default search action
Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCIDSynthese, Volume 191
Volume 191, Number 1, January 2014
- Cyrille Imbert, Ryan Muldoon
, Jan Sprenger, Kevin J. S. Zollman:
Introduction, SI of Synthese "The collective dimension of science". 1-2 - Carlo Martini:
Experts in science: a view from the trenches. 3-15 - Thomas Boyer:
Is a bird in the hand worth two in the bush? Or, whether scientists should publish intermediate results. 17-35 - G. Jeroen de Ridder:
Epistemic dependence and collective scientific knowledge. 37-53 - Conor Mayo-Wilson:
Reliability of testimonial norms in scientific communities. 55-78 - Adam Green:
Evaluating distributed cognition. 79-95 - Jesús Zamora-Bonilla:
The nature of co-authorship: a note on recognition sharing and scientific argumentation. 97-108 - Krist Vaesen, Wybo Houkes:
Modelling the truth of scientific beliefs with cultural evolutionary theory. 109-125
Volume 191, Number 2, January 2014
- M. Chirimuuta:
Minimal models and canonical neural computations: the distinctness of computational explanation in neuroscience. 127-153 - Felipe De Brigard:
Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking. 155-185 - Philipp E. Koralus:
Attention, consciousness, and the semantics of questions. 187-211 - Alex Morgan:
Representations gone mental. 213-244 - Markus E. Schlosser:
The neuroscientific study of free will: A diagnosis of the controversy. 245-262 - Miguel Angel Sebastián:
Dreams: an empirical way to settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness. 263-285
Volume 191, Number 3, February 2014
- Luigi Secchi:
The main two arguments for probabilism are flawed. 287-295 - Leon de Bruin, Albert Newen:
The developmental paradox of false belief understanding: a dual-system solution. 297-320 - Bart Hollebrandse, Angeliek van Hout, Petra Hendriks:
Children's first and second-order false-belief reasoning in a verbal and a low-verbal task. 321-333 - Elske van der Vaart, Charlotte K. Hemelrijk:
'Theory of mind' in animals: ways to make progress. 335-354 - Maartje E. J. Raijmakers, Dorothy J. Mandell, Sara E. van Es, Marian Counihan:
Children's strategy use when playing strategic games. 355-370 - Cédric Dégremont, Lena Kurzen, Jakub Szymanik:
Exploring the tractability border in epistemic tasks. 371-408 - Lorenz Demey:
Agreeing to disagree in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic. 409-438 - Victor Kumar:
'Knowledge' as a natural kind term. 439-457 - Sam Baron:
Optimisation and mathematical explanation: doing the Lévy Walk. 459-479 - Francesco Berto, Jacopo Tagliabue:
The world is either digital or analogue. 481-497 - Matthieu Fontaine, Shahid Rahman:
Towards a semantics for the artifactual theory of fiction and beyond. 499-516 - Fred D'Agostino:
Verballed? Incommensurability 50 years on. 517-538 - Marco J. Nathan, Andrea Borghini:
Development and natural kinds - Some lessons from biology. 539-556 - Hao Tang:
"It is not a something, but not a nothing either!" - McDowell on Wittgenstein. 557-567 - Eugen Fischer:
Philosophical intuitions, heuristics, and metaphors. 569-606 - Robin McKenna:
Normative scorekeeping. 607-625
Volume 191, Number 4, March 2014
- Jeanne Peijnenburg, Sylvia Wenmackers:
Infinite regress in decision theory, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology. 627-628 - Paul Bartha, John Barker, Alan Hájek:
Satan, Saint Peter and Saint Petersburg - Decision theory and discontinuity at infinity. 629-660 - Hanti Lin:
On the regress problem of deciding how to decide. 661-670 - John D. Norton:
A material dissolution of the problem of induction. 671-690 - Benjamin Bewersdorf:
Infinitism and probabilistic justification. 691-699 - Frederik Herzberg:
The dialectics of infinitism and coherentism: inferential justification versus holism and coherence. 701-723
Volume 191, Number 5, March 2014
- Jens Harbecke:
The role of supervenience and constitution in neuroscientific research. 725-743 - Hans van Ditmarsch:
Dynamics of lying. 745-777 - Campbell Brown:
