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ORCIDJournal of Economic Theory, Volume 146
Volume 146, Number 1, January 2011
- David M. Frankel
, Oscar Volij:
Measuring school segregation. 1-38 - Gabriel Felbermayr, Julien Prat, Hans-Jörg Schmerer:
Globalization and labor market outcomes: Wage bargaining, search frictions, and firm heterogeneity. 39-73 - Cheng Wang:
Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model. 74-110 - Marcin Peski:
Prior symmetry, similarity-based reasoning, and endogenous categorization. 111-140 - Volker Nocke, Martin Peitz, Frank Rosar:
Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device. 141-162 - Chao Gu:
Herding and bank runs. 163-188 - Pablo F. Beker, Emilio Espino:
The dynamics of efficient asset trading with heterogeneous beliefs. 189-229 - Jakub Steiner, Colin Stewart:
Communication, timing, and common learning. 230-247 - Ronald Stauber:
Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity. 248-274 - Hans Gersbach, Hans Haller:
Groups, collective decisions and markets. 275-299 - Willemien Kets:
Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games. 300-325 - Rodrigo A. Velez:
Are incentives against economic justice? 326-345
- Chiaki Hara, James Huang, Christoph Kuzmics:
Effects of background risks on cautiousness with an application to a portfolio choice problem. 346-358 - Sotiris Georganas, John H. Kagel:
Asymmetric auctions with resale: An experimental study. 359-371 - Jingyuan Li:
The demand for a risky asset in the presence of a background risk. 372-391 - Caterina Calsamiglia, Guillaume Haeringer, Flip Klijn:
A comment on "School choice: An experimental study" [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]. 392-396
- Yan Chen, Tayfun Sönmez:
Corrigendum to "School choice: An experimental study" [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]. 397-399
Volume 146, Number 2, March 2011
- Ying Chen:
Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers. 401-424 - Philippe Choné, Guy Laroque:
Optimal taxation in the extensive model. 425-453 - Alessio Figalli, Young-Heon Kim, Robert J. McCann:
When is multidimensional screening a convex program? 454-478 - Mehmet Ekmekci:
Sustainable reputations with rating systems. 479-503 - Valérie Lechene, Ian Preston:
Noncooperative household demand. 504-527 - Levon Barseghyan, Ani Guerdjikova:
Institutions and growth in limited access societies. 528-568 - Angelo Antoci, Marcello Galeotti, Paolo Russu:
Poverty trap and global indeterminacy in a growth model with open-access natural resources. 569-591 - Özgür Yilmaz:
Kidney exchange: An egalitarian mechanism. 592-618 - Michael Schwarz, M. Bumin Yenmez:
Median stable matching for markets with wages. 619-637 - Maxwell B. Stinchcombe:
Correlated equilibrium existence for infinite games with type-dependent strategies. 638-655 - Maxwell B. Stinchcombe:
Balance and discontinuities in infinite games with type-dependent strategies. 656-671 - Hannu Vartiainen:
Dynamic coalitional equilibrium. 672-698 - Reyer Gerlagh, Matti Liski:
Strategic resource dependence. 699-727 - Leandro Nascimento, Gil Riella:
A class of incomplete and ambiguity averse preferences. 728-750
- Yi-Chun Chen, Siyang Xiong:
The genericity of beliefs-determine-preferences models revisited. 751-761 - Ehud Lehrer, Roee Teper:
Justifiable preferences. 762-774
Volume 146, Number 3, May 2011
- Dean Corbae, Ramon Marimon:
Introduction to Incompleteness and Uncertainty in Economics. 775-784 - Aloisio Araujo, Rodrigo Novinski, Mário R. Páscoa:
General equilibrium, wariness and efficient bubbles. 785-811 - Per Krusell, Toshihiko Mukoyama, Anthony A. Smith Jr.:
Asset prices in a Huggett economy. 812-844 - Francisco J. Buera, Yongseok Shin:
Self-insurance vs. self-financing: A welfare analysis of the persistence of shocks. 845-862 - George-Marios Angeletos, Vasia Panousi:
Financial integration, entrepreneurial risk and global dynamics. 863-896 - Mark Huggett, Greg Kaplan:
