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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 91
Volume 91, May 2015
- Ye Du, Ehud Lehrer, Ady Pauzner
:
Competitive economy as a ranking device over networks. 1-13 - Adrian de Groot Ruiz, Theo Offerman, Sander Onderstal:
Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games. 14-25 - Wei He, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
Discontinuous games with asymmetric information: An extension of Reny's existence theorem. 26-35
- Qianfeng Tang:
Interim partially correlated rationalizability. 36-44
- Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite:
Plausible cooperation. 45-59 - Pauli Murto, Juuso Välimäki:
Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders. 60-74 - Elisabetta Iossa, David Martimort:
Pessimistic information gathering. 75-96 - Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán González, Stephen J. Rassenti:
Firing threats: Incentive effects and impression management. 97-113 - Ernest K. Lai, Wooyoung Lim, Joseph Tao-Yi Wang:
An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk. 114-144 - Geoffroy de Clippel, Kfir Eliaz:
Strategic disclosure of feasible options. 145-165 - Itai Arieli, Yehuda John Levy:
Determinacy of games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring. 166-185 - Matt Van Essen, John Wooders:
Blind stealing: Experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment. 186-206 - Cheng Wang, Youzhi Yang:
Outside opportunities and termination. 207-228 - Georgy Artemov:
Time and Nash implementation. 229-236 - Salvador Barberà, Carmen Beviá, Clara Ponsati:
Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations. 237-257
- Makoto Shimoji, Paul Schweinzer:
Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners. 258-267 - Ratul Lahkar, Frank Riedel:
The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets. 268-282
- Yan Chen, Tim Roughgarden:
Special Section of Games and Economic Behavior dedicated to the 11th and 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 283 - Itai Ashlagi, Felix A. Fischer, Ian A. Kash, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange. 284-296 - Shuchi Chawla, David L. Malec, Balasubramanian Sivan:
The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design. 297-317 - Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Tim Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan:
Revenue maximization with a single sample. 318-333 - Arpita Ghosh, Aaron Roth:
Selling privacy at auction. 334-346 - Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Polynomial-time computation of exact correlated equilibrium in compact games. 347-359 - Panos Toulis, David C. Parkes:
Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs. 360-382
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