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"An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit."

Dolors Berga et al. (2007)

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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.03.004

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2020-09-05

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  - https://dblp.org/rec/journals/mss/BergaBMN07
Dolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme:
An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit. Math. Soc. Sci. 54(2): 152-175 (2007)

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