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ORCIDInternational Journal of Game Theory, Volume 26
Volume 26, Number 1, March 1997
- Javier Arin, Vincent Feltkamp:
The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games. 61-73 - Daniel Granot, Michael Maschler:
The reactive bargaining set: Structure, dynamics and extension to NTU games. 75-95 - Harry Aarts, Kees Hoede, Yukihiko Funaki:
A marginalistic value for monotonic set games. 97-111 - Amnon Rapoport:
Order of play in strategically equivalent games in extensive form. 113-136 - Andrzej S. Nowak:
On an axiomatization of the banzhaf value without the additivity axiom. 137-141
Volume 26, Number 2, June 1997
- Peter Sudhölter
:
The modified nucleolus: Properties and axiomatizations. 147-182 - Bert Fristedt:
The deceptive number changing game, in the absence of symmetry. 183-191 - Jean Derks, Jeroen Kuipers:
On the core of routing games. 193-205 - Daniel Granot, Frieda Granot, Weiping R. Zhu:
The reactive bargaining set of some flow games and of superadditive simple games. 207-214 - Andrey Garnaev, G. Garnaeva, P. Goutal:
On the infiltration game. 215-221 - Abraham Neyman:
Correlated equilibrium and potential games. 223-227 - Leeat Yariv:
A note on repeated games with non-monotonie value. 229-234 - Ton Storcken:
Effectivity functions and simple games. 235-248 - Jingang Zhao:
A cooperative analysis of covert collusion in oligopolistic industries. 249-266 - Paolo Cubiotti:
Existence of nash equilibria for generalized games without upper semicontinuity. 267-273 - John Hillas, Dries Vermeulen, Mathijs Jansen:
On the finiteness of stable sets. 275-278
Volume 26, Number 3, October 1997
- Ken-Ichi Shimomura:
Quasi-Cores in Bargaining sets. 283-302 - János Flesch, Frank Thuijsman, Koos Vrieze:
Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games. 303-314 - Massimo Marinacci:
Finitely additive and epsilon Nash equilibria. 315-333 - Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé Machover:
Ternary voting games. 335-351 - Thomas Quint, Martin Shubik:
A theorem on the number of Nash equilibria in a bimatrix game. 353-359 - Ulrich Faigle, Walter Kern, Sándor P. Fekete, Winfried Hochstättler:
On the complexity of testing membership in the core of min-cost spanning tree games. 361-366 - Jeroen Kuipers:
Minimum cost forest games. 367-377 - Parkash Chander, Henry Tulkens:
The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities. 379-401 - Frank Thuijsman, Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan:
Perfect information stochastic games and related classes. 403-408 - Ulrich Kamecke:
Rotations: Matching schemes that efficiently preserve the best reply structure of a one shot game. 409-417
Volume 26, Number 4, December 1997
- Elaine Bennett, Michael Maschler, William R. Zame:
A demand adjustment process. 423-438 - Amit Pazgal:
Satisficing leads to cooperation in mutual interests games. 439-453 - Yves Sprumont:
On the game-theoretic structure of public-good economies. 455-472 - Stephen Ching:
Strategy-proofness and "median voters". 473-490 - Carles Rafels, Stef Tijs:
On the Cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set. 491-499 - Clara Ponsati, Joel Watson:
Multiple-issue bargaining and axiomatic solutions. 501-524 - Ross Cressman:
Dynamic stability in symmetric extensive form games. 525-547 - Maria Saez-Marti:
On the asymptotic convergence to mixed equilibria in 2×2 asymmetric games. 549-559 - John M. Rulnick, Lloyd S. Shapley:
Convex covers of symmetric games. 561-577 - Mark B. Cronshaw, Levon S. Kazarian:
Some bounds for Markov chains. 579-582
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