Human capital values and returns: Bounds implied by earnings and asset returns data. 897-919 - Dirk Krueger, Fabrizio Perri:
Public versus private risk sharing. 920-956 - Tobias Broer:
Crowding out and crowding in: When does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies? 957-975 - Ramon Marimon, Vincenzo Quadrini:
Competition, human capital and income inequality with limited commitment. 976-1008 - Daron Acemoglu, Mikhail Golosov, Aleh Tsyvinski:
Power fluctuations and political economy. 1009-1041 - Weerachart T. Kilenthong, Robert M. Townsend:
Information-constrained optima with retrading: An externality and its market-based solution. 1042-1077 - Piero Gottardi, Felix Kubler:
Social security and risk sharing. 1078-1106 - Per Krusell, Toshihiko Mukoyama, Richard Rogerson, Aysegül Sahin:
A three state model of worker flows in general equilibrium. 1107-1133 - Truman F. Bewley:
Knightian decision theory and econometric inferences. 1134-1147 - Giuseppe Lopomo, Luca Rigotti, Chris Shannon:
Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard. 1148-1172 - Tomasz Strzalecki, Jan Werner:
Efficient allocations under ambiguity. 1173-1194 - Lars Peter Hansen, Thomas J. Sargent:
Robustness and ambiguity in continuous time. 1195-1223 - Klaus Adam, Albert Marcet:
Internal rationality, imperfect market knowledge and asset prices. 1224-1252 - Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Olivier Tercieux:
Rationalizable implementation. 1253-1274
Volume 146, Number 4, July 2011
- Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci, Luigi Montrucchio:
Uncertainty averse preferences. 1275-1330 - Árpád Ábrahám, Sebastian Koehne, Nicola Pavoni:
On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending. 1331-1361 - Wioletta Dziuda:
Strategic argumentation. 1362-1397 - Oleksii Birulin, Sergei Izmalkov:
On efficiency of the English auction. 1398-1417 - H. Henry Cao, Bing Han, David Hirshleifer:
Taking the road less traveled by: Does conversation eradicate pernicious cascades? 1418-1436 - John Duffy, Alexander Matros, Ted Temzelides:
Competitive behavior in market games: Evidence and theory. 1437-1463 - Johanna M. M. Goertz, François Maniquet:
On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules. 1464-1480 - Felix Brandt:
Minimal stable sets in tournaments. 1481-1499 - Martin Ellison, Joseph Pearlman:
Saddlepath learning. 1500-1519 - Gaetano Bloise, Pietro Reichlin:
Asset prices, debt constraints and inefficiency. 1520-1546 - Günter Franke, Harris Schlesinger, Richard C. Stapleton:
Risk taking with additive and multiplicative background risks. 1547-1568 - Andrés Carvajal, Herakles M. Polemarchakis:
Idiosyncratic risk and financial policy. 1569-1597 - Min Dai, Hanqing Jin, Hong Liu:
Illiquidity, position limits, and optimal investment for mutual funds. 1598-1630 - Nancy H. Chau, Rolf Färe:
Shadow pricing market access: A trade benefit function approach. 1631-1663
- Drew Fudenberg, Yuichi Yamamoto:
The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring. 1664-1683 - Jürgen Eichberger, Simon Grant, David Kelsey, Gleb A. Koshevoy:
The α-MEU model: A comment. 1684-1698 - Robin Mason, Juuso Välimäki:
Learning about the arrival of sales. 1699-1711 - Rene Saran:
Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle. 1712-1720 - Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein:
Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability. 1721-1731
Volume 146, Number 5, September 2011
- Drew Fudenberg, Yuichi Yamamoto:
Learning from private information in noisy repeated games. 1733-1769 - Johannes Hörner, Stefano Lovo, Tristan Tomala:
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence. 1770-1795 - Ratul Lahkar:
The dynamic instability of dispersed price equilibria. 1796-1827 - Levon Barseghyan, Riccardo DiCecio:
Entry costs, industry structure, and cross-country income and TFP differences. 1828-1851 - Aleksander Berentsen, Christopher Waller:
