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ORCIDSocial Choice and Welfare, Volume 36
Volume 36, Number 1, January 2011
- Marcin Dziubinski
, Jaideep Roy:
Electoral competition in 2-dimensional ideology space with unidimensional commitment. 1-24 - Conal Duddy, Juan Perote-Peña, Ashley Piggins:
Arrow's theorem and max-star transitivity. 25-34 - Alexander W. Cappelen, Bertil Tungodden:
Distributive interdependencies in liberal egalitarianism. 35-47 - Daniel J. Seidmann:
A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees. 49-74 - Christopher P. Chambers, Alan D. Miller:
Rules for aggregating information. 75-82 - Sandro Brusco, Jaideep Roy:
Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties. 83-104 - Alexander W. Cappelen, Astri Drange Hole, Erik Ø. Sørensen, Bertil Tungodden:
The importance of moral reflection and self-reported data in a dictator game with production. 105-120 - Mostapha Benhenda:
A model of deliberation based on Rawls's political liberalism. 121-178
Volume 36, Number 2, February 2011
- Luis C. Corchón, Matteo Triossi:
Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent. 179-198 - Hans Gersbach, Hans Haller:
Bargaining cum voice. 199-225 - Wai Chiu Woo:
Status and welfare under monopolistic competition. 227-239 - Kristof Bosmans, Lucio Esposito, Peter Lambert:
New perspectives on a more-or-less familiar poverty index. 241-247 - Marieke Quant, Peter Borm:
Random conjugates of bankruptcy rules. 249-266 - Markus Schulze:
A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method. 267-303 - Miguel A. Ballester, Guillaume Haeringer:
A characterization of the single-peaked domain. 305-322 - Ian Ayres, Colin Rowat, Nasser Zakariya:
Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees. 323-354
Volume 36, Numbers 3-4, April 2011
- Maria Gallego, Norman Schofield, D. Marc Kilgour:
Guest editors' introduction to the special issue on the political economy of elections and bargaining. 355-364 - John W. Patty, Elizabeth Maggie Penn:
A social choice theory of legitimacy. 365-382 - John E. Roemer:
A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters. 383-421 - Woojin Lee:
Bandwagon, underdog, and political competition: the uni-dimensional case. 423-449 - Norman Schofield, Maria Gallego, Ugur Ozdemir, Alexei V. Zakharov:
Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey. 451-482 - Norman Schofield, Christopher Claassen, Ugur Ozdemir, Alexei V. Zakharov:
Estimating the effects of activists in two-party and multi-party systems: comparing the United States and Israel. 483-518 - Vincent Anesi, Philippe De Donder:
Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy. 519-546 - Johanna M. M. Goertz:
Omnibus or not: package bills and single-issue bills in a legislative bargaining game. 547-563 - Daniel Diermeier, Pohan Fong:
Bargaining over the budget. 565-589 - Maria Eugenia Gallego, David Scoones:
Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals. 591-610 - John Duggan, Tasos Kalandrakis:
A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games. 611-650
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