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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 122
Volume 122, July 2020
- Krishna Dasaratha:
Distributions of centrality on networks. 1-27 - Anna Bykhovskaya:
Stability in matching markets with peer effects. 28-54 - Michael Arnold
, Lan Zhang:
Competition with an information clearinghouse and asymmetric firms: Why more than two firms compete (or not) for shoppers. 55-82 - Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Catherine Rainer, Eilon Solan:
Solving two-state Markov games with incomplete information on one side. 83-104 - Ulrike Malmendier, Adam Szeidl:
Fishing for fools. 105-129 - Jan U. Auerbach, Miguel A. Fonseca:
Preordered service in contract enforcement. 130-149 - Chiara Aina, Pierpaolo Battigalli, Astrid Gamba:
Frustration and anger in the Ultimatum Game: An experiment. 150-167 - Srinivas Arigapudi:
Exit from equilibrium in coordination games under probit choice. 168-202 - Ali Kakhbod, Fei Song:
Dynamic price discovery: Transparency vs. information design. 203-232
- Thomas W. L. Norman:
The evolution of monetary equilibrium. 233-239
- Nicola Gatti, Mario Gilli, Alberto Marchesi:
A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria. 240-255 - Timothy N. Cason, Tridib Sharma, Radovan Vadovic:
Correlated beliefs: Predicting outcomes in 2 × 2 games. 256-276 - Eduard Talamàs, Rakesh Vohra:
Free and perfectly safe but only partially effective vaccines can harm everyone. 277-289 - Dilip Mookherjee, Alberto Motta, Masatoshi Tsumagari:
Consulting collusive experts. 290-317
- Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Ludovic A. Julien:
Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian. 318-327
- Shiqi Guo, Pinghan Liang, Erte Xiao:
In-group bias in prisons. 328-340 - Nadja R. Ging-Jehli, Florian H. Schneider, Roberto A. Weber:
On self-serving strategic beliefs. 341-353 - Anna Bayona, Jordi Brandts, Xavier Vives:
Information frictions and market power: A laboratory study. 354-369 - Sung-Ha Hwang, Luc Rey-Bellet:
Strategic decompositions of normal form games: Zero-sum games and potential games. 370-390 - Ludmila Matysková, Brian Rogers, Jakub Steiner, Keh-Kuan Sun:
Habits as adaptations: An experimental study. 391-406
- Deniz Dizdar, Eugen Kovác:
A simple proof of strong duality in the linear persuasion problem. 407-412
- Frederik Schwerter, Florian Zimmermann:
Determinants of trust: The role of personal experiences. 413-425
- Henrik Petri:
Lexicographic probabilities and robustness. 426-439
- Ehud Lehrer, Roee Teper:
Allocation in multi-agenda disputes: A set-valued games approach. 440-452 - C. Matthew Leister:
Information acquisition and welfare in network games. 453-475
- Makoto Hagiwara:
Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions: Comment. 476-480
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