Stop the war!Остановите войну!
for scientists:
default search action
Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCIDJournal of Economic Theory, Volume 132
Volume 132, Number 1, January 2007
- Biung-Ghi Ju
, Eiichi Miyagawa, Toyotaka Sakai:
Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations. 1-26 - Antoni Calvó-Armengol, Matthew O. Jackson:
Networks in labor markets: Wage and employment dynamics and inequality. 27-46 - Josef Hofbauer, William H. Sandholm:
Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs. 47-69 - Archishman Chakraborty, Rick Harbaugh:
Comparative cheap talk. 70-94 - Sven de Vries, James Schummer, Rakesh V. Vohra:
On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects. 95-118 - Michael Landsberger:
Non-existence of monotone equilibria in games with correlated signals. 119-136 - André de Palma, Karim Kilani:
Invariance of conditional maximum utility. 137-146 - Guillermo Caruana, Liran Einav, Daniel Quint:
Multilateral bargaining with concession costs. 147-166 - Edi Karni:
Foundations of Bayesian theory. 167-188 - Roberto Veneziani:
Exploitation and time. 189-207 - Szilvia Pápai:
Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods. 208-235 - Kfir Eliaz, Debraj Ray, Ronny Razin:
Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement. 236-273 - Andreas Blume, Andreas Ortmann:
The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. 274-290 - Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano:
Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory. 291-305 - Koichi Futagami, Tatsuro Iwaisako:
Dynamic analysis of patent policy in an endogenous growth model. 306-334 - Debasis Mishra, David C. Parkes:
Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations. 335-366 - William H. Sandholm:
Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation. 367-382 - Alan W. Beggs:
Large deviations and equilibrium selection in large populations. 383-410 - Hippolyte d'Albis:
Demographic structure and capital accumulation. 411-434 - Takashi Kamihigashi, Santanu Roy:
A nonsmooth, nonconvex model of optimal growth. 435-460
- Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine:
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games. 461-473 - Ernesto Savaglio, Stefano Vannucci:
Filtral preorders and opportunity inequality. 474-492 - Erzo G. J. Luttmer, Thomas Mariotti:
Efficiency and equilibrium when preferences are time-inconsistent. 493-506 - Matthew O. Jackson, Ilan Kremer:
On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions. 507-517 - Michael T. Rauh:
Nonstandard foundations of equilibrium search models. 518-529 - María Elena Iñarra García, María Concepción Larrea Jaurrieta, Ana Isabel Saracho de la Torre:
The supercore for normal-form games. 530-538 - Aradhna Krishna, Yu Wang:
The relationship between top trading cycles mechanism and top trading cycles and chains mechanism. 539-547 - Jonathan Hamilton, Steven Slutsky:
Optimal nonlinear income taxation with a finite population. 548-556 - Larry Karp:
Non-constant discounting in continuous time. 557-568 - Nicolas Gravel, Sylvie Thoron:
Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification? 569-583 - R. Vijay Krishna:
Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players. 584-592
a service of 
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
last updated on 2024-05-10 19:43 CEST by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint
dblp was originally created in 1993 at:
since 2018, dblp has been operated and maintained by:
the dblp computer science bibliography is funded and supported by:
