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ORCID3rd WINE 2007: San Diego, CA, USA
- Xiaotie Deng, Fan Chung Graham:
Internet and Network Economics, Third International Workshop, WINE 2007, San Diego, CA, USA, December 12-14, 2007, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4858, Springer 2007, ISBN 978-3-540-77104-3
Invited Talks
- Kenneth J. Arrow:
Getting to Economic Equilibrium: A Problem and Its History. 1-2 - Herbert E. Scarf:
My Favorite Simplicial Complex and Some of Its Applications. 3 - Vijay V. Vazirani:
Markets and the Primal-Dual Paradigm. 4 - Christos H. Papadimitriou:
The Computation of Equilibria. 5-6
Equilibrium
- Lihua Chen, Yinyu Ye, Jiawei Zhang:
A Note on Equilibrium Pricing as Convex Optimization. 7-16 - Hartwig Bosse, Jaroslaw Byrka, Evangelos Markakis:
New Algorithms for Approximate Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games. 17-29 - Heiner Ackermann, Paul W. Goldberg, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Heiko Röglin
, Berthold Vöcking:
A Unified Approach to Congestion Games and Two-Sided Markets. 30-41 - Haralampos Tsaknakis, Paul G. Spirakis:
An Optimization Approach for Approximate Nash Equilibria. 42-56 - Andrew Gilpin, Samid Hoda, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm:
Gradient-Based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games. 57-69
Information Market
- Yiling Chen, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock, Robin D. Hanson, Lance Fortnow, Rica Gonen:
Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets. 70-81 - Mark Peters, Anthony Man-Cho So, Yinyu Ye:
Pari-Mutuel Markets: Mechanisms and Performance. 82-95 - Gabrielle Demange:
Information Sharing Communities. 96-107
Sponsored Auction
- Danny Kuminov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Competitive Safety Strategies in Position Auctions. 108-118 - Jennifer Wortman, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Lihong Li, John Langford:
Maintaining Equilibria During Exploration in Sponsored Search Auctions. 119-130 - S. Muthukrishnan, Martin Pál, Zoya Svitkina:
Stochastic Models for Budget Optimization in Search-Based Advertising. 131-142 - Zoë Abrams, Arpita Ghosh:
Auctions with Revenue Guarantees for Sponsored Search. 143-154 - Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Daniel M. Reeves:
Equilibrium Analysis of Dynamic Bidding in Sponsored Search Auctions. 155-166 - Li Liang, Qi Qi:
Cooperative or Vindictive: Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search Auction. 167-178
Network Economics
- Dimitris Fotakis, Paul G. Spirakis:
Cost-Balancing Tolls for Atomic Network Congestion Games. 179-190 - Esteban Arcaute, Ramesh Johari, Shie Mannor:
Network Formation: Bilateral Contracting and Myopic Dynamics. 191-207 - Heiner Ackermann, Patrick Briest, Alexander Fanghänel, Berthold Vöcking:
Who Should Pay for Forwarding Packets? 208-219 - Aristotelis Giannakos, Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Vangelis Th. Paschos:
On the Performance of Congestion Games for Optimum Satisfiability Problems. 220-231 - Alexander Hall, Evdokia Nikolova, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
Incentive-Compatible Interdomain Routing with Linear Utilities. 232-244
Mechanism Design I
- Atsushi Iwasaki, David Kempe, Yasumasa Saito, Mahyar Salek, Makoto Yokoo:
False-Name-Proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team. 245-256 - Arpita Ghosh, Mohammad Mahdian, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock, Ryan Fugger:
Mechanism Design on Trust Networks. 257-268 - Samuel Ieong, Anthony Man-Cho So, Mukund Sundararajan:
Stochastic Mechanism Design. 269-280
Social Networks
- Eyal Even-Dar, Asaf Shapira:
A Note on Maximizing the Spread of Influence in Social Networks. 281-286 - Yair Halevi, Yishay Mansour:
A Network Creation Game with Nonuniform Interests. 287-292 - Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, T.-H. Hubert Chan, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi:
A Theory of Loss-Leaders: Making Money by Pricing Below Cost. 293-299 - Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer:
PageRank as a Weak Tournament Solution. 300-305 - Shishir Bharathi, David Kempe, Mahyar Salek:
Competitive Influence Maximization in Social Networks. 306-311
Advertisement Pricing I
- Eyal Even-Dar, Michael J. Kearns, Jennifer Wortman:
Sponsored Search with Contexts. 312-317 - Sudhir Kumar Singh, Vwani P. Roychowdhury, Himawan Gunadhi, Behnam Attaran Rezaei:
Capacity Constraints and the Inevitability of Mediators in Adword Auctions. 318-325 - Zoë Abrams, Arpita Ghosh, Erik Vee:
Cost of Conciseness in Sponsored Search Auctions. 326-334 - Gagan Goel, Aranyak Mehta:
Adwords Auctions with Decreasing Valuation Bids. 335-340 - Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov:
An Adaptive Sponsored Search Mechanism delta -Gain Truthful in Valuation, Time, and Budget. 341-346
Computational General Equilibrium
- Benton McCune:
Extending Polynomial Time Computability to Markets with Demand Correspondences. 347-355 - Rahul Garg, Sanjiv Kapoor:
Market Equilibrium Using Auctions for a Class of Gross-Substitute Utilities. 356-361 - Nimrod Megiddo, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Continuity Properties of Equilibrium Prices and Allocations in Linear Fisher Markets. 362-367 - Chinmay Karande, Nikhil R. Devanur:
Computing Market Equilibrium: Beyond Weak Gross Substitutes. 368-373 - Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Nikhil R. Devanur:
On Competitiveness in Uniform Utility Allocation Markets. 374-380
Network Games
- Martin Gairing, Florian Schoppmann:
Total Latency in Singleton Congestion Games. 381-387 - Jacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, David C. Parkes:
The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games. 388-395 - Kurt Nielsen, Tomas Toft:
Secure Relative Performance Scheme. 396-403 - Stefania Di Giannantonio, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli, Mordechai Shalom, Shmuel Zaks:
Selfishness, Collusion and Power of Local Search for the ADMs Minimization Problem. 404-411 - Mohammad Hossein Falaki:
The Wi-Fi Roaming Game. 412-418
Algorithmic Issues
- Heiner Ackermann, Alexander Skopalik:
On the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific Network Congestion Games. 419-430 - David J. Abraham, Ariel Levavi, David F. Manlove, Gregg O'Malley:
The Stable Roommates Problem with Globally-Ranked Pairs. 431-444 - Kyle W. Burke, Shang-Hua Teng:
A PSPACE-complete Sperner Triangle Game. 445-456 - Ola Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Group Dominant Strategies. 457-468 - Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien, Klaus W. Wagner:
Weighted Boolean Formula Games. 469-481 - Qizhi Fang, Liang Kong:
Core Stability of Vertex Cover Games. 482-490
Mechanism Design II
- Edith Elkind, S. Shaheen Fatima:
Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions. 491-502 - Davide Bilò, Luca Forlizzi, Luciano Gualà, Guido Proietti:
Approximate Mechanisms for the Graphical TSP and Other Graph Traversal Problems. 503-514 - Yvonne Bleischwitz, Burkhard Monien, Florian Schoppmann:
To Be or Not to Be (Served). 515-528
Advertisement Pricing II
- Zoë Abrams, Michael Schwarz:
Ad Auction Design and User Experience. 529-534 - Zoë Abrams, Erik Vee:
Personalized Ad Delivery When Ads Fatigue: An Approximation Algorithm. 535-540 - Kuzman Ganchev, Alex Kulesza, Jinsong Tan, Ryan Gabbard, Qian Liu, Michael J. Kearns:
Empirical Price Modeling for Sponsored Search. 541-548 - Mohammad Mahdian, Kerem Tomak:
Pay-per-action Model for Online Advertising. 549-557 - Atish Das Sarma, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Sreenivas Gollapudi:
Public Advertisement Broker Markets. 558-563
Mechanism Design III
- Itai Ashlagi, Andrey Klinger, Moshe Tennenholtz:
K-NCC: Stability Against Group Deviations in Non-cooperative Computation. 564-569 - Aries Wei Sun:
Monotone Properties of Randomized Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions. 570-575 - Arpita Ghosh, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Mukund Sundararajan:
Computing Optimal Bundles for Sponsored Search. 576-583 - Qiqi Yan:
On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions. 584-589 - Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov:
Characterizing Truthful Market Design. 590-595
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