The composition of reasons. 779-800 - Robert Hudson:
Saving Pritchard's anti-luck virtue epistemology: the case of Temp. 801-815 - John Michael, Wayne Christensen, Søren Overgaard:
Mindreading as social expertise. 817-840 - Dolf Rami:
On the unification argument for the predicate view on proper names. 841-862 - Sjur K. Dyrkolbotn, Michal Walicki:
Propositional discourse logic. 863-899 - Anthony Shiver:
Mereological bundle theory and the identity of indiscernibles. 901-913 - Claudio Calosi:
Quantum mechanics and Priority Monism. 915-928 - Anika Fiebich:
Mindreading with ease? Fluency and belief reasoning in 4- to 5-year-olds. 929-944 - Yasha Rohwer:
Lucky understanding without knowledge. 945-959 - Bredo C. Johnsen:
Reclaiming Quine's epistemology. 961-988 - Colin Howson:
Finite additivity, another lottery paradox and conditionalisation. 989-1012 - Jonathan Waskan, Ian Harmon, Zachary Horne, Joseph Spino, John Clevenger:
Explanatory anti-psychologism overturned by lay and scientific case classifications. 1013-1035
Volume 191, Number 6, April 2014
- Luciano Floridi:
Information closure and the sceptical objection. 1037-1050 - Alexander R. Pruss:
Infinitesimals are too small for countably infinite fair lotteries. 1051-1057 - Robert William Fischer:
Why it doesn't matter whether the virtues are truth-conducive. 1059-1073 - Conal Duddy:
Reconciling probability theory and coherentism. 1075-1084 - Joseph Diekemper:
The existence of the past. 1085-1104 - Dan López de Sa:
Lewis vs Lewis on the problem of the many. 1105-1117 - Michael Hannon:
Fallibilism and the value of knowledge. 1119-1146 - Matthew Tugby:
Categoricalism, dispositionalism, and the epistemology of properties. 1147-1162 - Adrian Mitchell Currie:
Narratives, mechanisms and progress in historical science. 1163-1183 - Mauro Rossi:
Simulation theory and interpersonal utility comparisons reconsidered. 1185-1210 - Darrell P. Rowbottom:
Aimless science. 1211-1221 - Chris Ranalli:
Luck, propositional perception, and the Entailment Thesis. 1223-1247 - Pietro Galliani:
Transition semantics: the dynamics of dependence logic. 1249-1276 - Michael Rescorla:
A theory of computational implementation. 1277-1307 - Ramiro Caso:
Assertion and relative truth. 1309-1325 - Linton Wang, Wei-Fen Ma:
Comparative syllogism and counterfactual knowledge. 1327-1348
Volume 191, Number 7, May 2014
- Michael Baumgartner:
Exhibiting interpretational and representational validity. 1349-1373 - Rosanna Keefe:
What logical pluralism cannot be. 1375-1390 - Nathan Ballantyne:
Does luck have a place in epistemology? 1391-1407 - Stefan Lukits:
The principle of maximum entropy and a problem in probability kinematics. 1409-1431 - Weng Hong Tang:
Intentionality and partial belief. 1433-1450 - Nicolas Fillion, Robert M. Corless:
On the epistemological analysis of modeling and computational error in the mathematical sciences. 1451-1467 - Nir Fresco, Marty J. Wolf:
The instructional information processing account of digital computation. 1469-1492 - Anders Kraal:
The aim of Russell's early logicism: a reinterpretation. 1493-1510 - Jonathan Tallant:
Against mereological nihilism. 1511-1527 - Klemens Kappel, Emil F. L. Moeller:
Epistemic expressivism and the argument from motivation. 1529-1547 - Harmen Ghijsen:
Phenomenalist dogmatist experientialism and the distinctiveness problem. 1549-1566 - John P. Burgess:
On a derivation of the necessity of identity. 1567-1585 - Matthew Frise:
Speaking freely: on free will and the epistemology of testimony. 1587-1603 - Rafal Urbaniak:
Plural quantifiers: a modal interpretation. 1605-1626 - André Fuhrmann:
Knowability as potential knowledge. 1627-1648 - André Fuhrmann:
Erratum to: Knowability as potential knowledge. 1649
Volume 191, Number 8, May 2014
- Brendan Clarke, Bert Leuridan, Jon Williamson:
Modelling mechanisms with causal cycles. 1651-1681 - J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon:
A new maneuver against the epistemic relativist. 1683-1695 - Kristian Camilleri:
Toward a constructivist epistemology of thought experiments in science. 1697-1716 - Matt Lutz:
