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3rd SAGT 2010: Athens, Greece
- Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Elias Koutsoupias, Paul G. Spirakis:

Algorithmic Game Theory - Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 6386, Springer 2010, ISBN 978-3-642-16169-8 - Amos Fiat, Christos H. Papadimitriou:

When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers. 1-14 - Paul W. Goldberg

:
How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard? 15-17 - Bharat Adsul, Ch. Sobhan Babu, Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Milind A. Sohoni:

A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets. 18-29 - Bharat Adsul, Ch. Sobhan Babu, Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Milind A. Sohoni:

Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market. 30-41 - Elliot Anshelevich

, Bugra Çaskurlu, Ameya Hate:
Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games. 42-53 - Vincenzo Auletta

, Diodato Ferraioli
, Francesco Pasquale
, Giuseppe Persiano:
Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics. 54-65 - Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb:

Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games. 66-77 - Pranjal Awasthi, Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Or Sheffet, Santosh S. Vempala:

On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games. 78-89 - Vittorio Bilò

, Ioannis Caragiannis
, Angelo Fanelli
, Gianpiero Monaco:
Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games. 90-101 - Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein:

On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play. 102-113 - Constantinos Daskalakis, Rafael M. Frongillo

, Christos H. Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos, Gregory Valiant:
On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria. 114-125 - Alex Fabrikant, Aaron D. Jaggard

, Michael Schapira:
On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games. 126-137 - Uriel Feige, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:

A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium. 138-149 - Uriel Feige, Moshe Tennenholtz:

Responsive Lotteries. 150-161 - Dimitris Fotakis

, George Karakostas
, Stavros G. Kolliopoulos:
On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users. 162-173 - Martin Gairing, Rahul Savani

:
Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games. 174-185 - Gagan Goel, Vijay V. Vazirani:

A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It. 186-197 - Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen

, Peter Bro Miltersen, Troels Bjerre Sørensen:
The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements. 198-209 - Noam Hazon

, Edith Elkind:
Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting. 210-221 - Rajgopal Kannan, Costas Busch:

Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy. 222-233 - Gagan Goel, Chinmay Karande, Lei Wang:

Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations. 234-245 - Volodymyr Kuleshov, Adrian Vetta:

On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms. 246-261 - Martin Macko, Kate Larson

, L'ubos Steskal:
Braess's Paradox for Flows over Time. 262-275 - Matús Mihalák, Jan Christoph Schlegel

:
The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant. 276-287 - Elchanan Mossel

, Omer Tamuz
:
Truthful Fair Division. 288-299 - Uri Nadav, Georgios Piliouras:

No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand. 300-311 - Martin Hoefer, Alexander Skopalik:

On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria. 312-322 - Vijay V. Vazirani:

2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties. 323-334 - Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Orestis Telelis:

On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games. 335-346 - Reshef Meir, Yoram Bachrach, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:

Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games. 347-358

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