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ORCID10th WINE 2014: Beijing, China
- Tie-Yan Liu, Qi Qi
, Yinyu Ye:
Web and Internet Economics - 10th International Conference, WINE 2014, Beijing, China, December 14-17, 2014. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8877, Springer 2014, ISBN 978-3-319-13128-3
Regular Papers
- Haris Aziz, Chun Ye:
Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise Constant and Piecewise Uniform Valuations. 1-14 - Melika Abolhassani, MohammadHossein Bateni, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Hamid Mahini, Anshul Sawant:
Network Cournot Competition. 15-29 - Matthias Feldotto, Martin Gairing, Alexander Skopalik:
Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria. 30-43 - Ludek Cigler, Wolfgang Dvorák, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger:
Limiting Price Discrimination when Selling Products with Positive Network Externalities. 44-57 - Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Rahul Savani, Paul G. Spirakis:
Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Games. 58-71 - Vasilis Gkatzelis, Konstantinos Kollias, Tim Roughgarden:
Optimal Cost-Sharing in Weighted Congestion Games. 72-88 - Hau Chan, Jing Chen:
Truthful Multi-unit Procurements with Budgets. 89-105 - Smriti Bhagat, Anthony Kim, S. Muthukrishnan, Udi Weinsberg:
The Shapley Value in Knapsack Budgeted Games. 106-119 - Dennis Kraft, Salman Fadaei, Martin Bichler:
Fast Convex Decomposition for Truthful Social Welfare Approximation. 120-132 - Nicolas Bousquet, Sergey Norin, Adrian Vetta:
A Near-Optimal Mechanism for Impartial Selection. 133-146 - Kamesh Munagala, Xiaoming Xu:
Value-Based Network Externalities and Optimal Auction Design. 147-160 - Martin Hoefer, Lisa Wagner:
Matching Dynamics with Constraints. 161-174 - Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Peter Bro Miltersen:
Truthful Approximations to Range Voting. 175-188 - Tobias Harks, Max Klimm, Britta Peis:
Resource Competition on Integral Polymatroids. 189-202 - Jaroslaw Byrka, Krzysztof Sornat:
PTAS for Minimax Approval Voting. 203-217 - Gagan Aggarwal, Yang Cai, Aranyak Mehta, George Pierrakos:
Biobjective Online Bipartite Matching. 218-231 - Yash Kanoria, Hamid Nazerzadeh:
Dynamic Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions: Learning from Bids - Working Paper. 232 - Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi, Piotr Sankowski, Qiang Zhang:
Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Fixed-Price Auctions with Budgets. 233-246 - Salman Fadaei, Martin Bichler:
A Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment Problem. 247-248 - Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass, Lior Seeman:
Not Just an Empty Threat: Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Repeated Games Played by Computationally Bounded Players. 249-262 - Arash Asadpour, MohammadHossein Bateni, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Vahab S. Mirrokni:
Concise Bid Optimization Strategies with Multiple Budget Constraints. 263-276 - Shaddin Dughmi, Li Han, Noam Nisan:
Sampling and Representation Complexity of Revenue Maximization. 277-291 - Gerardo Berbeglia, Peter Sloan, Adrian Vetta:
Bounds on the Profitability of a Durable Good Monopolist. 292-293 - Ruta Mehta, Nithum Thain, László A. Végh, Adrian Vetta:
To Save Or Not To Save: The Fisher Game. 294-307 - Edith Elkind:
Coalitional Games on Sparse Social Networks. 308-321 - Munther A. Dahleh, John N. Tsitsiklis, Spyros I. Zoumpoulis:
The Value of Temporally Richer Data for Learning of Influence Networks. 322-323 - Gagan Goel, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Mohammad Reza Khani:
Randomized Revenue Monotone Mechanisms for Online Advertising. 324-337 - Maria-Florina Balcan, Amit Daniely, Ruta Mehta, Ruth Urner, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Learning Economic Parameters from Revealed Preferences. 338-353 - Rafael M. Frongillo, Ian A. Kash:
General Truthfulness Characterizations via Convex Analysis. 354-370 - Yiling Chen, Or Sheffet, Salil P. Vadhan:
Privacy Games. 371-385 - Rad Niazadeh, Yang Yuan, Robert D. Kleinberg:
Simple and Near-Optimal Mechanisms for Market Intermediation. 386-399 - Ruggiero Cavallo, Christopher A. Wilkens:
GSP with General Independent Click-through-Rates. 400-416
Short Papers
- Patrick Hummel, R. Preston McAfee:
Position Auctions with Externalities. 417-422 - Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Alexander Mäcker, Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide:
Quality of Service in Network Creation Games. 423-428 - Jasper de Jong, Marc Uetz:
The Sequential Price of Anarchy for Atomic Congestion Games. 429-434 - Sebastian Abshoff, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung, Alexander Skopalik:
Multilevel Network Games. 435-440 - Krzysztof R. Apt, Mona Rahn, Guido Schäfer, Sunil Simon:
Coordination Games on Graphs (Extended Abstract). 441-446 - Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Federico Echenique, Adam Wierman:
On the Existence of Low-Rank Explanations for Mixed Strategy Behavior. 447-452 - Max Klimm, Andreas Schütz:
Congestion Games with Higher Demand Dimensions. 453-459 - Junpei Komiyama, Tao Qin:
Time-Decaying Bandits for Non-stationary Systems. 460-466 - Jugal Garg:
Market Equilibrium under Piecewise Leontief Concave Utilities - [Extended Abstract]. 467-473 - Qizhi Fang, Bo Li, Xiaoming Sun, Jia Zhang, Jialin Zhang:
Computing the Least-Core and Nucleolus for Threshold Cardinality Matching Games. 474-479 - Martin Gairing, Grammateia Kotsialou, Alexander Skopalik:
Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games. 480-485 - Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli:
Nash Stability in Fractional Hedonic Games. 486-491 - Sanmay Das, Zhuoshu Li:
The Role of Common and Private Signals in Two-Sided Matching with Interviews. 492-497
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