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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 72
Volume 72, Number 1, May 2011
- Gagan Aggarwal, Amos Fiat, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Madhu Sudan:
Derandomization of auctions. 1-11 - Sophie Bade:
Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties. 12-29 - Ulrich Berger
:
Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity. 30-37 - Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal:
Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders. 38-45 - Alessandra Casella:
Agenda control as a cheap talk game: Theory and experiments with Storable Votes. 46-76 - Gary Charness, Aldo Rustichini:
Gender differences in cooperation with group membership. 77-85 - Drew Fudenberg, Wojciech Olszewski:
Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal. 86-99 - Maria Goltsman, Gregory Pavlov:
How to talk to multiple audiences. 100-122 - Michel Grabisch, Agnieszka Rusinowska:
Influence functions, followers and command games. 123-138 - Thomas A. Gresik:
The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral k-double auctions. 139-148 - Jeanne Hagenbach:
Centralizing information in networks. 149-162 - Ziv Hellman:
Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors. 163-171 - Bettina Klaus:
Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets. 172-186 - Masahiro Kumabe, H. Reiju Mihara:
Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction. 187-201 - Steffen Lippert, Giancarlo Spagnolo:
Networks of relations and Word-of-Mouth Communication. 202-217 - Vlad Mares, Jeroen M. Swinkels:
Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions. 218-241 - Manipushpak Mitra, Suresh Mutuswami:
Group strategyproofness in queueing models. 242-254 - Jawwad Noor:
Intertemporal choice and the magnitude effect. 255-270 - Mathias Staudigl:
Potential games in volatile environments. 271-287 - Jonathan Weinstein, Muhamet Yildiz:
Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games. 288-300
- Alfredo Di Tillio:
A robustness result for rationalizable implementation. 301-305 - Toshihiro Matsumura, Noriaki Matsushima:
Collusion, agglomeration, and heterogeneity of firms. 306-313 - Hervé Moulin, Francois Laigret:
Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints. 314-320
Volume 72, Number 2, June 2011
- Mariana Blanco, Dirk Engelmann, Hans-Theo Normann:
A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences. 321-338 - Antonio Cabrales, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, Yves Zenou:
Social interactions and spillovers. 339-360 - Gary Charness, Ninghua Du, Chun-Lei Yang:
Trust and trustworthiness reputations in an investment game. 361-375 - Francesco Feri, Anita Gantner:
Bargaining or searching for a better price? - An experimental study. 376-399 - Marina Fiedler, Ernan Haruvy, Sherry Xin Li:
Social distance in a virtual world experiment. 400-426 - Daniel Granot, Herbert Hamers, Jeroen Kuipers, Michael Maschler:
On Chinese postman games where residents of each road pay the cost of their road. 427-438 - Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Giovanni Ponti, Josefa Tomás, Luis Ubeda:
Framing effects in public goods: Prospect Theory and experimental evidence. 439-447 - Maciej H. Kotowski:
Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: Comment. 448-451 - Christoph Kuzmics:
On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations. 452-466 - Jordi Massó, Inés Moreno de Barreda:
On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness. 467-484 - Rebecca B. Morton, Jean-Robert Tyran:
Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees. 485-509 - Andrés Perea:
An algorithm for proper rationalizability. 510-525 - Arkadi Predtetchinski:
One-dimensional bargaining. 526-543 - Rene Saran:
Bilateral trading with naive traders. 544-557 - Quazi Shahriar, John Wooders:
An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values. 558-573 - Artyom Shneyerov, Adam Chi Leung Wong:
Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable. 574-582
- Nicholas G. Hall, Zhixin Liu:
On auction protocols for decentralized scheduling. 583-585 - Patrick Hummel:
Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections. 586-593 - Maarten C. W. Janssen, Vladimir A. Karamychev, Emiel Maasland:
Auctions with flexible entry fees: A note. 594-601 - Ryuji Sano:
Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders. 602-606
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