"Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system."

Lê Nguyên Hoang (2017)

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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-017-1031-2

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2020-07-22

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Lê Nguyên Hoang:
Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system. Soc. Choice Welf. 48(3): 679-701 (2017)

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