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ORCID2. AMMA 2011: New York, NY, USA
- Peter Coles, Sanmay Das, Sébastien Lahaie, Boleslaw K. Szymanski:
Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications - Second International ICST Conference, AMMA 2011, New York, NY, USA, August 22-23, 2011, Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 80, Springer 2012, ISBN 978-3-642-30912-0
Market Design and Interfaces
- Eduardo M. Azevedo, Eric Budish:
Strategyproofness for "Price Takers" as a Desideratum for Market Design. 1 - Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz, Kamal Jain, Mary Czerwinski, Desney S. Tan:
Market User Interface Design - (Extended Abstract). 2-4 - Florian Teschner, Christof Weinhardt
:
Evaluating Hidden Market Design. 5-17 - David Rothschild:
Expectations: Point-Estimates, Probability Distributions, Confidence, and Forecasts. 18
Internet and Information Markets
- Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated Market Makers That Enable New Settings: Extending Constant-Utility Cost Functions. 19-30 - Mithun Chakraborty, Sanmay Das, Allen Lavoie, Malik Magdon-Ismail, Yonatan Naamad:
Instructor Rating Markets. 31-32 - Yeon-Koo Che, Syngjoo Choi, Jinwoo Kim:
An Experimental Study of Sponsored-Search Auctions. 33 - Mike Ruberry, Sven Seuken:
Sharing in BitTorrent Can Be Rational - (Extended Abstract). 34-35
Combinatorial Mechanisms
- Riko Jacob, Tobias Scheffel, Georg Ziegler, Martin Bichler:
Hierarchical Package Bidding: Computational Complexity and Bidder Behavior. 36-37 - Martin Bichler, Pasha Shabalin, Jürgen Wolf:
Efficiency, Auctioneer Revenue, and Bidding Behavior in the Combinatorial Clock Auction. 38-39 - Michael Benisch, Tuomas Sandholm:
A Framework for Automated Bundling and Pricing Using Purchase Data. 40-52
Auction Theory
- Pablo Daniel Azar, Jing Chen, Silvio Micali:
Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions - (Abstract). 53 - Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed:
Approximation of Large Games with Applications to Uniform Price Auctions. 54 - Ron Lavi, Sigal Oren:
Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case. 55 - Ruggiero Cavallo:
Improving Allocations through Revenue Redistribution in Auctions with Entry. 56
Matching and Double Auctions
- Jinpeng Ma, Qiongling Li:
Bubbles, Crashes and Efficiency with Double Auction Mechanisms. 57 - Yan Chen, Onur Kesten:
From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on a Family of School Choice Mechanisms. 58-59 - Aytek Erdil, Taro Kumano:
Stability and Efficiency in the General-Priority-Based Assignment - (Extended Abstract). 60-61 - Farshad Fatemi:
The Regulated Market for Kidneys in Iran. 62-75
Novel Applications
- Dries R. Goossens, Sander Onderstal, Frits C. R. Spieksma:
Solids - A Combinatorial Auction for a Housing Corporation. 76-87 - Matteo Vasirani, Sascha Ossowski:
A Computational Monetary Market for Plug-In Electric Vehicle Charging. 88-99 - Valentin Robu, Sebastian Stein, Enrico H. Gerding, David C. Parkes, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings:
An Online Mechanism for Multi-speed Electric Vehicle Charging. 100-112
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