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ORCIDSocial Choice and Welfare, Volume 39
Volume 39, Number 1, June 2012
- Luisa Monroy
, Francisco R. Fernández:
Stable sets and cores for multi-criteria simple games and for their extensions. 1-22 - Itai Ashlagi, Flip Klijn:
Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests. 23-33 - Tibor Neugebauer, Stefan Traub:
Public good and private good valuation for waiting time reduction: a laboratory study. 35-57 - Efthymios Athanasiou:
Endogenous productivity and equality of opportunity. 59-89 - Bezalel Peleg, Shmuel Zamir:
Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury. 91-125 - Elchanan Mossel, Omer Tamuz:
Complete characterization of functions satisfying the conditions of Arrow's theorem. 127-140 - Rosa Camps, Xavier Mora, Laia Saumell:
A continuous rating method for preferential voting: the complete case. 141-170 - Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Ðura-Georg Granic:
Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany. 171-205 - Stephen Bazen, Patrick Moyes:
Elitism and stochastic dominance. 207-251
Volume 39, Numbers 2-3, July 2012
- Vincent Merlin, Marc Fleurbaey, Dominique Lepelley:
Introduction to the special issue on new developments in social choice and welfare theories. 253-257 - Amartya Sen:
The reach of social choice theory. 259-272 - Brian Hill:
Confidence in preferences. 273-302 - Wulf Gaertner:
Evaluating sets of objects in characteristics space. 303-321 - Walter Bossert, Kotaro Suzumura:
Quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent relations. 323-334 - Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno:
Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences. 335-352 - Conal Duddy, Ashley Piggins:
The proximity condition. 353-369 - M. Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker:
Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules. 371-398 - Hans Peters, Souvik Roy, Ton Storcken:
On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules. 399-429 - Gabrielle Demange:
On the influence of a ranking system. 431-455 - Philippe De Donder, Michel Le Breton, Eugenio Peluso:
On the (sequential) majority choice of public good size and location. 457-489 - Michel Le Breton, Peter Sudhölter, Vera Zaporozhets:
Sequential legislative lobbying. 491-520 - Philip J. Reny, Eyal Winter, Myrna Wooders:
The partnered core of a game with side payments. 521-536 - Anindya Bhattacharya, Abderrahmane Ziad:
On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players. 537-552 - Hélène Ferrer, Guillermo Owen, Fabrice Valognes:
Stable syndicates of factor owners and distribution of social output: a Shapley value approach. 553-565 - Katherine Cuff, Sunghoon Hong, Jesse A. Schwartz, Quan Wen, John A. Weymark:
Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations. 567-597 - Marc Fleurbaey:
Social preferences for the evaluation of procedures. 599-614 - Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, Christian Klamler:
The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items. 615-631 - Eugenio Peluso, Alain Trannoy:
Preserving dominance relations through disaggregation: the evil and the saint. 633-647 - Claudio Zoli, Peter J. Lambert:
Sequential procedures for poverty gap dominance. 649-673 - Anders Björklund, Markus Jäntti, John E. Roemer:
Equality of opportunity and the distribution of long-run income in Sweden. 675-696
Volume 39, Number 4, October 2012
- Joseph M. Ostroy, Uzi Segal:
No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods. 697-719 - René van den Brink:
On hierarchies and communication. 721-735 - Juan Carlos Cesco:
Hedonic games related to many-to-one matching problems. 737-749 - Laurent Simula, Alain Trannoy:
Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective. 751-782 - Olivier Bargain, Olivier Donni:
Targeting and child poverty. 783-808 - Christopher P. Chambers, Takashi Hayashi:
Money-metric utilitarianism. 809-831 - Simon Grant, Atsushi Kajii, Ben Polak, Zvi Safra:
A generalized representation theorem for Harsanyi's ('impartial') observer. 833-846 - Juan Carlos Candeal:
Subgroup independence conditions on preferences. 847-853 - Conal Duddy, Ashley Piggins:
A measure of distance between judgment sets. 855-867 - Susumu Cato:
Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis. 869-889 - Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko:
Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of hamming type. 891-905 - Dwight R. Bean:
Proportional quota weighted voting system hierarchies II. 907-918 - Vincent Anesi:
A new old solution for weak tournaments. 919-930 - Eric Gilson, Chelsey Cooley, William Ella, Michael Follett, Lorenzo Traldi:
The Efron dice voting system. 931-959
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