The pragmatics of pragmatic encroachment. 1717-1740 - Samuel Schindler:
Explanatory fictions - for real? 1741-1755 - Philip Kremer:
Indeterminacy of fair infinite lotteries. 1757-1760 - Preston J. Werner:
Seemings: still dispositions to believe. 1761-1774 - Victor Gijsbers, Leon de Bruin:
How agency can solve interventionism's problem of circularity. 1775-1791 - Pendaran Roberts:
Parsing the rainbow. 1793-1811 - J. P. Smit, Filip Buekens, Stan du Plessis:
Developing the incentivized action view of institutional reality. 1813-1830 - Alexander Rueger:
Idealized and perspectival representations: some reasons for making a distinction. 1831-1845 - Davide Rizza:
Arrow's theorem and theory choice. 1847-1856 - Matthew A. Benton, John Turri:
Iffy predictions and proper expectations. 1857-1866 - Anthony Robert Booth:
On some recent moves in defence of doxastic compatibilism. 1867-1880 - George Masterton:
What to do with a forecast? 1881-1907 - Alessandro Giordani:
On the factivity of implicit intersubjective knowledge. 1909-1923 - Daniel M. Hausman, Reuben Stern, Naftali Weinberger:
Systems without a graphical causal representation. 1925-1930 - Spyridon Orestis Palermos:
Knowledge and cognitive integration. 1931-1951
Volume 191, Number 9, June 2014
- Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, Kristoffer Ahlström-Vij, Klemens Kappel:
Rational trust. 1953-1955 - Karen Frost-Arnold:
The cognitive attitude of rational trust. 1957-1974 - Paul Faulkner:
The practical rationality of trust. 1975-1989 - Aron Vallinder, Erik J. Olsson:
Trust and the value of overconfidence: a Bayesian perspective on social network communication. 1991-2007 - Klemens Kappel:
Believing on trust. 2009-2028 - Katherine Hawley:
Partiality and prejudice in trusting. 2029-2045 - Katherine Hawley:
Erratum to: Partiality and prejudice in trusting. 2047
Volume 191, Number 10, July 2014
- Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Vanessa Jine Schweizer:
Objectivity and a comparison of methodological scenario approaches for climate change research. 2049-2088 - Keith A. Markus:
An incremental approach to causal inference in the behavioral sciences. 2089-2113 - Thibaut Giraud:
Constructing formal semantics from an ontological perspective. The case of second-order logics. 2115-2145 - Stephan Krämer:
Implicit commitment in theory choice. 2147-2165 - Franz Huber:
New foundations for counterfactuals. 2167-2193 - Christian Damböck:
Kuhn's notion of scientific progress: "Reduction" between incommensurable theories in a rigid structuralist framework. 2195-2213 - Sven Walter:
Willusionism, epiphenomenalism, and the feeling of conscious will. 2215-2238 - John R. Welch:
Plausibilistic coherence. 2239-2253 - Mark Staples:
Critical rationalism and engineering: ontology. 2255-2279 - Iris Loeb:
Towards transfinite type theory: rereading Tarski's Wahrheitsbegriff. 2281-2299 - Justin M. Dallmann:
A normatively adequate credal reductivism. 2301-2313 - Sandy C. Boucher:
What is a philosophical stance? Paradigms, policies and perspectives. 2315-2332 - Mark Pexton:
How dimensional analysis can explain. 2333-2351
Volume 191, Number 11, July 2014
- Frank Zenker, Carlo Proietti:
Editors' introduction: social dynamics and collective rationality. 2353-2358 - Peter Brössel, Anna-Maria A. Eder:
How to resolve doxastic disagreement. 2359-2381 - Gustavo Cevolani:
Truth approximation, belief merging, and peer disagreement. 2383-2401 - Fenrong Liu, Jeremy Seligman, Patrick Girard:
Logical dynamics of belief change in the community. 2403-2431 - George Masterton:
Topological variability of collectives and its import for social epistemology. 2433-2443 - Jens Christian Bjerring, Jens Ulrik Hansen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen:
On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance. 2445-2470 - Rasmus K. Rendsvig:
Pluralistic ignorance in the bystander effect: informational dynamics of unresponsive witnesses in situations calling for intervention. 2471-2498