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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 123
Volume 123, September 2020
- Binzhen Wu

, Xiaohan Zhong:
Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: Evidence from China's college admissions. 1-21 - Itzhak Gilboa

, Stefania Minardi, Larry Samuelson:
Theories and cases in decisions under uncertainty. 22-40 - Jan Christoph Schlegel

:
Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms. 41-53
- Adam Bjorndahl, Joseph Y. Halpern

, Rafael Pass:
Bayesian games with intentions. 54-67
- Ennio Bilancini

, Leonardo Boncinelli
, Jonathan Newton
:
Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching. 68-80 - Yangbo Song

, Jiahua Zhang:
Social learning with coordination motives. 81-100 - Klaus Abbink

, Dmitry Ryvkin
, Danila Serra:
Corrupt police. 101-119
- Yi-You Yang

:
Rationalizable choice functions. 120-126
- Ritwik Banerjee

, Nabanita Datta Gupta
, Marie-Claire Villeval
:
Feedback spillovers across tasks, self-confidence and competitiveness. 127-170
- Wonki Jo Cho

, Biung-Ghi Ju
:
Group identification: An integrated approach. 171-181
- Christian Ewerhart

, Kremena Valkanova
:
Fictitious play in networks. 182-206
- Pierpaolo Battigalli, Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek

:
Introduction to the special issue on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT13). 207-209
- Gregory J. DeAngelo

, Laura K. Gee
:
Peers or police?: The effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods. 210-227
- Tomoya Tajika

:
Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game. 228-239
- Ascensión Andina-Díaz

, José A. García-Martínez
:
Reputation and news suppression in the media industry. 240-271 - Chen Li, Uyanga Turmunkh

, Peter P. Wakker
:
Social and strategic ambiguity versus betrayal aversion. 272-287
- Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko

:
Equilibrium existence in games with a concave Bayesian potential. 288-294
- Yun Kuen Cheung

, Richard Cole, Nikhil R. Devanur:
Tatonnement beyond gross substitutes? Gradient descent to the rescue. 295-326 - Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin

, Brendan Lucier:
Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient. 327-341 - Gagan Goel, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme:

Clinching auctions with online supply. 342-358 - Vittorio Bilò

, Michele Flammini, Luca Moscardelli:
The price of stability for undirected broadcast network design with fair cost allocation is constant. 359-376

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