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Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings: Computing and Markets 2005
- Daniel Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm:

Computing and Markets, 3.-7. January 2005. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 05011, IBFI, Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany 2005 - Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:

Congestion games with failures. - Hongwei Gui, Rudolf Müller, Rakesh V. Vohra:

Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types. - Kazuo Murota:

Fundamentals in Discrete Convex Analysis. - Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:

Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party Computations. - Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin:

Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation. - Rudolf Müller, Andrés Perea, Sascha Wolf:

A Network Approach to Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatible Mechanisms. - Robert W. Day, S. Raghavan:

Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions. - Kevin Leyton-Brown, Navin A. R. Bhat:

Computing Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph Games. - Daniel Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm:

05011 Executive Summary - Computing and Markets. - Daniel Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm:

05011 Abstracts Collection - Computing and Markets. - Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:

The Value of Correlation in Strategic Form Games. - Edward J. Anderson, Frank Kelly, Richard Steinberg:

A Contract and Balancing Mechanism for Sharing Capacity in a Communication Network. - Henner Gimpel:

Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining. - Anna Osepayshvili, Michael P. Wellman, Daniel M. Reeves, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason:

Self-Confirming Price Prediction for Bidding in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions. - Kevin Leyton-Brown, Moshe Tennenholtz:

Local-Effect Games. - Martin Gairing, Thomas Lücking, Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien:

The Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Social Cost. - Rainer Feldmann:

Selfish Routing of Splittable Flow with Respect to Maximum Congestion. - Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham:

Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions. - Alon Altman:

The PageRank Axioms. - Tuomas Sandholm:

Automated Mechanism Design.

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