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Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 90
Volume 90, Number 1, January 2000
- Martin Peitz:
Aggregation in a Model of Price Competition. 1-38 - Dolors Berga
, Shigehiro Serizawa:
Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good. 39-61 - Christian Ghiglino, Mich Tvede
:
Optimal Policy in OG Models. 62-83 - Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg:
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria. 84-115 - Udo Ebert, Patrick Moyes:
Consistent Income Tax Structures When Households Are Heterogeneous. 116-150 - Rajiv Sarin:
Decision Rules with Bounded Memory. 151-160 - Andreas Blume, Uri Gneezy:
An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games. 161-172
Volume 90, Number 2, February 2000
- Fernando Vega-Redondo:
Unfolding Social Hierarchies. 177-203 - Clive D. Fraser:
When Is Efficiency Separable from Distribution in the Provision of Club Goods? 204-221 - Alessandro Citanna, Antonio Villanacci
:
Incomplete Markets, Allocative Efficiency, and the Information Revealed by Prices. 222-253 - Eran Hanany, Zvi Safra:
Existence and Uniqueness of Ordinal Nash Outcomes. 254-276 - Paolo Ghirardato
, Michel Le Breton:
Choquet Rationality. 277-285 - Hector M. Ramos
, Jorge Ollero, Miguel A. Sordo
:
A Sufficient Condition for Generalized Lorenz Order. 286-292 - Tetsuya Shinkai:
Second Mover Disadvantages in a Three-Player Stackelberg Game with Private Information. 293-304
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