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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 98
Volume 98, July 2016
- Felipe Balmaceda
:
Optimal task assignments. 1-18 - Ulrich Berger
, Ansgar Grüne:
On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information. 19-33 - Peter Buisseret, Carlo Prato:
Electoral control and the human capital of politicians. 34-55 - Ingela Alger
, Jörgen W. Weibull:
Evolution and Kantian morality. 56-67 - Guillaume Haeringer, Hanna Halaburda:
Monotone strategyproofness. 68-77 - Elnaz Bajoori
, János Flesch, Dries Vermeulen
:
Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games. 78-109 - Raphael Boleslavsky, Tracy R. Lewis:
Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships. 110-134 - Ashish Ranjan Hota
, Siddharth Garg, Shreyas Sundaram
:
Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes. 135-164
- Battal Dogan
:
Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies. 165-171
- Giorgio Martini
:
Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful. 172-179 - Marco E. Castillo
, Ahrash Dianat:
Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: Theory and experiment. 180-196 - James C. Cox, Rudolf Kerschbamer
, Daniel Neururer:
What is trustworthiness and what drives it? 197-218 - Stefano Barbieri, David A. Malueg:
Private-information group contests: Best-shot competition. 219-234
- Jan Zápal
:
Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: Existence with three players. 235-242
- Colin F. Camerer, Salvatore Nunnari, Thomas R. Palfrey:
Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions. 243-263 - Philipp Weinschenk:
Procrastination in teams and contract design. 264-283

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