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8th SAGT 2015: Saarbrücken, Germany
- Martin Hoefer:

Algorithmic Game Theory - 8th International Symposium, SAGT 2015, Saarbrücken, Germany, September 28-30, 2015, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 9347, Springer 2015, ISBN 978-3-662-48432-6
Matching Under Preferences
- Naoyuki Kamiyama:

Stable Matchings with Ties, Master Preference Lists, and Matroid Constraints. 3-14 - Ágnes Cseh, David F. Manlove

:
Stable Marriage and Roommates Problems with Restricted Edges: Complexity and Approximability. 15-26 - Katarína Cechlárová

, Pavlos Eirinakis, Tamás Fleiner, Dimitrios Magos, David F. Manlove
, Ioannis Mourtos
, Eva Oceláková, Baharak Rastegari
:
Pareto Optimal Matchings in Many-to-Many Markets with Ties. 27-39
Cost Sharing
- Georgios Birmpas

, Costas Courcoubetis, Ioannis Giotis, Evangelos Markakis:
Cost-Sharing Models in Participatory Sensing. 43-56 - Thomas Erlebach, Matthew Radoja:

Further Results on Capacitated Network Design Games. 57-68 - Guy Avni, Tami Tamir:

Cost-Sharing Scheduling Games on Restricted Unrelated Machines. 69-81
Mechanism Design and Social Choice
- Dimitris Fotakis, Dimitris Tsipras, Christos Tzamos

, Emmanouil Zampetakis:
Efficient Money Burning in General Domains. 85-97 - Khaled M. Elbassioni

, Kurt Mehlhorn, Fahimeh Ramezani:
Towards More Practical Linear Programming-Based Techniques for Algorithmic Mechanism Design. 98-109 - Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obraztsova, Piotr Skowron

:
Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-Biased Voters. 110-122
Auctions
- Shant Boodaghians, Adrian Vetta:

The Combinatorial World (of Auctions) According to GARP. 125-136 - Paul W. Goldberg

, Bo Tang:
Auction Design with a Revenue Target. 137-149 - Shaddin Dughmi, Nicole Immorlica, Ryan O'Donnell, Li-Yang Tan:

Algorithmic Signaling of Features in Auction Design. 150-162
Networking
- George Christodoulou

, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Bo Tang:
On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources. 165-177 - Maximilian Drees, Matthias Feldotto

, Sören Riechers, Alexander Skopalik:
On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games. 178-189 - Yukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng

, Yifan Pi, Xiang Yan:
Can Bandwidth Sharing Be Truthful? 190-202 - Georgios Kouroupas, Evangelos Markakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Vasileios Rigas, Martha Sideri:

The Web Graph as an Equilibrium. 203-215
Routing and Fairness
- Xujin Chen, Zhuo Diao

, Xiao-Dong Hu:
Excluding Braess's Paradox in Nonatomic Selfish Routing. 219-230 - Gideon Blocq, Ariel Orda:

"Beat-Your-Rival" Routing Games. 231-243 - Simina Brânzei, Hadi Hosseini, Peter Bro Miltersen:

Characterization and Computation of Equilibria for Indivisible Goods. 244-255
Equilibrium Computation
- Pavel Hubácek

, Moni Naor, Jonathan R. Ullman:
When Can Limited Randomness Be Used in Repeated Games? 259-271 - Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod:

Settling Some Open Problems on 2-Player Symmetric Nash Equilibria. 272-284 - Siddharth Barman, Katrina Ligett

, Georgios Piliouras:
Approximating Nash Equilibria in Tree Polymatrix Games. 285-296
Abstracts and Brief Announcements
- Yunjian Xu, Katrina Ligett

:
Commitment in First-Price Auctions. 299 - Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Nishanth Dikkala, Éva Tardos:

Brief Announcement: Effect of Strategic Grading and Early Offers in Matching Markets. 300-302 - Hossein Efsandiari, Guy Kortsarz:

Brief Announcement: New Mechanisms for Pairwise Kidney Exchange. 303-304 - Yun Liu:

Brief Announcement: On Effective Affirmative Action in School Choice. 305-306 - Roy B. Ofer, Tami Tamir:

Brief Announcement: Resource Allocation Games with Multiple Resource Classes. 307-308 - Gaia Nicosia

, Andrea Pacifici, Ulrich Pferschy:
Brief Announcement: On the Fair Subset Sum Problem. 309-311 - Yurii E. Nesterov, Vladimir Shikhman:

Brief Announcement: Computation of Fisher-Gale Equilibrium by Auction. 312-313

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