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International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 36
Volume 36, Number 1, September 2007
- Yaron Azrieli, Ehud Lehrer:

On some families of cooperative fuzzy games. 1-15 - Josep M. Izquierdo

, Marina Núñez
, Carles Rafels:
A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market. 17-26 - Julio González-Díaz

, Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez
:
A natural selection from the core of a TU game: the core-center. 27-46 - André Casajus:

The position value is the Myerson value, in a sense. 47-55 - Nikolai S. Kukushkin

:
Congestion games revisited. 57-83 - Akira Yamada, Naoki Yoshihara

:
Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills. 85-106 - Alexander Zimper

:
A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes. 107-117 - Edward J. Cartwright

:
Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium. 119-135 - Kevin Hasker:

Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games. 137-146
Volume 36, Number 2, October 2007
- Hans Peters, Dries Vermeulen

:
Preface to the special issue on the occasion of the first Spain Italy Netherlands meeting on Game theory (SING 1). 147 - Arantza Estévez-Fernández

, Peter Borm, Herbert Hamers:
Project games. 149-176 - Bettina Klaus

, Flip Klijn
:
Fair and efficient student placement with couples. 177-207 - Jesús Mario Bilbao

, Julio Rodrigo Fernández García
, N. Jiménez
, J. J. López:
The core and the Weber set for bicooperative games. 209-222 - Gustavo Bergantiños

, Juan J. Vidal-Puga
:
The optimistic TU game in minimum cost spanning tree problems. 223-239 - Victor K. Domansky:

Repeated games with asymmetric information and random price fluctuations at finance markets. 241-257 - Youngsub Chun, Junghoon Lee:

On the convergence of the random arrival rule in large claims problems. 259-273 - Zafer Akin:

Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games. 275-299 - Olivier Bochet:

Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem. 301-316
Volume 36, Numbers 3-4, March 2008
- Marilda Sotomayor:

A collection of papers dedicated to David Gale on the occasion of his 85th birthday. 317-319 - Georgy Artemov

:
Matching and price competition: would personalized prices help? 321-331 - Péter Biró, Katarína Cechlárová

, Tamás Fleiner:
The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems. 333-352 - Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones

, Christian Klamler
:
Proportional pie-cutting. 353-367 - David Cantala, Francisco Sánchez-Sánchez:

Welfare and stability in senior matching markets. 369-392 - Robert Day, Paul Milgrom

:
Core-selecting package auctions. 393-407 - Kimmo Eriksson

, Olle Häggström:
Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures. 409-420 - Kimmo Eriksson

, Jonas Sjöstrand, Pontus Strimling
:
Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences. 421-440 - Sergiu Hart

:
Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games. 441-460 - Elena Inarra

, Concepción Larrea, Elena Molis
:
Random paths to P -stability in the roommate problem. 461-471 - Fuhito Kojima

, M. Utku Ünver
:
Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration. 473-488 - Mihai Manea:

Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts. 489-496 - Ruth Martínez, Jordi Massó

, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo
:
On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles. 497-518 - Nitsan Perach, Julia Polak, Uriel G. Rothblum:

A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the technion. 519-535 - Alvin E. Roth

:
Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions. 537-569 - Uzi Segal, Joel Sobel

:
A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity. 571-585 - Konstantinos Serfes

:
Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents. 587-619 - Marilda Sotomayor:

The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules. 621-640

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