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Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 59
Volume 59, Number 1, July 2022
- Marie-Louise Leroux, Pierre Pestieau, Gregory Ponthiere:
Childlessness, childfreeness and compensation. 1-35 - Konstantinos Protopappas:
Optimal lobbying pricing. 37-61 - Stefan Wintein, Conrad Heilmann:
Liberal political equality does not imply proportional representation. 63-91 - Rodrigo A. Velez:
A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget. 93-118 - Deren Çaglayan, Emin Karagözoglu, Kerim Keskin, Çagri Saglam:
Effort comparisons for a class of four-player tournaments. 119-137 - Hiroki Saitoh:
Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules. 139-173 - Hayrullah Dindar, Jean Lainé:
Compromise in combinatorial vote. 175-206 - Cécile Aubert, Huihui Ding:
Voter conformism and inefficient policies. 207-249
Volume 59, Number 2, August 2022
- Andrea Mannberg, Tomas Sjögren:
Social identity and risky leisure activities: implications for welfare and policy. 251-285 - Susumu Cato:
Stable preference aggregation with infinite population. 287-304 - Umut Keskin, M. Remzi Sanver, H. Berkay Tosunlu:
Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections. 305-333 - Xu Lang:
Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives. 335-359 - Radhika Lahiri, Zivanemoyo Chinzara:
Institutional reform, technology adoption and redistribution: a political economy perspective. 361-400 - Joseph Armel Momo Kenfack:
Committees under qualified majority rules: the one-core stability index. 401-422 - Benoît R. Kloeckner:
Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in Approval Voting. 423-466 - Roy Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan, Erel Segal-Halevi:
One person, one weight: when is weighted voting democratic? 467-493
Volume 59, Number 3, October 2022
- Kyung Hwan Baik, Jong Hwa Lee, Seokho Lee:
Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests. 495-523 - Dmitry Dagaev, Andrey Zubanov:
Round-robin tournaments with limited resources. 525-583 - Shashwat Khare, Ton Storcken:
Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information. 585-604 - Benjamin Ouvrard, Stefan Ambec, Arnaud Reynaud, Stéphane Cezera, Murudaiah Shivamurthy:
Sharing rules for a common-pool resource in a lab experiment. 605-635 - Camelia Bejan, Juan Camilo Gómez, Anne van den Nouweland:
On the importance of reduced games in axiomatizing core extensions. 637-668 - Thomas Aronsson, Ronnie Schöb:
Habit formation and the pareto-efficient provision of public goods. 669-681 - Costel Andonie, Daniel Diermeier:
Electoral Institutions with impressionable voters. 683-733 - Marco Rogna:
The Burning Coalition Bargaining Model. 735-768
Volume 59, Number 4, November 2022
- Alexander Max Bauer, Frauke Meyer, Jan Romann, Mark Siebel, Stefan Traub:
Need, equity, and accountability. 769-814 - David Lowing, Kevin Techer:
Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games. 815-861 - Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo, Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo, Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez:
The average-of-awards rule for claims problems. 863-888 - Rouzbeh Ghouchani, Szilvia Pápai:
Preference aggregation for couples. 889-923 - Julián Costas-Fernández, Simón Lodato:
Inequality, poverty and the composition of redistribution. 925-967 - Josué Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting. 969-988 - Hui-Chun Peng:
Effects of majority-vote reward mechanism on cooperation: a public good experimental study. 989-1008 - Saptarshi Mukherjee, Hans Peters:
Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium. 1009-1028
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