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ORCIDSocial Choice and Welfare, Volume 29
Volume 29, Number 1, July 2007
- Juan A. Lacomba, Francisco M. Lagos:
Political election on legal retirement age. 1-17 - Franz Dietrich, Christian List
:
Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation. 19-33 - Justin Leroux:
Cooperative production under diminishing marginal returns: interpreting fixed-path methods. 35-53 - Eyal Baharad, Zvika Neeman:
Robustness against inefficient manipulation. 55-67 - Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly:
Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives. 69-82 - Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly:
Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives. 83-104 - Jack E. Graver:
A note on natural correspondences that satisfy exclusion. 105-106 - Udo Ebert, Georg Tillmann:
Distribution-neutral provision of public goods. 107-124 - Sidartha Gordon:
Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle. 125-147 - John W. Patty:
Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters. 149-173
Volume 29, Number 2, September 2007
- Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez:
On the manipulation of social choice correspondences. 175-199 - Geoffroy de Clippel:
An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution. 201-210 - Michel Regenwetter, Elena I. Rykhlevskaia:
A general concept of scoring rules: general definitions, statistical inference, and empirical illustrations. 211-228 - Arnaud Dellis, Mandar P. Oak:
Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment. 229-245 - Stefan Maus, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken:
Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity. 247-269 - Maurice Koster:
The Moulin-Shenker rule. 271-293 - Sebastian Bervoets:
Freedom of choice in a social context: comparing game forms. 295-315 - Jon X. Eguia:
Citizen candidates under uncertainty. 317-331 - Hannu Vartiainen:
Nash implementation and the bargaining problem. 333-351
Volume 29, Number 3, October 2007
- Hannu Vartiainen:
Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms. 353-367 - Debasis Mishra, Bharath Rangarajan:
Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem. 369-382 - Kevin Roberts:
Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting. 383-404 - Kristof Bosmans:
Comparing degrees of inequality aversion. 405-428 - Christian Klamler, Ulrich Pferschy:
The traveling group problem. 429-452 - Ruth Ben-Yashar, Igal Milchtaich:
First and second best voting rules in committees. 453-486 - Geoffrey Pritchard, Mark C. Wilson:
Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules. 487-513 - Buhong Zheng:
Inequality orderings and unit consistency. 515-538 - Yan Yu:
Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units. 539-555
Volume 29, Number 4, December 2007
- Maurice Salles:
Foreword. 557 - Kaushik Basu:
Coercion, contract and the limits of the market. 559-579 - Claus Beisbart, Luc Bovens:
Welfarist evaluations of decision rules for boards of representatives. 581-608 - Richard Bradley:
Reaching a consensus. 609-632 - Marc Fleurbaey:
Social choice and the indexing dilemma. 633-648 - Sven Ove Hansson:
Social decisions about risk and risk-taking. 649-663 - Robert Sugden:
The value of opportunities over time when preferences are unstable. 665-682 - Paul Weirich:
Collective, universal, and joint rationality. 683-701
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