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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 127
Volume 127, May 2021
- Ehud Kalai:
Editor's retirement note. iii-v
- Alvaro J. Name-Correa, Hüseyin Yildirim:
Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee. 1-27 - Konstantinos Georgalos
:
Dynamic decision making under ambiguity: An experimental investigation. 28-46 - Ritesh Jain:
Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences. 47-66 - P. Jean-Jacques Herings, László Á. Kóczy:
The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games. 67-79 - Vincent P. Crawford:
Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading. 80-101 - Péter Vida, Takakazu Honryo:
Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games. 102-112 - Sebastian Fehrler, Maik T. Schneider:
Buying supermajorities in the lab. 113-154 - Alexei Boulatov, Sergei Severinov:
Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers. 155-178 - Haomin Yan:
Position auctions with multi-unit demands. 179-193 - Bas J. Dietzenbacher:
Monotonicity and egalitarianism. 194-205 - Guillaume Cheikbossian:
Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods. 206-226 - Delong Meng:
On the value of repetition for communication games. 227-246
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