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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 87
Volume 87, September 2014
- Rosario Macera
:
Dynamic beliefs. 1-18 - Luís Vasconcelos:
Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements. 19-33 - George Kanatas, Christodoulos Stefanadis:
Ethics, welfare, and capital markets. 34-49 - David Eil, Jaimie W. Lien:
Staying ahead and getting even: Risk attitudes of experienced poker players. 50-69 - Christina Aperjis, Richard J. Zeckhauser, Yali Miao:
Variable temptations and black mark reputations. 70-90 - Jose Apesteguia, Miguel A. Ballester, Yusufcan Masatlioglu:
A foundation for strategic agenda voting. 91-99 - Luís Cabral, Erkut Y. Ozbay, Andrew Schotter:
Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: An experimental study. 100-121 - Mariana Blanco, Dirk Engelmann, Alexander K. Koch, Hans-Theo Normann:
Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis. 122-135 - M. Laclau:
Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring. 136-160 - József Sákovics:
Price formation in a matching market with targeted offers. 161-177 - Christos A. Ioannou, Julian Romero:
A generalized approach to belief learning in repeated games. 178-203 - Daniel Monte:
Learning with bounded memory in games. 204-223 - Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Roman M. Sheremeta, Theodore L. Turocy:
Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules. 224-238 - Dominik Karos:
Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices. 239-252 - Alfredo Di Tillio, Joseph Y. Halpern, Dov Samet:
Conditional belief types. 253-268 - Keisuke Bando:
On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm. 269-287 - Gil Riella, Roee Teper:
Probabilistic dominance and status quo bias. 288-304 - Uriel Feige, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On fair division of a homogeneous good. 305-321 - Gary Charness, Ramón Cobo-Reyes, Natalia Jiménez:
Identities, selection, and contributions in a public-goods game. 322-338 - Jens Leth Hougaard, Hervé Moulin:
Sharing the cost of redundant items. 339-352 - Tore Ellingsen, Topi Miettinen:
Tough negotiations: Bilateral bargaining with durable commitments. 353-366 - David Hugh-Jones, Morimitsu Kurino, Christoph Vanberg:
An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism. 367-380 - Braz Camargo:
Learning in society. 381-396 - Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Simon Weidenholzer:
Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures. 397-411
- Lucas J. Maestri:
The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations. 412-418
- Shintaro Miura:
Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages. 419-441 - Alan Gelder:
From Custer to Thermopylae: Last stand behavior in multi-stage contests. 442-466 - Christoph Brunner, Audrey Hu, Jörg Oechssler:
Premium auctions and risk preferences: An experimental study. 467-484 - Masaki Aoyagi:
Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters. 485-496
- Andrei Dubovik, Alexei Parakhonyak:
Drugs, guns, and targeted competition. 497-507
- Tsuyoshi Adachi:
A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites. 508-518 - Erik Eyster, Andrea Galeotti, Navin Kartik, Matthew Rabin:
Congested observational learning. 519-538 - Jens Leth Hougaard, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Lars Peter Østerdal:
Assigning agents to a line. 539-553 - Jonathan Lafky:
Why do people rate? Theory and evidence on online ratings. 554-570 - Irem Bozbay, Franz Dietrich, Hans Peters:
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth. 571-590 - Peter Coles, Ran I. Shorrer:
Optimal truncation in matching markets. 591-615 - Maciej H. Kotowski, Shiran Rachmilevitch:
Bribing in first-price auctions: Corrigendum. 616-618
- Dimitrios Xefteris:
Mixed equilibria in runoff elections. 619-623 - Antonio Romero-Medina, Matteo Triossi:
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets. 624-630 - Daniel F. Garrett:
Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement. 631-641 - Nenad Kos:
Asking questions. 642-650
- Elchanan Ben-Porath:
Game Theory, Michael Maschler, Eilon Solan, Shmuel Zamir. Cambridge University Press (2013). 651-652 - David K. Levine:
Simple Adaptive Strategies: From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell. World Scientific Publishing Company, Singapore (2013). 652-653
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