- 2017
- Robert Akerlof:
Value Formation: The Role of Esteem. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 1-19 (2017) - Luca Anderlini, Daniele Terlizzese:
Equilibrium trust. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 624-644 (2017) - Itai Arieli, Manuel Mueller-Frank:
Inferring beliefs from actions. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 455-461 (2017) - Nicholas C. Bedard:
The strategically ignorant principal. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 548-561 (2017) - Charles Bellemare, Alexander Sebald, Sigrid Suetens:
A note on testing guilt aversion. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 233-239 (2017) - Gustavo Bergantiños, Julio González-Díaz, Ángel Manuel González-Rueda, María P. Fernández de Córdoba:
Loss allocation in energy transmission networks. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 69-97 (2017) - Sourav Bhattacharya, John Duffy, Sun-Tak Kim:
Voting with endogenous information acquisition: Experimental evidence. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 316-338 (2017) - Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Frédéric Malherbe:
Unanimous rules in the laboratory. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 179-198 (2017) - Yeon-Koo Che, Syngjoo Choi, Jinwoo Kim:
An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 20-43 (2017) - Youngsub Chun, Duygu Yengin:
Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 462-476 (2017) - Malte Dold, Menusch Khadjavi:
Jumping the queue: An experiment on procedural preferences. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 127-137 (2017) - Martin Dufwenberg, Maros Servátka, Radovan Vadovic:
Honesty and informal agreements. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 269-285 (2017) - John Duggan:
Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 111-126 (2017) - János Flesch, Dries Vermeulen, Anna Zseleva:
Zero-sum games with charges. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 666-686 (2017) - Uri Gneezy, Christina Gravert, Silvia Saccardo, Franziska Tausch:
A must lie situation - avoiding giving negative feedback. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 445-454 (2017) - Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Angela M. Smith:
An experimental examination of the volunteer's dilemma. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 303-315 (2017) - Volker Hahn:
Committee design with endogenous participation. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 388-408 (2017) - Fuhai Hong, Wooyoung Lim, Xiaojian Zhao:
The emergence of compositional grammars in artificial codes. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 255-268 (2017) - Jens Leth Hougaard, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Mich Tvede, Lars Peter Østerdal:
Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 98-110 (2017) - Zhenhua Jiao, Guoqiang Tian:
The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 44-55 (2017) - Sangram Vilasrao Kadam:
Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 56-68 (2017) - Agne Kajackaite, Uri Gneezy:
Incentives and cheating. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 433-444 (2017) - Jin Yeub Kim:
Interim third-party selection in bargaining. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 645-665 (2017) - Mert Kimya:
Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 138-146 (2017) - René Kirkegaard:
Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 373-387 (2017) - Greg Leo:
Taking turns. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 525-547 (2017) - Andrew T. Little:
Propaganda and credulity. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 224-232 (2017) - Volodymyr Lugovskyy, Daniela Puzzello, Andrea Sorensen, James M. Walker, Arlington Williams:
An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 286-302 (2017) - Wolfgang J. Luhan, Anders U. Poulsen, Michael W. M. Roos:
Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 687-699 (2017) - Joseph McMurray:
Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 199-223 (2017)