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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 143
Volume 143, January 2024
- Charles Louis-Sidois
:
Buying winners. 1-11 - R. Pablo Arribillaga
, Agustín G. Bonifacio
:
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules. 12-24 - Danny Blom
, Bart Smeulders, Frits C. R. Spieksma
:
Rejection-proof mechanisms for multi-agent kidney exchange. 25-50 - Yuval Heller
, Christoph Kuzmics
:
Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values. 51-76 - Ville Korpela, Michele Lombardi
, Riccardo D. Saulle
:
Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities. 77-102 - Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez
, Antonio Romero-Medina
:
School choice with transferable student characteristics. 103-124 - Peilu Zhang, Yinjunjie Zhang, Marco A. Palma
:
Social roles and competitiveness: My willingness to compete depends on who I am (supposed to be). 125-151
- Julien Manili:
Order independence for rationalizability. 152-160
- Isaías N. Chaves, Shota Ichihashi:
Auction timing and market thickness. 161-178 - Tobias Cagala
, Ulrich Glogowsky, Johannes Rincke, Simeon Schudy
:
Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments. 179-190 - Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong
, Joosung Lee
:
The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism. 191-203 - Bo Chen, Bo Chen:
Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations. 204-222 - Pietro Battiston
, Sharon G. Harrison
:
Believe it or not: Experimental evidence on sunspot equilibria with social networks. 223-247 - Tyler Maxey
:
School choice with costly information acquisition. 248-268 - Yoichi Kasajima, Manabu Toda:
Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems. 269-286 - Julien Combe, Jan Christoph Schlegel:
Reallocation with priorities. 287-299 - Christian Ewerhart, Guang-Zhen Sun:
The n-player Hirshleifer contest. 300-320 - Adriana Piazza, Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez
:
Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences. 321-339 - Emiliano Catonini, Andrey Kurbatov, Sergey Stepanov
:
Independent versus collective expertise. 340-356 - Helmut Bester, József Sákovics
:
Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market. 357-369
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