"Procurement Contract Design Under Asymmetric Information of Random Yield."

Qingkai Ji, Feng Liu, Jun Zhuang (2024)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0217595923500161

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2024-04-24

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Qingkai Ji, Feng Liu, Jun Zhuang:
Procurement Contract Design Under Asymmetric Information of Random Yield. Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res. 41(2): 2350016:1-2350016:24 (2024)

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