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ORCIDInternational Game Theory Review, Volume 13
Volume 13, Number 1, March 2011
- Kjell Hausken, Gregory Levitin:
Active vs. Passive Defense against a Strategic Attacker. 1-12 - Raphael Eidenbenz
, Yvonne-Anne Pignolet, Stefan Schmid, Roger Wattenhofer:
Cost and Complexity of harnessing Games with Payments. 13-44 - Takashi Harada, Mikio Nakayama:
The Strategic Cores α, β, γ and δ. 45-59 - Jean Derks, Martijn Tennekes:
Payoff Functions in the One-Way Flow Model of Network Formation for which Nash Networks Exist. 61-73 - Sascha Füllbrunn:
Collusion or Sniping in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions - a Prisoner's Dilemma. 75-82 - Sumit Joshi, Yuan Sun, Poorvi L. Vora:
Price Discrimination and Privacy: a Note. 83-92 - José Luís Ferreira:
A Note on Bagwell's Paradox and Forward Induction in Three Classic Games. 93-104 - Evan Shellshear:
A Note on Characterizing Core stability with Fuzzy Games. 105-118 - Ngo Van Long:
Book Review: "A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics". 119-120
Volume 13, Number 2, June 2011
- Dave Furth:
Duopoly Models with Vertical Product Differentiation. 121-140 - Pierre Dehez:
Allocation of Fixed Costs: Characterization of the (Dual) Weighted Shapley Value. 141-157 - Delfina Femenia, Mabel Marí, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo:
Stable solutions on Matching Models with quota restriction. 159-179 - Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, Sudipta Sarangi:
Nash Networks with Imperfect Reliability and Heterogeous Players. 181-194 - Christian W. Bach, Conrad Heilmann:
Agent Connectedness and Backward Induction. 195-208 - Emanuele Bacchiega, Luca Lambertini, Andrea Mantovani:
Process and Product Innovation in a Vertically Differentiated Industry. 209-221 - Ezio Marchi:
E-Points for Diagonal Games II. 223-233 - Bryan C. McCannon:
Sophisticated Enforcement and Adaptive Offenders. 235-246
Volume 13, Number 3, September 2011
- Kjell Hausken:
Game Theoretic Analysis of Two-Period-Dependent Degraded Multistate Reliability Systems. 247-267 - Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau:
On Equilibrium Refinement for Discontinuous Games. 269-280 - Imma J. Curiel:
Project Management Games. 281-300 - Federica Briata:
Noncooperative Games from TU Games with Information Cost. 301-323 - Messaoud Deghdak, Monique Florenzano:
On the existence of Berge's Strong Equilibrium. 325-340 - Paraskevas V. Lekeas, Giorgos Stamatopoulos:
Strategic Delegation in a Stackelberg Game with Multiple Stages. 341-352 - José Alcalde, Matthias Dahm:
On the Complete Information First-Price Auction and its Intuitive Solution. 353-361
Volume 13, Number 4, December 2011
- Giuseppe De Marco, Jacqueline Morgan:
Altruistic Behavior and Correlated Equilibrium Selection. 363-381 - Harald Wiese:
Unions and unemployment Benefits: Some Insights from a Simple Three-Player Example. 383-402 - Alaa el-Shazly:
Auctions, Real Options Valuation, and Privatization. 403-415 - Julia Belau:
Outside Options in Probabilistic Coalition Situations. 417-442 - Kimmo Eriksson, Fredrik Jansson, Thomas Vetander:
The Assignment Game with Negative Externalities and Bounded Rationality. 443-459 - Tanga Morae McDaniel:
Coordination in Games with Incomplete Information: Experimental Results. 461-474 - Hubert Kempf, Grégoire Rota-Graziosi:
A Complementary Note on the Issue of Time Inconsistency Revisited as an Extended Game. 475-480
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