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Krishnamurthy Iyer
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2020 – today
- 2024
- [j10]Jerry Anunrojwong
, Krishnamurthy Iyer
, David Lingenbrink
:
Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach. Oper. Res. 72(1): 151-166 (2024) - 2023
- [j9]Jerry Anunrojwong
, Krishnamurthy Iyer
, Vahideh H. Manshadi
:
Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion. Manag. Sci. 69(7): 3778-3796 (2023) - [i7]Krishnamurthy Iyer, Haifeng Xu, You Zu:
Markov Persuasion Processes with Endogenous Agent Beliefs. CoRR abs/2307.03181 (2023) - 2022
- [i6]Jerry Anunrojwong, Krishnamurthy Iyer, David Lingenbrink:
Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach. CoRR abs/2208.03758 (2022) - 2021
- [j8]Dragos Florin Ciocan
, Krishnamurthy Iyer
:
Tractable Equilibria in Sponsored Search with Endogenous Budgets. Oper. Res. 69(1): 227-244 (2021) - [j7]Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee
, Krishnamurthy Iyer
:
From Monetary to Nonmonetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies. Math. Oper. Res. 46(3): 835-855 (2021) - [c14]Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Krishnamurthy Iyer:
The Remarkable Robustness of the Repeated Fisher Market. EC 2021: 562 - [c13]You Zu, Krishnamurthy Iyer
, Haifeng Xu:
Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance. EC 2021: 927-928 - [i5]You Zu, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Haifeng Xu:
Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance. CoRR abs/2102.10156 (2021) - 2020
- [c12]Jerry Anunrojwong, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Vahideh H. Manshadi:
Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion. EC 2020: 349-350 - [i4]Jerry Anunrojwong, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Vahideh H. Manshadi:
Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion. CoRR abs/2005.07253 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j6]David Lingenbrink
, Krishnamurthy Iyer
:
Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues. Oper. Res. 67(5): 1397-1416 (2019) - [c11]Jerry Anunrojwong, Krishnamurthy Iyer, David Lingenbrink:
Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach. WINE 2019: 334 - [c10]Pu Yang, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Peter I. Frazier:
Information Design in Spatial Resource Competition. WINE 2019: 346 - [i3]Pu Yang, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Peter I. Frazier:
Information Design in Spatial Resource Competition. CoRR abs/1909.12723 (2019) - 2018
- [c9]David Lingenbrink, Krishnamurthy Iyer
:
Signaling in Online Retail: Efficacy of Public Signals. NetEcon@SIGMETRICS 2018: 10:1 - 2017
- [j5]Jiayang Gao, Krishnamurthy Iyer
, Huseyin Topaloglu:
Price competition under linear demand and finite inventories: Contraction and approximate equilibria. Oper. Res. Lett. 45(4): 382-387 (2017) - [c8]David Lingenbrink, Krishnamurthy Iyer:
Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues with Strategic Customers. EC 2017: 347 - [c7]Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Krishnamurthy Iyer
:
From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies. EC 2017: 563-564 - [i2]Pu Yang, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Peter I. Frazier:
Mean Field Equilibria for Resource Competition in Spatial Settings. CoRR abs/1707.07919 (2017) - 2016
- [c6]Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Krishnamurthy Iyer:
Near-Efficient Allocation Using Artificial Currency in Repeated Settings. WINE 2016: 476-477 - [c5]Pu Yang, Krishnamurthy Iyer
, Peter I. Frazier:
Mean Field Equilibria for Competitive Exploration in Resource Sharing Settings. WWW 2016: 177-187 - [i1]Pu Yang, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Peter I. Frazier:
Mean Field Equilibria for Competitive Exploration in Resource Sharing Settings. CoRR abs/1602.06571 (2016) - 2014
- [j4]Krishnamurthy Iyer
, Ramesh Johari, Ciamac C. Moallemi:
Information Aggregation and Allocative Efficiency in Smooth Markets. Manag. Sci. 60(10): 2509-2524 (2014) - [j3]Krishnamurthy Iyer
, Ramesh Johari, Mukund Sundararajan:
Mean Field Equilibria of Dynamic Auctions with Learning. Manag. Sci. 60(12): 2949-2970 (2014) - 2012
- [c4]Krishnamurthy Iyer
, Ramesh Johari, Ciamac Cyrus Moallemi:
Information and the value of execution guarantees. EC 2012: 673 - 2011
- [j2]Krishnamurthy Iyer
, Ramesh Johari, Mukund Sundararajan:
Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning. SIGecom Exch. 10(3): 10-14 (2011) - [c3]Krishnamurthy Iyer
, Ramesh Johari, Mukund Sundararajan
:
Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning: A dynamic revenue equivalence theorem. Allerton 2011: 1002-1003 - [c2]Krishnamurthy Iyer
, Ramesh Johari, Mukund Sundararajan:
Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning. EC 2011: 339-340 - 2010
- [j1]Krishnamurthy Iyer
, Nandyala Hemachandra:
Sensitivity analysis and optimal ultimately stationary deterministic policies in some constrained discounted cost models. Math. Methods Oper. Res. 71(3): 401-425 (2010) - [c1]Krishnamurthy Iyer
, Ramesh Johari, Ciamac Cyrus Moallemi:
Information aggregation in smooth markets. EC 2010: 199-206
Coauthor Index
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last updated on 2024-07-05 21:07 CEST by the dblp team
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