:
A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting. Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 571-581 (2012) - Kirill Chernomaz:
On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study. Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 690-710 (2012) - Kirill Chernomaz, Dan Levin:
Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study. Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 611-635 (2012) - Thorsten Chmura, Sebastian J. Goerg
, Reinhard Selten:
Learning in experimental 2×2 games. Games Econ. Behav. 76(1): 44-73 (2012) - Andrea Collevecchio
, Marco LiCalzi
:
The probability of nontrivial common knowledge. Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 556-570 (2012) - Stefano Colombo
:
A comment on "welfare reducing licensing". Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 515-518 (2012) - Daniel Diermeier, Pohan Fong:
Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter. Games Econ. Behav. 76(1): 349-353 (2012) - Franz Dietrich:
Modelling change in individual characteristics: An axiomatic framework. Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 471-494 (2012) - Songzi Du:
Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play. Games Econ. Behav. 76(1): 74-87 (2012) - Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler
, Burkhard C. Schipper:
Unbeatable imitation. Games Econ. Behav. 76(1): 88-96 (2012) - John Duffy
, Jack Ochs:
Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games. Games Econ. Behav. 76(1): 97-116 (2012) - Prajit K. Dutta:
Coordination need not be a problem. Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 519-534 (2012) - Tore Ellingsen
, Magnus Johannesson
, Johanna Mollerstrom, Sara Munkhammar:
Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs? Games Econ. Behav. 76(1): 117-130 (2012) - Wedad Elmaghraby, Nathan Larson
:
Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs. Games Econ. Behav. 76(1): 131-159 (2012) - Dirk Engelmann, Martin Strobel:
Deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly. Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 678-689 (2012) - Arantza Estévez-Fernández
:
New characterizations for largeness of the core. Games Econ. Behav. 76(1): 160-180 (2012) - Emel Filiz-Ozbay:
Incorporating unawareness into contract theory. Games Econ. Behav. 76(1): 181-194 (2012) - Yuval Heller
:
Justifiable choice. Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 375-390 (2012) - Penélope Hernández, Amparo Urbano
, José Enrique Vila:
Pragmatic languages with universal grammars. Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 738-752 (2012) - Miguel A. Hinojosa
, Eulalia Romero, José Manuel Zarzuelo
:
Consistency of the Harsanyi NTU configuration value. Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 665-677 (2012) - Steffen Huck
, Gabriele K. Lünser, Jean-Robert Tyran
:
Competition fosters trust. Games Econ. Behav. 76(1): 195-209 (2012)
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