![](https://dblp1.uni-trier.de/img/logo.ua.320x120.png)
![](https://dblp1.uni-trier.de/img/dropdown.dark.16x16.png)
![](https://dblp1.uni-trier.de/img/peace.dark.16x16.png)
Остановите войну!
for scientists:
![search dblp search dblp](https://dblp1.uni-trier.de/img/search.dark.16x16.png)
![search dblp](https://dblp1.uni-trier.de/img/search.dark.16x16.png)
default search action
16th SAGT 2023: Egham, UK
- Argyrios Deligkas
, Aris Filos-Ratsikas
:
Algorithmic Game Theory - 16th International Symposium, SAGT 2023, Egham, UK, September 4-7, 2023, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 14238, Springer 2023, ISBN 978-3-031-43253-8
Computational Aspects and Efficiency in Games
- Stanislaw Kazmierowski, Marcin Dziubinski
:
Computation of Nash Equilibria of Attack and Defense Games on Networks. 3-21 - Katharina Eickhoff
, Lennart Kauther
, Britta Peis
:
Stackelberg Vertex Cover on a Path. 22-39 - Vittorio Bilò
, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
, Marios Mavronicolas
:
Computational Complexity of Decision Problems About Nash Equilibria in Win-Lose Multi-player Games. 40-57 - Eirini Georgoulaki, Kostas Kollias:
Arbitrary Profit Sharing in Federated Learning Utility Games. 58-70 - Marios Mavronicolas
, Paul G. Spirakis
:
The Contest Game for Crowdsourcing Reviews. 71-89 - Shaul Rosner
, Tami Tamir
:
Entrepreneurship Facility-Activation Games. 90-108
Computational Social Choice
- Tobias Friedrich, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor, Lars Seifert:
Single-Peaked Jump Schelling Games. 111-126 - Andrew Fraser
, Brian Lavallee
, Blair D. Sullivan
:
Parameterized Complexity of Gerrymandering. 127-141 - Haris Aziz, Sujit Gujar, Manisha Padala, Mashbat Suzuki, Jeremy Vollen:
Coordinating Monetary Contributions in Participatory Budgeting. 142-160 - Niclas Boehmer, Piotr Faliszewski
, Lukasz Janeczko
, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk
:
Robustness of Participatory Budgeting Outcomes: Complexity and Experiments. 161-178 - Cyrus Cousins
, Justin Payan
, Yair Zick
:
Into the Unknown: Assigning Reviewers to Papers with Uncertain Affinities. 179-197 - Lata Narayanan, Yasaman Sabbagh:
Diversity-Seeking Jump Games in Networks. 198-217
Fair Division
- Sirin Botan, Angus Ritossa, Mashbat Suzuki, Toby Walsh:
Maximin Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items Under Cost Utilities. 221-238 - April Niu
, Agnes Totschnig
, Adrian Vetta
:
Fair Algorithm Design: Fair and Efficacious Machine Scheduling. 239-256 - Yusuke Kobayashi
, Ryoga Mahara
, Souta Sakamoto:
EFX Allocations for Indivisible Chores: Matching-Based Approach. 257-270 - Umang Bhaskar, Neeldhara Misra, Aditi Sethia, Rohit Vaish:
The Price of Equity with Binary Valuations and Few Agent Types. 271-289 - Paul W. Goldberg
, Kasper Høgh
, Alexandros Hollender
:
The Frontier of Intractability for EFX with Two Agents. 290-307
Matching and Mechanism Design
- Haris Aziz
, Gergely Csáji
, Ágnes Cseh
:
Computational Complexity of k-Stable Matchings. 311-328 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Nidhi Rathi:
Optimizing over Serial Dictatorships. 329-346 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Shivika Narang:
Repeatedly Matching Items to Agents Fairly and Efficiently. 347-364 - Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Alexandros A. Voudouris, Rongsen Zhang:
Truthful Two-Facility Location with Candidate Locations. 365-382 - Ali Khodabakhsh
, Evdokia Nikolova
, Emmanouil Pountourakis
, Jimmy Horn:
Threshold Mechanisms for Dynamic Procurement with Abandonment. 383-400 - Jonathan Wagner, Reshef Meir:
Strategy-Proof Budgeting via a VCG-Like Mechanism. 401-418
![](https://dblp1.uni-trier.de/img/cog.dark.24x24.png)
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.