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"Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff ..."

Matthias Messner, Mattias Polborn (2007)

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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-006-0048-Z

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2017-05-20

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Matthias Messner, Mattias Polborn:
Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule. Int. J. Game Theory 35(2): 287-314 (2007)

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