Outside versus inside bonds: A Modigliani-Miller type result for liquidity constrained economies. 1852-1887 - Antonia Díaz, Fernando Perera-Tallo:
Credit and inflation under borrowerʼs lack of commitment. 1888-1914 - Leo Ferraris, Makoto Watanabe:
Collateral fluctuations in a monetary economy. 1915-1940 - Daniel Sanches:
A dynamic model of unsecured credit. 1941-1964 - Gabriel Y. Weintraub, C. Lanier Benkard, Benjamin Van Roy:
Industry dynamics: Foundations for models with an infinite number of firms. 1965-1994 - Geoffroy de Clippel, Camelia Bejan:
No profitable decompositions in quasi-linear allocation problems. 1995-2012 - Russell Golman:
Quantal response equilibria with heterogeneous agents. 2013-2028 - Colin Stewart:
Nonmanipulable Bayesian testing. 2029-2041 - Daniel Engelage:
Optimal stopping with dynamic variational preferences. 2042-2074 - An Chen, Antoon Pelsser, Michel Vellekoop:
Modeling non-monotone risk aversion using SAHARA utility functions. 2075-2092
- Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Stephen Morris:
The robustness of robust implementation. 2093-2104 - Felix J. Bierbrauer:
On the optimality of optimal income taxation. 2105-2116 - Tomasz Strzalecki:
Probabilistic sophistication and variational preferences. 2117-2125 - Helga Habis, P. Jean-Jacques Herings:
Transferable utility games with uncertainty. 2126-2139 - Kazuya Kamiya, Takashi Shimizu:
Stationary monetary equilibria with strictly increasing value functions and non-discrete money holdings distributions: An indeterminacy result. 2140-2150 - Emin Dokumaci, William H. Sandholm:
Large deviations and multinomial probit choice. 2151-2158 - Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz:
Comment on "Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents" [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210-217]. 2159-2164 - Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Johannes Kern, Klaus Ritzberger:
Comment on "Trees and extensive forms" [J. Econ. Theory 143 (1) (2008) 216-250]. 2165-2168
Volume 146, Number 6, November 2011
- Ricardo Lagos, Guillaume Rocheteau, Pierre-Olivier Weill:
Crises and liquidity in over-the-counter markets. 2169-2205 - Ryan Oprea, Keith Henwood, Daniel Friedman:
Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games. 2206-2225 - Jörg Stoye:
Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences. 2226-2251 - Han N. Ozsoylev, Johan Waldén:
Asset pricing in large information networks. 2252-2280 - Marek Weretka:
Endogenous market power. 2281-2306 - April M. Franco, Matthew Mitchell, Galina Vereshchagina:
Incentives and the structure of teams. 2307-2332 - Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst:
Pre-sale information. 2333-2355 - Borys Grochulski, Yuzhe Zhang:
Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment. 2356-2388 - Rabah Amir, Natalia Lazzati:
Network effects, market structure and industry performance. 2389-2419 - Audrey Hu, Theo Offerman, Liang Zou:
Premium auctions and risk preferences. 2420-2439 - Brice Magdalou, Richard Nock:
Income distributions and decomposable divergence measures. 2440-2454 - Pascal Mossay, Pierre Picard:
On spatial equilibria in a social interaction model. 2455-2477 - Christian Ghiglino, Alain Venditti:
Wealth distribution and output fluctuations. 2478-2509 - Juuso Toikka:
Ironing without control. 2510-2526
- Dirk Bergemann, Karl H. Schlag:
Robust monopoly pricing. 2527-2543 - Michael Hoy, Buhong Zheng:
Measuring lifetime poverty. 2544-2562 - Hervé Crès, Itzhak Gilboa, Nicolas Vieille:
Aggregation of multiple prior opinions. 2563-2582 - Takashi Kunimoto, Roberto Serrano:
A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies. 2583-2595 - Nora Szech:
Optimal advertising of auctions. 2596-2607 - Elchanan Ben-Porath, Aviad Heifetz:
Common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in economies with asymmetric information. 2608-2626
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