"Maximizing Revenue From Selfish Agents in Crowd Tasks: Indirect Incentive ..."

Mina Montazeri et al. (2024)

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DOI: 10.1109/LCSYS.2024.3412651

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type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2024-10-22

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Mina Montazeri, Matteo Castiglioni, Giulia Romano, Hamed Kebriaei, Nicola Gatti:
Maximizing Revenue From Selfish Agents in Crowd Tasks: Indirect Incentive Strategies. IEEE Control. Syst. Lett. 8: 2295-2300 (2024)

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