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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 109
Volume 109, May 2018
- Volker Britz
:
Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining. 1-20 - Sandro Ambuehl, Shengwu Li:
Belief updating and the demand for information. 21-39 - Brit Grosskopf, Lucas Rentschler, Rajiv Sarin:
An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner. 40-64 - Adrian Hillenbrand, Fabian Winter:
Volunteering under population uncertainty. 65-81 - Cheng-Cheng Hu, Min-Hung Tsay, Chun-Hsien Yeh:
A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: Axiomatic and strategic perspectives. 82-98
- Rabah Amir, Igor V. Evstigneev:
A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly. 99-103 - Dmitry Lubensky, Eric Schmidbauer:
Equilibrium informativeness in veto games. 104-125 - Henrique de Oliveira:
Blackwell's informativeness theorem using diagrams. 126-131 - Andreas Blume:
Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games. 132-155 - Christian Basteck, Marco Mantovani:
Cognitive ability and games of school choice. 156-183 - Sayantan Ghosal, Simone Tonin:
Noncooperative oligopoly in economies with infinitely many commodities and traders. 184-200 - Qingyun Wu, Alvin E. Roth:
The lattice of envy-free matchings. 201-211 - Toshiji Kawagoe, Taisuke Matsubae, Hirokazu Takizawa:
The Skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: Theory and experiment. 212-239 - Debasis Mishra, Swaprava Nath, Souvik Roy:
Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers. 240-261 - Gilat Levy, Ronny Razin:
Information diffusion in networks with the Bayesian Peer Influence heuristic. 262-270 - Dean P. Foster, Sergiu Hart:
Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics. 271-293 - Subhasish Dugar, Quazi Shahriar:
Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination. 294-310 - Brice Corgnet, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Roberto Hernán González:
Goal setting in the principal-agent model: Weak incentives for strong performance. 311-326 - Yu Zhou, Shigehiro Serizawa:
Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule. 327-363 - Drew Fudenberg, Yuichiro Kamada:
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs. 364-381 - Benjamin Sperisen:
Bounded memory and incomplete information. 382-400 - Zifan Li, Ambuj Tewari:
Sampled fictitious play is Hannan consistent. 401-412 - Shurojit Chatterji, Huaxia Zeng:
On random social choice functions with the tops-only property. 413-435 - A. Yesim Orhun:
Perceived motives and reciprocity. 436-451 - Vernon L. Smith, Bart J. Wilson:
Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted. 452-464 - Jon X. Eguia, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Rebecca B. Morton, Antonio Nicolò:
Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information. 465-483 - Bogaçhan Çelen, Onur Özgür:
Final-offer arbitration with uncertainty averse parties. 484-500 - Ilwoo Hwang:
A theory of bargaining deadlock. 501-522 - Ziv Hellman, Amnon Schreiber:
Indexing gamble desirability by extending proportional stochastic dominance. 523-543 - Eva I. Hoppe, Patrick W. Schmitz:
Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory. 544-564 - Shachar Kariv, Maciej H. Kotowski, C. Matthew Leister:
Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks. 565-581 - Simon Grant, J. Jude Kline, John Quiggin:
Contracting under uncertainty: A principal-agent model with ambiguity averse parties. 582-597 - Spyros Galanis:
Speculation under unawareness. 598-615 - Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Eran Shmaya:
Learning the fundamentals in a stationary environment. 616-624 - Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin:
Financially-constrained lawyers: An economic theory of legal disputes. 625-647
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