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ORCIDJournal of Economic Theory, Volume 135
Volume 135, Number 1, July 2007
- Jawwad Noor:
Commitment and self-control. 1-34 - Fahad Khalil, David Martimort, Bruno Parigi:
Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting. 35-67 - Matthew Haag, Roger Lagunoff:
On the size and structure of group cooperation. 68-89 - Jerry R. Green, Nancy L. Stokey:
A two-person game of information transmission. 90-104 - Michael Mandler:
Strategies as states. 105-130 - Ricardo Arlegi
:
Sequentially consistent rules of choice under complete uncertainty. 131-143 - Geoffroy de Clippel:
The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information. 144-158 - Begoña Domínguez:
Public debt and optimal taxes without commitment. 159-170 - Aleksander Berentsen, Gabriele Camera, Christopher Waller:
Money, credit and banking. 171-195 - Yuval Salant:
On the learnability of majority rule. 196-213 - Jihong Lee, Hamid Sabourian:
Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs. 214-235 - Jaehoon Kim, Mark Fey:
The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences. 236-252 - Hongbin Cai, John Riley, Lixin Ye:
Reserve price signaling. 253-268 - Klaus Nehring, Clemens Puppe:
The structure of strategy-proof social choice - Part I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces. 269-305 - Susanna Esteban, Eiichi Miyagawa, Matthew Shum:
Nonlinear pricing with self-control preferences. 306-338 - Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein:
Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities. 339-356 - Subir Bose, Jinhua Zhao:
Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible. 357-381 - Yuichi Yamamoto:
Efficiency results in N player games with imperfect private monitoring. 382-413 - Christian Ghiglino, Alain Venditti:
Wealth inequality, preference heterogeneity and macroeconomic volatility in two-sector economies. 414-441 - Francesco Feri:
Stochastic stability in networks with decay. 442-457 - Paul Beaudry, Franck Portier:
When can changes in expectations cause business cycle fluctuations in neo-classical settings? 458-477 - Yann Bramoullé, Rachel Kranton:
Public goods in networks. 478-494 - Ohad Kadan:
Equilibrium in the two-player, k-double auction with affiliated private values. 495-513 - Federico Echenique:
Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements. 514-532 - Stefan Maus, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken:
Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability. 533-544
- José Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto:
Representing roommates' preferences with symmetric utilities. 545-550 - Sophie Bade, Guillaume Haeringer, Ludovic Renou:
More strategies, more Nash equilibria. 551-557 - Braz Camargo:
Good news and bad news in two-armed bandits. 558-566 - Katsutoshi Wakai:
A note on recursive multiple-priors. 567-571 - Ulrich Berger:
Brown's original fictitious play. 572-578 - Walter Bossert, Yves Sprumont, Kotaro Suzumura:
Ordering infinite utility streams. 579-589 - Andrea Attar, Gwenaël Piaser, Nicolás Porteiro:
Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions. 590-593 - Michael Peters:
Erratum to "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency": [Journal of Economic Theory 111 (2003) 88-109]. 594-595
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