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International Game Theory Review, Volume 16
Volume 16, Number 1, March 2014
- Giacomo Bonanno, Hans van Ditmarsch, Wiebe van der Hoek, Steffen Jørgensen:
Introduction. - Andrés Perea:
From Classical to Epistemic Game Theory. - Michael Trost:
An Epistemic Rationale for Order Independence. - Elias Tsakas:
Universally Rational Belief Hierarchies. - Bastien Maubert
, Sophie Pinchinat:
A General Notion of Uniform Strategies. - Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Werner Güth, Stephan Schosser:
Backward Induction or Forward Reasoning? - an Experiment of stochastic Alternating offer bargaining. - Miklós Pintér:
On the Completeness of the Universal Knowledge-Belief Space: a Technical note.
Volume 16, Number 2, June 2014
- Leon A. Petrosyan, David W. K. Yeung:
Preface. - Josef Shinar, Valery Y. Glizer, Vladimir Turetsky
:
Solution of a singular Zero-Sum Linear-quadratic differential Game by Regularization. - Dusan M. Stipanovic
, Christopher G. Valicka, Ali E. Abbas:
Control Strategies for Players in Pursuit-Evasion Games Based on their Preferences. - Vladimir V. Mazalov
, Tatyana E. Nosalskaya
, Julia S. Tokareva
:
Stochastic Cake Division Protocol. - Mikhail I. Gomoyunov
, Dmitri Kornev
, Nikolai Lukoyanov
:
Game Theory Applications to Guarantee Optimization in Dynamical Systems with Control delays. - Luca Lambertini
:
Exploration for nonrenewable Resources in a Dynamic oligopoly: an Arrovian Result. - David W. K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan:
Subgame Consistent Cooperative solutions for randomly furcating stochastic Dynamic Games with uncertain horizon. - Vladimir N. Ushakov
, Sergey A. Brykalov, Alexander R. Matviychuk
, Andrey V. Ushakov:
Invariance Property with Application to Solving Control Problems. - A. G. Chentsov
:
Nikolai Nikolayevich Krasovskii: an extraordinary Russian Scientist.
Volume 16, Number 3, September 2014
- Sebastian Ille:
The Dynamics of Norms and Conventions under Local Interactions and Imitation. - Yigal Gerchak, D. Marc Kilgour:
Degree of Difficulty as the objective of Contest Design. - Wilfried Pauwels, Peter M. Kort
, Eve Vanhaecht:
R&d Investments as Prebargaining Strategies. - Kirsten A. Davis
, Mark R. Frascatore:
A note on Equilibria in a Circular Location Model with a Single-peaked Distribution of Consumers. - Stefan Wrzaczek, Ekaterina V. Shevkoplyas, Sergey Kostyunin
:
A differential Game of Pollution Control with Overlapping Generations. - Yukihiko Funaki, Takehiko Yamato
:
Stable Coalition Structures under Restricted coalitional changes. - Brandon Lehr:
Efficiency wages with Heterogeneous Agents.
Volume 16, Number 4, December 2014
- Ismail Saglam
:
A Simple Axiomatization of the egalitarian solution. - Antonin Pottier
, Rabia Nessah:
Berge-Vaisman and Nash Equilibria: Transformation of Games. - Subhadip Chakrabarti, Supanit Tangsangasaksri:
Network Topology, Higher Orders of stability and Efficiency. - Miguel Aramendía
, Quan Wen:
Forward-looking Principle in repeated Games. - Rabia Nessah, Moussa Larbani:
Berge-Zhukovskii Equilibria: existence and Characterization. - Nikolay A. Zenkevich, Andrey V. Zyatchin
:
Strong Equilibria in the Vehicle Routing Game. - Koji Okuguchi, Takeshi Yamazaki:
Global stability of Nash equilibrium in Aggregative Games. - Carlos González-Alcón
, Peter Borm
, Ruud Hendrickx
:
Nash Equilibria in 2 × 2 × 2 Trimatrix Games with identical Anonymous Best-Replies. - Leon A. Petrosyan, David W. K. Yeung:
A Time-Consistent solution Formula for bargaining Problem in differential Games.
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