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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 86
Volume 86, July 2014
- Hector Chade, Virginia N. Vera de Serio:
Wealth effects and agency costs. 1-11
- Paolo Masella, Stephan Meier, Philipp Zahn:
Incentives and group identity. 12-25 - Wonki Jo Cho
:
Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies. 26-39 - Juan A. Lacomba, Francisco M. Lagos, Ernesto Reuben, Frans van Winden:
On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict. 40-57
- Katsuhiko Aiba:
A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring. 58-66 - Dieter Balkenborg, Dries Vermeulen:
Universality of Nash components. 67-76
- Jona Linde, Joep Sonnemans, Jan Tuinstra:
Strategies and evolution in the minority game: A multi-round strategy experiment. 77-95
- Tsuyoshi Adachi:
Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems. 96-101
- Yves Breitmoser, Jonathan H. W. Tan, Daniel John Zizzo:
On the beliefs off the path: Equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-k. 102-125 - Elias Tsakas:
Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies. 126-144 - Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, Nicolás Porteiro:
Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts. 145-164 - Tommy Andersson, Jens Gudmundsson, Dolf Talman, Zaifu Yang:
A competitive partnership formation process. 165-177 - Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski:
On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols. 178-183 - Wanchuan Lin, Yiming Liu, Juanjuan Meng:
The crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing: An experimental study. 184-211 - Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng:
Random dictatorship domains. 212-236 - Axel Ockenfels, Reinhard Selten:
Impulse balance in the newsvendor game. 237-247 - Mark Satterthwaite, Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E. Zachariadis:
Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions. 248-263 - Francesco Brindisi, Bogaçhan Çelen, Kyle Hyndman:
The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: An experimental study. 264-281 - Rafael Costa Lima, Humberto Moreira:
Information transmission and inefficient lobbying. 282-307 - Dmitry Shapiro, Xianwen Shi, Artie Zillante:
Level-k reasoning in a generalized beauty contest. 308-329
- Christian Seel:
The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions. 330-338
- Michal Feldman, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Introduction. 339 - Aaron Archer, Robert Kleinberg:
Truthful germs are contagious: A local-to-global characterization of truthfulness. 340-366 - Ning Chen, Arpita Ghosh, Nicolas S. Lambert:
Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis. 367-391 - Geoffroy de Clippel, Victor Naroditskiy, Maria Polukarov, Amy Greenwald, Nicholas R. Jennings:
Destroy to save. 392-404 - Mathijs Michiel de Weerdt, Paul Harrenstein, Vincent Conitzer:
Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties. 405-420 - Renato Gomes, Kane S. Sweeney:
Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction. 421-437 - Ronen Gradwohl, Omer Reingold:
Fault tolerance in large games. 438-457 - Shaili Jain, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes:
Designing incentives for online question-and-answer forums. 458-474 - Hervé Moulin:
Pricing traffic in a spanning network. 475-490 - Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre:
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification. 491-509
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