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ORCID"Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions."
Helmuts Azacis (2020)
- Helmuts Azacis
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Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions. Int. J. Game Theory 49(2): 411-444 (2020)
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