"Optimal incentive contracts with a spiteful principal: Single agent."

Swapnendu Banerjee, Somenath Chakraborty (2023)

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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2023.01.005

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2023-04-12

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Swapnendu Banerjee, Somenath Chakraborty:
Optimal incentive contracts with a spiteful principal: Single agent. Math. Soc. Sci. 122: 29-41 (2023)

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