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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 141
Volume 141, September 2023
- Burak Ünveren, Murat Donduran, Guy Barokas
:
On self- and other-regarding cooperation: Kant versus Berge. 1-20 - Teresa Backhaus, Steffen Huck, Johannes Leutgeb, Ryan Oprea:
Learning through period and physical time. 21-29 - Arne Lauber, Christoph March, Marco Sahm:
Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence. 30-51 - Serhiy Kandul, Bruno Lanz, Evert Reins:
Reciprocity and gift exchange in markets for credence goods. 52-69 - Sen Geng, Menglong Guan:
Trustworthy by design. 70-87 - Michela Chessa, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Aymeric Lardon, Takashi Yamada:
An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value. 88-104 - Anujit Chakraborty:
Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. 105-132 - Alessandra Casella, Jeffrey Da-Ren Guo, Michelle Jiang:
Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment. 133-155 - Açelya Altuntas, William Phan, Yuki Tamura:
Some characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles. 156-181 - Diego Aycinena, Alexander Elbittar, Andrei Gomberg, Lucas Rentschler:
Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It's a matter of timing. 182-195 - Brian Hill:
Beyond uncertainty aversion. 196-222 - Devansh Jalota, Marco Pavone, Qi Qi, Yinyu Ye:
Fisher markets with linear constraints: Equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms. 223-260 - Xinghua Wang, Daniel Navarro-Martinez:
Increasing the external validity of social preference games by reducing measurement error. 261-285 - Steven Kivinen:
On the manipulability of equitable voting rules. 286-302 - Aditya Aradhye, János Flesch, Mathias Staudigl, Dries Vermeulen:
Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games. 303-320 - Sophie Bade, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Fairness for multi-self agents. 321-336 - Antonio Nicolò, Pietro Salmaso, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav:
Stable sharing. 337-363 - Shunya Noda:
A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain. 364-379 - Francis Bloch, Shaden Shabayek:
Targeting in social networks with anonymized information. 380-402 - Mengling Li, Yohanes E. Riyanto, Menghan Xu:
Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints. 403-427 - Federico Echenique, Antonio Miralles, Jun Zhang:
Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments. 428-443 - Lucas Pahl:
Polytope-form games and index/degree theories for extensive-form games. 444-471 - Siyu Ma, Dov Biran:
Attacking a nuclear facility: The impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality. 472-483 - David L. Dickinson, David Masclet:
Unethical decision making and sleep restriction: Experimental evidence. 484-502 - Geir B. Asheim, Thomas Brunnschweiler:
Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox. 503-514 - Josué Ortega, Thilo Klein:
The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice. 515-528 - Gregory Z. Gutin, Philip R. Neary, Anders Yeo:
Unique stable matchings. 529-547 - Metin Uyanik, Duygu Yengin:
Expropriation power in private dealings: Quota rule in collective sales. 548-580
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