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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 136
Volume 136, November 2022
- Stefano Barbieri

, Marco Serena
:
Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players. 1-30 - Francesco Fallucchi

, R. Andrew Luccasen III
, Theodore L. Turocy
:
The sophistication of conditional cooperators: Evidence from public goods games. 31-62 - Urs Fischbacher, Jan Hausfeld

, Baiba Renerte
:
Strategic incentives undermine gaze as a signal of prosocial motives. 63-91 - Jonathan Lafky, Ernest K. Lai, Wooyoung Lim

:
Preferences vs. strategic thinking: An investigation of the causes of overcommunication. 92-116 - Svetlana Pevnitskaya

, Dmitry Ryvkin
:
The effect of access to clean technology on pollution reduction: An experiment. 117-141 - Thomas W. L. Norman

:
The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games. 142-152 - Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili

, Oriol Tejada
:
Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers. 153-176 - Georgy Lukyanov

, Konstantin Shamruk, Tong Su, Ahmed Wakrim:
Public communication with externalities. 177-196 - Yohei Yamaguchi

:
Issue selection, media competition, and polarization of salience. 197-225 - Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu

, Konstantin Zabarnyi:
Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion. 226-248
- Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch

:
The bargaining trap. 249-254
- Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren

:
Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect. 255-273 - Burak Can

, Jens Leth Hougaard, Mohsen Pourpouneh
:
On reward sharing in blockchain mining pools. 274-298 - Jin-yeong Sohn

, Wenhao Wu:
Reciprocity with uncertainty about others. 299-324 - Miharu Naono

:
Cost heterogeneity and the persistence of bilingualism. 325-339 - Sihua Ding

:
Link investment substitutability: A factor influencing network formation. 340-359 - Christian Kellner

, Mark Thordal-Le Quement, Gerhard Riener
:
Reacting to ambiguous messages: An experimental analysis. 360-378 - Francisco Silva

:
The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise. 379-388 - Hitoshi Matsushima

:
Epistemological implementation of social choice functions. 389-402 - Francesco Feri

, Anita Gantner
, Peter G. Moffatt
, Dominik Erharter:
Leading to efficient coordination: Individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game. 403-427 - Péter Biró, Flip Klijn

, Szilvia Pápai:
Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market. 428-453 - Tom-Reiel Heggedal, Leif Helland

, Magnus Våge Knutsen:
The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types. 454-468 - Gerard Domènech

, Marina Núñez:
Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market. 469-484 - Yi-Chun Chen

, Satoru Takahashi, Siyang Xiong
:
Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty. 485-504 - David Rojo Arjona

, Stefania Sitzia
, Jiwei Zheng:
Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation. 505-523 - M. Josune Albizuri, Alex Goikoetxea:

Probabilistic Owen-Shapley spatial power indices. 524-541 - Wendelin Schnedler

:
The broken chain: Evidence against emotionally driven upstream indirect reciprocity. 542-558 - Pierfrancesco Guarino, Gabriel Ziegler

:
Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance. 559-585

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